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Abstract 
This thesis considers the period from the establishment of regular contact between Britain 
and Bahrain in 1806 until the deposition and criminalisation of Muhammed bin Khalifah, the 
incumbent Sheikh of Bahrain, in 1869. During this period Britain attempted to supervise regional 
affairs through a mediating layer of independent Arab Chieftains who it recognised by concluding a 
General Treaty with them in 1820. This system, however, identified here as a distinct paradigm, had 
several fundamental weaknesses. The practical organisation of this system was not only unable to 
effect the ambitions of peace, stability and the preservation of a dominant British influence, it acted 
negatively against the fulfilment of these ambitions and inhibited the very aims that it had been 
designed to secure. 
In signing the General Treaty, the Al Khalifah were formally recognised as sovereign rulers, 
but they did not have the means and the resources to exercise this right, and were still subject to 
aggressions from their neighbours. Britain was thus obliged to guarantee the tenure of the Al 
Khalifah as rulers of Bahrain, or accept the overthrow and destruction of the system of independent 
rulers. If the Al Khalifah were to avoid attack from hostile parties, they were obliged to offer 
submission, and repeatedly did so, although such acts compromised their independence and Britain's 
position in the Persian Gulf Under the terms of the General Treaty, however, the British had 
forfeited their opportunity actively defend their interests by restraining the Sheikh. In recognising the 
Al Khalifah as independent chiefs, Britain was committed to non-intervention in the affairs of the 
Persian Gulf. This withdrawal from the internal affairs of Bahrain transformed the independent 
sheikhs into agents for instability that compromised Britain's authority in the Gulf. It also allowed 
the Al Khalifah to indulge in oppressions that not only destabilised the tranquillity of the Persian 
Gulf, but destroyed the internal cohesion of the ruling tribe and precipitated Civil War. 
As the nineteenth century progressed, Britain was obliged in response to these reoccurring 
and irresolvable tensions to increasingly ignore its own paradigm and disregard the independence 
of theAl Khalifah in order to preserve its essential interests. Incrementally, starting with discussions 
in 1839, Britain considered alternative options for the organisation of the Gulf and began to 
refashion its relationship outside of the nineteenth century paradigm. This process culminated in the 
assumption under an Order-in-Council of protectorate status, although the abandonment of this 
unworkable paradigm was indicated by the deposition and criminalisation of the Sheikh of Bahrain in 
1869. Bahrain's independence was ultimately sacrificed to the exigencies of British policy. In point of 
fact, however, it had been conceived as a mask for British domination of the region. This thesis 
examines the ambiguity implicit in the General Treaty and the reasons behind the failure of British 
attempts at domination in the Persian Gulf in the nineteenth century. The diktats of the General 
Treaty precluded intervention in regional affairs while due attention to British strategic interests 
demanded the exercise of a degree of control. 
The thesis is divided into five sections: Chapter I - The Early History of Bahrain & Rise of 
the Al Khalifah: Chapter Two- Pirates and Profiteers: The East India Company: Chapter Three-
Laying the Foundations: The 1820's and the General Treaty: Chapter Four- An Untimely 
Intervention: Interlopers and Invaders Chapter Five- Settling the Question: Towards a New Regional 
Order: Conclusion: Appendices: Bibliography. 122 pp. 
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I have elected to use the standardised spelling of names, places, dynasties and 
tribes laid out below in this work. The original spelling of correspondence has been 
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Introduction 
This work is a study of the development and exercise of British 
influence in Bahrain and the nineteenth century experiment with petty territorial 
powers. Other writers have examined the period from 1900 onward in which 
the modern state of Bahrain was born.' My concern is to examine the 
processes through which the institutions, individuals and ideas that underpin 
later developments emerged. It is an attempt to explore the rise to prominence 
of the Al Khalifah family, the unsuccessful British attempts in the first half of 
the nineteenth century to stabilise the Gulf with the creation of independent 
states; the reasons for the failure of this project. 
The development of the British Empire was perceived as a voluntaristic 
extension of civilisation, in which colonials, inspired by their contact with the 
English, were assisted in their imitation of English progress, culture and mores. 
Imperialism was a source of pride and standing. An ill-defined, but consistent, 
aggregation of ethical precepts, underwritten with a popular idea of racial 
superiority, gave the British imperial establishment a sense of its own purpose 
Believing themselves to be culturally superior and highly civilised, the English 
equated their particular interests with the general interest of humanity. Sir 
Charles Wentworth Dilkes explained that: 
'The ultimate future of any one section of our race, however is of little moment by 
the side of its triumph as a whole, but the power of English laws and English principles of 
government is not merely an English question - its continuence is essential to the freedom of 
mankind. 
Thus the one-time Resident in the Persian Gulf, A T Wilson, described 
the process by which Britain extended its influence as an altruistic act for the 
general good, writing that: 
'We have maintained order and thereby promoted trade; we have raised the 
standard of living and thereby encouraged the spread of education: we have thus fostered 
the growth of individual freedom and of the aspiration to succeed in life. This is what we 
understand as civilisation, and what we call progress lies in the changes of structure in the 
social organism which entail such consequences. 
1 / Farah (1985), Rumaihi (1976), and Al- Tajir (1987) all provide excellent general 
commentaries on this later period. A.Clarke, Bahrain Oil and Development. 1990 is a 
commercially sponsored history of Bahrain's oil industry; H.Mapp, Leave Well Alone. 1994 
is a personal account of the changes in Bahrain post 1940. 
21 Sir C. Wentworth Dilkes Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English Speaking 
Countries. (1868) extract in Synder (1962) pi 12. 
31 Wilson (1928) p272. 
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The presentation of the process of historical development in the Gulf as 
a struggle between authentic social tendencies and external imperial civilising 
influences, however, caricatures the development of the modern Persian Gulf 
Britain expanded its role in the Persian Gulf in the nineteenth century covertly, 
exercising a position of dominance by virtue of its commitment to secure peace 
and protect shipping. Extrapolating from this basic tenets of policy, Britain 
constructed an elaborate system of independent states to shied itself from extra 
imperial responsibilities, but Britain was unable to impose its imperial ambitions 
on the islanders of Bahrain or fashion the Persian Gulf according to its 
preconceived plan. The distinction that Kiernan draws between growth - 'due 
primarily to internal evolution and ferment'- and change - 'which may come 
about most often through external intrusion' indicates the more complex 
pattern of interaction between imperial and local influences in Bahrain As he 
notes: 
'From the penetration of one society ripe for change, by another with some superior 
attainments, a third may be expected to emerge, distinct from both though inheriting much 
from each.' 
The nineteenth century Persian Gulf developed through the interaction 
and fusion of traditional modes of social organisation and Britain's new 
imperial ideology. Thus, although British intervention in Persian Gulf affairs 
was aimed at the pacification of the region, the nineteenth century history of 
the region was characterised by irreconcilable conflict 
The contradiction between imperial ambition and the failure of the 
nineteenth century system of imperial organisation can be explained by 
fundamental weaknesses that emerged at the heart of the system of independent 
states when put into operation in the traditional environment The key foci of 
British intervention in the Persian Gulf in the nineteenth century were the 
question of sovereignty, and the peaceful coexistence of the social aggregate 
However the acceptance of these new values did not transplant traditional 
Arabian value structures or forms of diplomacy. As a result an identifiable 
paradigm emerged based on the fusion and co-existence of contradictory ideas 
of sovereignty, tutelage, zakat -religious tribute- and overlordship. This new 
paradigm, comprised of both external and traditional elements, was inherently 
unstable, inhibited the establishment of any durable status quo, and ultimately 
proved to be unworkable. Until the system of independent states was 
abandoned in the 1860's, conflict amongst external powers over suzerainty; 
conflict within British Government over its mandate; and domestic confusion 
within Bahrain consistently reproduced and fuelled each other with often 
anarchic results. 
Chapter One will outline the history of Bahrain and the Al Khalifah 
prior to the significant arrival of Britain in the Persian Gulf that was marked by 
three military expeditions between 1800 and 1820. It explores the socio-
economic traditional structures of Bahraini society, political and social 
identities, forms of political expression, the traditional structure of power in 
Bahraini society and modes of diplomacy to establish the characteristics of the 
Persian Gulf and Bahrain at the point of contact with the British. 
Chapter Two will consider the growth of British interest in the East -
first through the East India Company and later through the Governments of 
Bombay and India- up to the point of the Expeditions against the Qawasim 
British awareness and interest in the Persian Gulf owed its origin to the 
development of the Indian trade which was originally organised by forerunners 
of the East India Company and later the East India Company itself.4 Early 
mention of Bahrain is found in Company despatches in 1613 and 1750 when 
Bahrain was briefly considered as a possible factory site or base for the East 
V The predecessor of the East India Company, the United Company was founded through 
the amalgamation of the Old London and the New English trading companies in 1709. This 
union was effected to circumvent contemporary parliamentary activity aimed at withdrawing 
exclusive East Indian trading privileges from the monolithic and unaccountable London 
Company. See later discussion. 
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India Company,5 but little interest was subsequently paid to the island by the 
Company until the Revolutionary Wars with France in the 1790's when 
Bahrain's importance in the wider geopolitical issues of the Persian Gulf could 
no longer be ignored. 
Chapter Three examines the defining moment in 1820 when the British 
codified the system of independent states and declared Bahrain an independent 
country by compacting the General Treaty with the Arabian Chieftains It 
considers the confusion that resulted from this shift in strategic policy within 
British diplomatic channels and the problems intendent upon the conjuring of 
independent states out of thin air. Having recognised the independence of the 
Al Khalifah, Britain adopted a position of non-intervention in the affairs of the 
Persian Gulf, placing the responsibility for the stability of the area on the 
independent chiefs it had summoned into existence. However, the independent 
chieftains did not have the resources to defend themselves against external 
aggression, nor the same commitment to the general interest and security. The 
Al Khalifah used their independence to compact agreements that encouraged 
other imperial powers to extend their influence over Bahrain, and themselves 
indulged in extreme oppressions without responsibility. There arose an 
inevitable contradiction within British policy between eschewing intervention 
in the affairs of the Gulf or conspicuous patronage of supposedly independent 
states which this chapter will examine. 
Chapter Four examines the conflict between Britain and its imperial 
proxy in the middle of the nineteenth century. Other regional powers such as 
Persia, Turkey and the Egyptians refused to accept Britain's regional security 
arrangement. They persisted in pursuing their claim to suzerainty over Bahrain. 
Britain attempted to oppose this establishment of third-party control over 
51 See Tuson (1978) p43. 
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Bahrain, but did not support the indpendent Sheikhs by guaranteeing them. The 
Sheikhs became their antithesis. Their reaction to the Egyptians compromised 
Britain's authority in the Gulf and forced Britain to reconsider their system of 
regional management. 
Chapter Five considers the implosion of political authority in Bahrain in 
the 1840's and 1859's. It identifies the flaws in the paradigm for the 
management of the Gulf through the system of independent states that led to 
the paralysis of civil authority, and Britain's reaction to this disintegration of 
Bahrain. It examines the revision of standing orders to allow Britain to mediate, 
intervene and settle the Civil War which broke out. Finally, it examines the 
growing trend towards alternative arrangements for managing Bahrain, and 
looks how Britain increasingly selectively undermined, and simply ignored 
Bahrain's sovereign rights as and when appropriate to protect its imperial 
interests. 
Chapter One: The Early History of Bahrain and the Rise of the Al Khalifah 
The histories of the Al Khalifah and Bahrain do not converge until 
1760, when the Beni Khalid refused the Al Khalifah permission to settle on the 
island, and the latter retired to Kuwait.1 Prior the arrival of the Al Khalifah, 
Bahrain had been integrated into the Persian Empire, though the islands were 
the subject of repeated usurpations, conquest and disputes This chapter will 
consider those aspects of the history of Bahrain; the Al Khalifah and the 
Persian Gulf that influenced events in the nineteenth century. Since Persian, 
Turkish and Omani claims of suzerainty over Bahrain were predicated on 
relations of submission and tutelage that had been acknowledged by previous 
rulers over Bahrain, a brief account of Bahrain's early history is provided to 
illustrate the historical aspect of these claims. An account of the Al Khalifah's 
rise to pre-eminence and overview of the diverse pressures that acted upon 
them in the early nineteenth century highlights the unstable and contentious 
position of the ruling clan when subject to the unmediated and direct impact of 
strength as power. Where possible, evidence of Bahrain! customs and social 
organisation has also been provided to establish the conditions of life prior to 
the arrival of the British. 2 
A Brief Sociology of Bahrain Pre-1783 
The ancient concept of Bahrain denoted an area larger than that 
recognised today. It incorporated the mainland region of Al Hasa, as well as 
the islands themselves. In contrast to the general nomadism of the Gulf, the 
1 / See Faroughy (1951) who provides the best account of the early history of the Al Khalifah. 
2 / Without a working knowledge Arabic, it is difficult to assess the condition of society, its 
organisation, customs and development in Bahrain prior to the arrival of the British. Whilst 
some travellers explored the Persian Gulf, it is the minute records of the Government of 
Bombay that provide the first consistent and detailed description of Bahrain. Historical 
anecdotes litter these archives, but are particularly abstract and ahistorical. The earlier 
travellers Niebuhr and Seton describe the more general state of affairs on the mainland. The 
most useful travel chronicle is that of T.H.Bent (1890), though it refers to a visit made in the 
1880's. The most useful sources for the early history of Bahrain are Francis Warden's 
minute, prepared in 1816 as a discussion document prior to Keir's invasion, Lorimer 
Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf (1970 part II, Tadjbakhche (1960), Faroughy(1951) and a 
report by Captain Hennell dated 2/3/1839. See Hennell/Wiloughby Secret Letter no.2 
BLOIORL R/15/1/72. Unfortunately the reliable information gleaned from these sources is 
scant and sketchy. 
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indigenous population of Bahrain appear to have been settled and sedentary 
over a long period of time. The population was comprised of emigre Persians, 
who belonged to the Shi'ah sect and tended to be non-tribal, even though the 
tribe provided the primary bond of association throughout the Arab quarter of 
the Gulf. These people were known generally as the Huwailah and those 
settled on Bahrain islands as the Baharnah, taking their name from the islands.3 
It is possible to identity social ties and settled customs in usage in Bahrain in 
the late eighteenth century that evidenced extended social interaction 
characteristic of a settled society. A canon of custom was developed to control 
the pearling industry. This 'law' was a pragmatic attempt to mediate relations 
amongst divers, captains and merchants. It embodied concepts, especially 
those concerned with debt and loans, that were distinctly un-Islamic and 
unique.4 In addition, the growth of towns and commerce promoted greater 
homogeneity, and common mores. It is perhaps more apt to consider Bahrain 
at this earlier stage of its history as a territorial rather than a tribal entity, since 
it appears that the tribal elements to Bahrain's identity were only introduced 
after the immigration of the Al Khalifah, however laws that governed the 
interaction between tribes were reflected and imitated by settled communities. 
No doubt momentum was given to the development of common non-
tribal values by the sedentary and settled nature of the islands. Historically 
Bahrain had been a vital link in the ancient trade routes and was known for its 
export of pearls, tent cloth, dates and sail.5 Its insularity, relative fertility and 
freshwater supply sustained a more sedentary existence than that known across 
the rest of the Gulf where the harsh environment promoted a nomadic 
lifestyle.6 The population of Bahrain had a unique commitment to the fertile 
3 / Faroughy (1951) describes the Huwailah Arabs as a body who migrated from the 
Arabian mainland and southern Persia to settle on the Gulf coast. See pp67/8. 
4 / See Rumaihi (1976) Chapter I for a discussion of the organisation of the pearling 
industry. 
5 / See Faroughy (1951) p33 for references from antiquity, including Pliny and Ptolemy. See 
C.E.Lawson, Land Use on the Bahrain Islands. Chicago, 1983. 
61 There are very divergent estimates of the population of Bahrain. It supported 
approximately 60,000 persons through the nineteenth century. By 1897, there were 12 main 
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island and the agriculture it supported that impeded its freedom of movement 
or its ability to migrate. The cultivation of date palms and the extraction of 
pearls are consistently mentioned in records and chronicles as major economic 
activities. Faroughy noted that: 
'Idrisi, who wrote in the first half of the twelfth century', tells us that although 
Bahrein was governed by an independent chief, the Governor of Kish was "entitled" to 
collect taxes on the pearl fishing in the island. He speaks of the capital city as well 
populated, with fertile outlying regions producing abundant grain and dates. There was also 
a flourishing trade in guano, which was both exported to Mesopotamia and used as a 
fertiliser for the palm groves. '7 
Over six hundred years later, a report examining Muhammed bin 
Khalifah's excesses again made mention of the production of dates. It 
recorded that prior to the arrival of the Al Khalifah, the elders of al Hawra, Al 
Majed, Al Abdul Raoof & Al Ghassomee had been local overlords and noted 
that: 
'the above had each appropriated a piece of ground cultivated and planted Date 
trees and lived on the fruit thereof All of these were of the Sheah Sect, acknowledging to be 
under the protection of the Kings of Persia and were in the habit of sending a yearly present 
to Shiraz with their own will as they were of one faith. "s 
Given this constant and unchanging nature of the local economy, it 
seems likely that over time customs would have ossified and thus been 
preserved in the collective consciousness as a distinct body of social mores. 
Major innovations in production methods or economic diversification appear to 
have been suppressed by the combined effect of feudal obligations, religious 
zealotry, the limitations of the natural economy and the destabilising influence 
of marauders. Travellers and Company representatives in the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries give the impression that the 'Bahraini' way of life was 
both well-ingrained and followed established patterns. Yet Bahrain flourished 
in a regional system based upon tribal associations. Two important aspects of 
tribal custom that influenced Bahrain in antiquity can be discerned: firstly in the 
direct interaction and interdependence between the community and the 
Bedouin, and secondly in the modes of diplomacy that governed relations 
between communities and their rulers. 
towns situated to promote the natural economy. Manama was the traditional merchant centre, 
and Muharraq the residence of the ruling clique. 
11 Faroughy (1951) p59. 
V BLOIORL R/15/1/192 Translated purport of report re: the excesses of Muhammed bin 
Khalifah[exact title unclear enclosure to Ross 11/7/1875. 
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Established centres of commercial settlement, such as Bahrain, Oman 
and Yemen were subject to the unpredictable and ravishing depredations of 
nomadic tribes. Throughout the early part of the eighteenth century, the Beni 
Khalid tribe exercised control over Al Hasa and north from Kuwait to Qatar, 
although the Al Mussallam tribe were also influential in the Qatar peninsula.9 
There was also a large preponderance of Bedouins, the Beni Hajar, who 
roamed Al Hasa and professed independence It appears that the Bedouin 
would periodically threaten to attack and harass settlements unless financially 
ameliorated for their moderation. Under the workings of this simple protection 
racket, settlements bought temporary relief from the Bedouins, but could not 
prevent sporadic attacks. The interdependence of Bedouin and settled 
communities was also reinforced by the obligation for any given ruler to enlist 
Bedouin support as a necessary component in a makeshift system of security 
However the relative concept of allegiance and authority within the tribe, and 
the mutation of these concepts within settled communities prevented the 
emergence of any long-term stability. 
The development or extension of a ruler's individual authority over a 
settlement was the antithesis of the tribal system of communal power-sharing 
where the interdependence of tribes, and the autonomy of familial units 
mitigated the potential for discord. The cohesion and unity of any given tribe 
was reinforced by extended familial relationships that encouraged common 
interests and provided a common heritage. Tribal legitimacy and authority 
resided in the familial unit, and whilst this promoted individual chiefs no 
authority was transferred to individual as rulers. The ruling Sheikh of a ruling 
family, had no particular title of distinction from other family elders, and was 
only and arbitrarily primus inter pares. His authority was an merely an 
97 See Miles (1966) and Farah (1985) pp4/5. More specifically the report on Muhammed bin 
Khalifah's excesses lists tribes present in the immediate vicinity of Ruwais, including the Al 
Chubaisah at Khose Yassas, the Al Mahaudeh at Khose Shaheek, the Al Bookoooueh at 
Biddah, the Al Bu 'Aynain at Wakra, and the Al Ghobaisand at Odeyd. 
10 
extension of familial authority, and as such was entirely contingent and 
frequently revoked. Lienhardt noted that: 
'The frequency with which ruling shaykhs in the states o f the Gulf were overthrown 
suggests the absence of any strong belief there in the legitimacy of authority in the hands of 
particular rulers. The families as wholes, however were a different matter. M 
A tribal chief was expected to pacify and reconcile disputes within the 
tribe in consultation with family elders as a leader not a ruler. Order was 
secured not by the chiefs personal rule, but by the observance of accepted 
tribal customs. Disputes were settled by migration, secession or the 
renunciation of political allegiance: wrongdoers could seek sanctuary from 
other tribes when fleeing from the scene of a crime; and in extreme cases the 
assassination or overthrow of the tribal elders by the ruling family was 
considered acceptable. Accordingly, not only did the Bedouin evidence little or 
no loyalty when pressed into the service for or against a particular ruler, the 
very concept of authority as it emerged within settlements was underdeveloped 
and provisional. Whilst several families had authoritarianly assumed power, 
there was no organic link between the ruler and his population. Indeed 
Lienherdt likens the allegiance of a population to its ruler to the revocable 
agreement of treaty.11 At all times, even after the advent of Britain into the 
Gulf in the nineteenth century, the ruler was confronted with the real 
possibility of assassination or the desertion of the populace, and also subject to 
interference from external powers. 
The historical basis of nineteenth century claims to suzerainty over Bahrain 
The ancient importance of the Bahrain islands as a commercial centre 
made Bahrain a prize possession and object of struggle. In addition to Bedouin 
ravages, other regional powers, most notably Persia, Oman, and the Kings of 
Hormuz allied with the Ottoman rulers fought over the possession of the 
islands with unremitting tenacity. Relationships between such settlements 
1 0 / Lienhardt (1975) p63. 
1 1/ibid. 
11 
initially appear to have been organised directly, according to their relative 
strength, and given expression through the obligation to offer fealty or to pay 
zakat This system threw up a pyramidal hierarchy of inter-dependent 
communities: the weaker ones offering vassalage to relatively stronger powers 
as a semi-feudal form of protection. When Britain attempted to refashion 
power relations in the nineteenth century, evidence of Bahrain's historical 
submission to a third-party was promoted as the basis for a contemporary right 
of that third party to assume suzerainty over the islands. A brief survey of 
historical submission and subjection is thus a necessary prelude to a study of 
nineteenth century regional history.12 
The most ancient and durable bond appears to have been that between 
Bahrain and Persia. Bahrain was incorporated into the Persian Empire in the 
sixth century B.C., fell under local control when the power of the Persians 
declined, but was subsequently re-established as a dependency of Fars in the 
fourth century A D. At one time, Bahrain was an integral part of the Persian 
Empire, and recognised as the Satrapy of Marzan, with a capital at Hajar. 
Under this arrangement the satrap tended to be a local chieftain who was 
allowed to control the most part of Bahraini affairs, the exception being those 
of a military nature. This arrangement persevered until the rise of Islam when 
Bahrain accepted submission. 
Revolt broke out after the death of Muhammed and Bahrain was 
subsequently used as a base by the heretical Karmats After their defeat by the 
Selucids, a local tribe, the 'Ujium, were installed as overlords of the island 
and obliged to pay tribute to the Governor of Kish. One can only surmise that 
once established, Islam acted as a lingua franca throughout the region to 
1 2 / The claims to suzerainty over Bahrain, by the Wahhabis (a religiously puritannical 
movement that existed on the mainland) and the Turks do not figure in this historical survey 
of Bahrain before the nineteenth century since both were based on the balance of power 
throughout the nineteenth century and will be dealt with later 
12 
justify tutelage, submission and ravage, in much the way that early Christianity 
supported the original robber barons in Europe. However, whether cloaked in 
Islamic garb or conducted in the form of naked oppression, a process was 
initiated whereby exactions were bled from Bahrain by a series of overlords, 
who seemed content to draw off revenue from the island without interfering in 
the local order. Undoubtedly fords were drawn from among the Bahrainis, but 
since little attempt was made to alter anything apart from the intensity of these 
exactions whose level was controlled by natural resources, these periodic 
invasions did not disrupt the ingrained traditions, and everyday life of the local 
population. Apart from occasional interruption in the pearl trade, different 
overlords allowed the local economy to follow its own trajectory, often 
nominating local chieftains as proxy rulers. However, the stability of this 
arrangement was disrupted by the greed of the controlling party and the decline 
of their relative military strength. Different proxy rulers gained control of 
Bahrain, by fighting off the attacks of other interested parties, but invariably 
they had to be forcibly removed from power when they refused to release 
tribute to the central authority. 
Relations between Kish and the Persians deteriorated until an 
expedition was sent against the ruler of Kish in 1229/30A.D. with the intention 
of re-securing Kishite submission and tribute. This expedition received 
assistance from the Governor of Hormuz, in return for which Bahrain was 
placed in his hands on the understanding that 2/3rds of the revenue accruing from 
the island be paid to the Emperor, but the King of Hormuz refused to pay 
tribute. A further imperial expedition was sent to reclaim the island. Bahrain 
was subsequently annexed to the Province of Fars and the Bahraini chiefs 
received substantial presents from the Emperor for their allegiance.13 Such gifts 
may indicate the tentative grip that the Persian centre was able to exercise on 
1 3 / See Faroughy (1951) p60. An expedition sent against the King of Hormuz in 1236. 
Thereafter the local Sheikhs were reportedly paid 12,000 gold Dinars to secure their loyalty. 
13 
Bahrain, especially given the absence of a significant imperial navy, but the 
Baharnah nevertheless offered fealty to the Shah. 
Sometime after the Mongol conquest of Persia, the privileged position 
of the province of Fars and the attempt to directly control Bahrain from the 
centre were abandoned. Bahrain was thereafter once more farmed out to third 
parties although an association was maintained between the islands and the II 
Khan, until the implosion of the II Khanid dynasty following the death of Abu 
Said in 1335A D. The King of Hormuz took advantage of the weakness of 
central Persian authority to establish his position as overlord of Bahrain. This 
relationship proved comparatively stable and appears to have lasted until and 
indeed even after the Portuguese invasion. Faroughy noted that: 
'For the next 260 years Bahrein was ruled almost without interruption by the Kings 
of Hormuz (themselves tributary of the Persian Empire), and followed the fate of Hormuz 
even after its invasion by the Portuguese in 1515. ' u 
Since the Governors of Hormuz nominally swore allegiance to the 
Persian Emperor, Bahrain was still formally subject to the Persians under this 
new arrangement. However, the appearance of the Portuguese in the Gulf and 
the outbreak of hostilities between Safavids and the Ottomans altered the 
balance of power. The governors of Hormuz disassociated themselves from 
the Persians, renouncing their submission to the Persians, and thereafter 
pursued their claim to Bahrain in the face of Persian opposition. In 1519A.D 
the Governor of Hormuz temporarily established himself in Bahrain, but his 
authority was commandeered by the Portuguese.15 
In contrast, to the later British dominance of the area, Portuguese 
mastery of the Persian Gulf, whilst representing a long period of stability, had 
no lasting effect and failed to break the cycle of conquest, exactions and further 
invasion that dominated the Gulf. The Portuguese invasion of Bahrain in 1522 
14/Faroughy (1951)p61. 
1 5 / Lorimer (1970) part II p841. 
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A.D. provided Bahrain with a brief respite from Arab subjugation. For the next 
130 years the Portuguese exercised an unassailable grip over the islands, 
although the Persians did not relinquish their supposed rights to suzerainty over 
Portuguese possessions. However, save for the garrisoning of soldiers and the 
construction of the fort of 'Arad on the island of Muharraq, the Portuguese 
left no indelible mark of their presence. Little innovation or change derived 
from this occupation. Miles noted that: 
'The system adopted by the Portuguese in their stations on the Arab coast was to 
maintain their political and commercial supremacy by retaining the citadel or fort which 
overawed and commanded the town and by controlling the customs house and port. This 
gave them all the protection and trade advantage they required, but they did not interfere 
with the internal administration or with native habits, religion, and prejudices in so far as 
they did not affect themselves, and the people were thus left to their own laws and customs in 
all respects. M 
When the Portuguese finally lost their commanding position in the Gulf 
at the end of the seventeenth century confronted with a Dutch/English/Persian 
alliance, the same forces that had previously destabilised the Gulf re-emerged 
and the struggle for control over Bahrain once more began in earnest. In the 
aftermath of the Portuguese, the power of the kings of Hormuz had been 
broken, but as long as their domestic cohesion permitted, the Ya'aribi dynasty 
of Oman and Safavid Persians confounded each other in their attempts to gain 
control of the islands. 
The Ya'aribi dynasty rose to prominence in Oman at the start of the 
seventeenth century out of the secessionist struggle that followed the collapse 
of the Nebhani rulers of Oman. Enjoying the Portuguese favouritism shown to 
their predecessors, which had made the Muscatis governors of Hormuz and 
given them effective control over Arab shipping through the straits of 
Musallam, the Ya'aribi were able to force the Portuguese out of Muscat and 
re-establish their territorial integrity. Then, once secure, they rapidly 
constructed an unparalleled Arab navy, under the Imamate of Saif bin Sultan, 
l f 7 Miles (1966) pl66. 
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that transformed them into a major regional force with its own ambitions 
against Bahrain. As Miles noted: 
'At the opening of the eighteenth century the maritime power of Oman was 
paramount to that of all the native rulers along the entire shores of the Indian Ocean, even 
to that of the pirate Angria. ''7 
Unsurprisingly, Saif attacked and captured Bahrain in 1699 A.D., but 
was forced to leave after a mass emigration of Bahrain's populace in protest 
against excessive exactions.18 Control over the island thus reverted to the 
Persian Safavid dynasty. However, the Ya'aribi re-occupied Bahrain in 1718 
and massacred the Persian garrison. Recognising their inability to hold the 
island, the Omanis negotiated a ransom and thereafter surrendered possession. 
No further Omani intrusions on Bahrain were recorded during the eighteenth 
century since the Ya'aribi dynasty imploded over the question of secession 
after the death of Saif in 1719. Dynastic strife eroded the stability of Oman to 
the point that Muscat itself was subject to Persian invasion in the early 
1740's.19 It was not until the emergence of Imam Sultan bin Ahmed Al Bu 
Saeed in 1793 that Omani regained its former regional pre-eminence and was 
once more able to scheme against Bahrain. 
The self-destruction of its major regional opponent might have 
heralded the beginning of a protracted period of Persian control over Bahrain, 
were the Safavid rulers of Persia themselves not suffering from fatal weakness 
at the heart of their administration. Following the withdrawal of the Ya'aribi 
in 1718, Bahrain was placed under the local charge of Sheikh Jibara of Tahiri, 
Admiral of the Persian Gulf and Chief of the Huwailah Arabs, but the power 
of the Safavids was broken by an Afghani invasion in 1722. When Nadir 
Khan Afshar, who had expelled the Afghanis seven years previously, 
proclaimed himself shahanshah in 1736 at the expense of Abbas I I I , Sheikh 
Jibara refused to recognise Nadir Shah Afshar's coup d'etat and subsequently 
1 7 / Miles (1966) p221. 
18/Lorimer (1970) part D p837, Faroughy (1951) p64 and Miles (1967) p233. 
1 9 / Miles (1966) pp237- 286 gives a detailed account of the dynastic struggle in Oman during 
this period. 
16 
withheld tribute from the centre. Order was restored after Bahrain was 
visited by Nadir Shah's hastily constructed Persian navy in 1737 and Sheikh 
Jibara was replaced by Sheikh Nasir of the Abu Muhair tribe.21 Whilst this 
censure did not encourage greater deference to central authority, the provision 
of a Persian Gulf Squadron provided Persia with the means to suppress 
discontent and revolt. When disagreement inevitably arose thereafter over the 
non-payment of tribute, Sheikh Nasir was rapidly imprisoned and an 
agreement reached for the surrender of a tribute of 4,000 tumans per annum.22 
But no sooner had the Persians gained this ascendancy, than civil war broke out 
following the assassination of Nadir Shah in 1749 For the next fifty years the 
Zand and Qajar dynasties engaged each other in a lingering conflict that was 
not properly resolved until 1797. In the course of this turmoil, Persia lost the 
naval means to assert its authority over the Arabian settlements of the Gulf and 
was divested of its suzerainty over Bahrain. 
This brief survey of Bahrain's relationship to other regional powers 
indicates the historical fact of submission. For periods of time Bahrain was in a 
position of fealty to Persia, Oman and the Kings of Hormuz. Such submission 
was not sacrosanct, but remained in a constant state of flux. The domination 
achieved over Bahrain reflected a contemporary balance of power in the region 
between settlements without establishing immemorial rights of suzerainty 
Indeed, the tendency throughout this survey was not towards the entrenchment 
of relations of domination, but for the consistent attempts to circumnavigate 
and renounce such claims. Overlordship lasted only as long as the means for 
exacting tribute or threatening the settlement were at the dominating power's 
disposal. By the mid-eighteenth century, foreign domination of Bahrain had 
thus fallen into abeyance owing to the collapse of internal cohesion within the 
2 0 / At this juncture, Nadir Shah did not possess the naval means to re-assert the centre's 
control over its satellites, and this may in part account for Sheikh Jibara's contumacy. 
2 1/Zahlan (1979) and Lorimer (1970) part II suggest that Nadir Shah recapture Bahrain 
around 1753 but Miles records the date as 1737, a year after Nadir Shah's accession. Nadir 
Shah appears to have died in 1749. 
2 2 / Lorimer (1970) part II p837. 
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Persian and Oman states. In the absence of any suzerain power, control of the 
islands devolved initially to the local populace, and thereafter the Al Khalifah, 
who, following their own trajectory, emerged in the 1780's as the foremost 
family on the islands. 
The Rise to Power of the Al Khalifah 
The history of the Al Khalifah is obscure during the eighteenth century. 
The Al Khalifah belonged to the larger 'Utub tribe which was in turn a sub-
branch of the 'Anaiza tribe. The Al Khalifah separated from the wider 'Utub 
tribe when they undertook a migration towards the littoral coast in compact 
with two other familial 'Utub branches, the Al Jalahimah and the Al Sabah. One 
report into the later excesses of the Al Khalifah family mentions that 
Muhammed bin Khalifah bin Faysal al Fazd, a Bedouin of Nejd came and 
located at the Bar 'Adaa with his family and flock in the early eighteenth 
century.23 It appears that the Al Khalifah negotiated local permission from 
their neighbours and subsequently settled along with other two familial 
branches at Grain. There was nothing untoward about the relocation of the Al 
Khalifah since migration and resettlement was an accepted aspect of 
contemporary nomadic life. 
By common consent, each of the three 'Utub families that resettled in 
the Arabian littoral specialised in an aspect of the tribe's affairs. The Al 
Khalifah family was responsible for mercantile activity and concentrated on 
building up substantial pearling and trading operations. Their success in this 
commercial activity made them a target of intra-tribal jealously and the family 
elders were forced to flee to avoid arrest. Thus around 1760 the Al Khalifah 
split from the larger body of 'Utub and resettled again at Zubarah on the Qatari 
/ BLOIORL R/15/1/192 op. cit. Faroughy concurs with this account. See p48 &pp70-71. 
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peninsula. In undertaking this migration and divorcing themselves from their 
immediate tribal kin, the Al Khalifah in effect constituted themselves as a 
distinct and independent familial branch. The development of their authority, 
even within a new settlement, was hampered by the physical immediacy of the 
rump 'Utub and the arbitrary commitment of their subject population, however 
their commercial prosperity travelled with them, and despite these pressures, 
Zubarah rapidly grew to become an important pearling and trading centre. This 
growth was encouraged by the absence of import duties and the decline of 
Basrah as a commercial centre owing to the war between Persia and Turkey.25 
When Basrah was captured by the Persians in 1776 many members of its 
commercial population resettled in Zubarah immediately raising the importance 
and trading volume of the town. 
This successful re-invention of the Al Khalifah as regional commercial 
moguls inevitably antagonised their traditional enemies, the rump 'Utub. It 
additionally drew ire from their neighbouring competitors, the Persians and 
the Baharnah. The Al Khalifah were obliged to defend their new advantages 
from hostile attacks, since the risk of losing all prosperity under attack 
outweighed a partial decline in fortune caused by the commercial instability 
brought on militarisation. The latent hostility of the rump 'Utub expressed itself 
in the continual harassment of cargo entering and leaving Zubarah.26 Karim 
Khan Zand went so far as to commission an assault against Zubarah in 1777 
although no action appears to resulted from this decree.27 However real 
hostilities between the Al Khalifah and the Baharnah broke out in 1782. The 
quarrel itself appears to have started as a minor incident with the refusal of 
some Baharnah to supply the Al Khalifah with raw materials, but was 
2 4 / Farah (1985), citing the Bombay Selections, notes that this migration went first to 
Bahrain. 
2 5 / Lorimer (1970) part n p841. 
26I This harassment receded after the major perpetrators Al Jalahimah joined the Al Khalifah 
at Zubarah in the late 1770's following further intra- tribal quarrelling. 
211 Lorimer (1970) part H p839. 
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transformed into a blood-feud after the death of a servant. Abu Hakima notes 
that: 
'According to a tradition held by the Al Khalifa probably from about 1780, the people 
of Bahrain, being Shi'as, forbade some of Khalifas' servants to by palm tree trunks from 
Sitra, an island of Bahrain. As a result of the quarrel a ser\>ant was killed. The Zubara 
inhabitants retaliated by attacking Sitra & killing five inhabitants. The Sitra people reported 
the matter to Sheikh Nasir, who prepared for a retaliatory expedition against Zubara. '2S 
A Baharnah counter-attack failed to destroy Zubarah and the Al 
Khalifah, assisted by other local tribes, captured Bahrain in a second counter-
attack in the Summer of 1783.29 Although the combined strength of the 
Baharnah and the Persians, to whom the Baharnah appealed for assistance, 
probably exceeded that of the Al Khalifah, no attempt was made to evict the Al 
Khalifah owing to the death of the Sheikh of Shiraz who had agreed to 
sponsor an attack, in February 1785, mid-way through preparations for an 
expedition. Under the circumstances, further retaliatory measures were 
abandoned. Thus a combination of fortuitous luck, the absence of a dominant 
regional power, and the physical shield of the sea that complicated retaliatory 
action, elevated the Al Khalifah to the position of Chiefs of Bahrain. The Al 
Khalifahs' control over the islands, its populace and their kinsmen however 
remained tentative for the next thirty years. 
Although they were able to exercise a reasonably strong familial 
authority, instability was promoted by the co-existence of distinct factions 
within the family. The family elder and first Al Khalifah Sheikh of Bahrain, 
Ahmed bin Khalifah, had two sons, Salman bin Khalifah and Abdullah bin 
Ahmed, whose descendants grew increasingly separate30. By 1820, the 
cohesion of the Al Khalifah family was unhinged by the latent hostility and 
intolerance between these two branches. For the first three generations of rule 
the Al Khalifah operated a power-sharing agreement which represented both 
/Abu Hakima (1956) plll.Lorimer (1970) part II suggests that the Al Khalifah attack was 
altogether more encompassing and that it involved the plunder of Manama. 
291 Lorimer (1970) part II p840 mentions that Manama fort surrendered on 28th July 1783 
after a short siege. 
3 0 / The geneology of the Al Khalifah is documented inthe appendices. 
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sides of the family in power. This meant that at any one time, one Sheikh from 
the Abdullah branch, and one from the Khalifah branch would share the 
responsibility for governing Bahrain. Power was thus diffused throughout the 
clan. In practise, there was invariably one minor partner in this arrangement 
although the authority of the nominal chief to control the sheikhs was marginal 
and the family elders pursued their own oppressions when opportunity 
presented itself, leaving behind a catalogue of complaints. 
The stability of the Al Khalifahs' rule over Bahrain was further upset by 
developments on the mainland, with which Bahrain was intimately connected 
owing to the shared pearl fishing and common identities. Farah noted that: 
'The continual interaction between the tribesmen of the islands and those on the 
mainland, the shifting of allegiances, and the regrouping of settlements tied Bahrain's 
affairs closely with those of the mainland.131 
For the first twelve years following the invasion, this connection was 
strengthened by the continued residence of the Chiefs of Bahrain at Zubarah. 
Ahmed bin Khalifah who became Chief of Bahrain did not settle on the islands, 
but retired to Zubarah and it was not until after Zubarah was laid waste by the 
Wahhabis- a religiously puritanical and proselytising mainland power united 
under Saud the Amir of the Nejd- that the Al Khalifah settled permanently on 
Bahrain.32 In addition, the Al Jalahimah branch of Utub refused to accept the 
Al- Khalifah's authority in Bahrain and returned to Khawr Hassan on the 
mainland, whence they struck alliance with the Wahhabis and the Qawasim and 
waged war on the Al Khalifah. Thereafter an unerring state of aggression was 
maintained by Rahman bin Jabir, the chief of the Al Jalahimah, against the Al 
Khalifah until his death in 1826. The Al Jalahimah's 'sworn enmity' to the Al 
Khalifah became a counter-point and rallying call for anti-Khalifah interests and 
was skilfully pursued through this period resulting in a series of anti-Khalifah 
alliances and attempted invasions: the most serious of which was the combined 
3 1/Farah (1985) p4. 
32/Rumaihi(1971)p26. 
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attack in 1816 undertaken in conjunction with the Omanis, although this was 
repulsed. 
Furthermore, contemporary changes in the political configuration of 
Gulf encouraged by the growth of the Qawasim pirates of Al Sirr, the rise of 
the Wahhabis and the re-emergence of Muscat posed an immediate threat to 
the Al Khalifah: the Imam of Muscat and the Wahhabis both harboured designs 
on Bahrain and attempted to pursue these ambitions in the early nineteenth 
century; the Persians under Fath Ali Qajar Shah remained an interested party in 
Bahraini affairs and were eager to re-establish their regional control, although 
their injunctions lacked the resonance of times past; and the Qawasim 
undermined the general stability and prosperity of the Gulf. The Al Khalifah 
appear to have intuitively appreciated that their survival required a relative 
parity between the Wahhabis and the Omani so that the power of one would 
nullify the other. With Machiavellian diplomatic contortions, the Al Khalifah 
exploited this balance of power in order to survive 
A series of shifting and often contradictory alliances and tutelage were 
thus acknowledged between 1800 and 1810, with the Al Khalifah concluding 
alliances to stave off imminent invasion, but renouncing ties in order to inhibit 
the emergence of a dominant power or prevent a curb on their authority. When 
the Imam of Muscat declared war on Bahrain in 1799 because of a dispute 
over transit tax past Muscat, the Al Khalifah became a vassal of Persia, hoping 
to dissuade further hostilities. Nevertheless, the island was invaded in 1800 
and 25 of the leading families were shipped to Muscat. The Omanis 
established a fort at 'Arad and the son of the Imam was left in charge of the 
garrison. The 'Utub forced the surrender of the garrison and re-established 
themselves with Persian assistance, but Bahrain was re-occupied a year later 
when the Omanis had neutralised the Al Khalifah's alliance by gaining 
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permission from the ruler of Shiraz for their adventures. In response the Al 
Khalifah made an alliance with the Wahhabis that forced the Imam Sayyid to 
return home.33 
This alliance with the Wahhabi was maintained until 1805, but sensing 
the growing dominance of the Wahhabis, the Al Khalifah joined an Omani 
expedition to destroy the influence of the Qawasim and the Wahhabis. This 
miscalculation led the Wahhabis to conclude an alliance with Rahman bin 
Jabir and resulted in a successful joint invasion of Bahrain. The 'Utub 
remained local proxies under the authority of a Wahhabi Vakil for the area of 
Bahrain, Al Hasa and Qatar until the threat of Egyptian encroachment forced 
the Wahhabis to retire in 1811 and the Al Khalifah were momentarily free from 
any bond of vassalage. However, this independence was inherently unstable and 
encouraged other local powers to take advantage of the Al Khalifah's 
weaknesses. Imam Sayyid Said immediately attacked Bahrain and the Al 
Khalifah were obliged to acknowledge their subordination to Muscat. The Al 
Khalifah subsequently renounced their loyalty in 1813, provoking a new 
configuration of alliances that resulted in the unsuccessful Omani expedition in 
1816. 
By aligning themselves propitiously, often through acts of submission, 
in relation to broader and stronger regional interests and ambitions, the Al 
Khalifah enjoyed a near-uninterrupted period of rule over Bahrain between the 
years 1783 and 1820. It is arguable that it was only their ability to accept 
vassalage or the protection of stronger regional powers, without drawing 
Bahrain into destructive alliances or highlighting the arbitrariness of their rule, 
that preserved the Al Khalifahs' power. Whilst they remained in power, the Al 
Khahfah sought to extend and develop their authority. They were not, 
/ Lorimer (1970) part II pp841/2. 
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however, able to lay the foundations for independent rule. The traditional 
organisation of the Gulf based upon the mutation of tribal mores did not admit 
to the concept of independence. No ruler's authority, nor indeed that of a clan 
was absolute and above question. When instances of dissatisfaction with the 
ruling clan arose, recourse was often sought from an uninvolved neighbouring 
ruler or tribe who could provide mediation.34 Nevertheless, even within this 
state of inter-dependence, the Al Khalifah made substantial headway in 
developing their authority, entrenching themselves in Bahrain and using their 
authority to engage in a campaign of oppression. 
Initially the brunt of oppression was borne by the Baharnah date 
cultivators since the farmers were least likely or able to confront the power of 
the sheikhs. Almost immediately therefore, the Al Khalifah intensified the 
feudal aspect of land ownership, reorganising land holdings as personal 
property. Previous land distribution was simply ignored. In order to persevere 
with their agriculture, the Baharnah were obliged to rent the same land for 
exaggerated tithes and taxes. Additionally, the Al Dowasir, a sub-tribe of Beni 
Khalid, were recruited as bodyguards for the ruling clan, and the Bedouin 
entertained at the ruling family's and the islands' expense.35 The merchant 
community however, acted as a counterweight to the Al Khalifah's despotic 
ambitions. 
The power of the pearl merchants mimicked that of the sectional tribal 
Sheikhs. Lienhardt described their patronage and their social function in 
political terms, noting that: 
'The leading families had the same power to resist the extension of shaykly 
authority as did the families of the sectional shaykhs of the tribes,... Leading families could 
lend support to one section of the ruling family as against another. Their followers were 
capable of bearing arms. The support of leading families was particularly important when 
/Third parry interference of this sort which undermined the exclusive authority of the 
Shuyukh was generally condoned on the basis of shared heritage and kinship. 
35/Farah(1985) p4. 
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some of the merchants were wealthier than the rulers, as often happened before the decline 
of pearl fishing and the development of oil. If internal pressures did not prevail, the 
merchants could sometimes take their followers, their jama ah, away with them, like the 
sectional shaykhs.36 
The oppression evidenced in the Al Khalifah's relationship with the 
Baharnah was thus tempered by the need to guarantee a stable and propitious 
environment for commerce and appease the merchants Abu Hakima noted 
that in these early years: 
"The tribal authority of the shaikhs was strong, but because of the commercial 
nature of the 'Utubi States, the shaikhs were less despotic than might be expected.'37 
In response to the pressure of the merchants the Al Khalifah initiated 
several progressive measures that underpinned and stimulated, rather than 
penalised, commerce.38 They were principally responsible for the 
development of sea trade, in particular the carrying trade between the Gulf and 
India which they promoted by restricting customs duties and sponsoring a fleet 
of carrying vessels. Lorimer noted that: 
'The conquest of Bahrain by the 'Utub gave a great impulse to the trade of the 
island, for the Arab immigrants soon acquired a mercantile fleet and became the principal 
carriers of goods between Masqat, at this time the chief local emporium, and Basrah and the 
places on the Western coast of the Gulf. 3 9 
As a result of this initiative, Bahraini traders rapidly cornered a major 
share of a re-export trade: Indian cotton goods, rice, sugar, spices, metals and 
timber were shipped to the Gulf and there exchanged for Basrah dates, Yemeni 
coffee, and dried fruit and grain from Persia and Oman. There was also 
contemporary accounts of Bahrain being used by 'pirates' as a staging post 
although such allegations will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
36/Lienhardt (19715 p72 
3 7 / Abu Hakima (1965) pl81. 
3 8/There is no reliable estimate of the size of Bahrain's early economy. Niebuhr estimates 
the trade at I lakh [£10,000]; Parsons estimates 60,000 Basra tumans [£112,500] in 1775; 
Manesty & Jones recorded the average annual export in the 1790's as 5 lakhs [£50,000]; in 
1818 Taylor assessed the total value of pearl trade at 100,000 tumans [£187,500]; Al Qasimi 
(1990) estimates the value of the pearl trade in 1818 as 100,000 tumans [£187,000] out of 
which the Sheikh levied tax of £10,000 per annum, (pi l);the 1824 Gulf survey estimated its 
value asl,600,000 Marie Terese dollars [£320,000]; and in 1833 Wilson guessed its value as 
$MT1- 1.2 million [£200-240,000]. The earliest accurate figures appear to be the Brucks 
survey in 1841 which recorded the annual value of trade as £490,000, of which imports were 
£160,000 and exports £320,000. By comparison annual revenue of Baghdad in 1796/7 was 
£200,000 and in 1798 £lmillion. 
3 9 / Lorimer (1970) part II p841. Abu Hakima (1965) also mentioned the existence of direct 
freight lines between Bahrain and India: 'With the acquisition of large vessels from India, 
the Utub of Bahrain in the 1780s and after sailed to Indian ports to import necessities for 
daily use of their people and to export to Baghdad and Aleppo' [pi 76]. 
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It is thus possible to identify two different aspects of the Al Khalifah's 
rule that developed before the appearance of the British in the Persian Gulf: an 
oppressive despotism drew heavy feudal exactions from the local populace, 
whilst their liberal approach to the merchant community encouraged trade 
These aspects were reflected by an informal division of the main islands to suit 
different purposes. Muharraq was used as a residence by the ruling family, 
whilst Manama was used by the commercial community and left relatively alone 
by the Al Khalifah. As the length of their occupation increased, the Al Khalifah 
became more deeply entrenched in Bahrain. On the other hand, there were 
clearly defined parameters to Al Khalifah's authority that i f transgressed 
implied the divorce of the Al Khalifah from Bahrain. At the point of contact 
with the British, marked by a visit in 1806 by Captain Bruce, Political Resident 
for the Persian Gulf, the Al Khalifah were still very much subject to the 
arbitrary realignment of power. Clever diplomacy had preserved the Al 
Khalifah family as overlords for twenty-five years, but hostilities between 
themselves and Rahman bin Jabir and the Omanis had not been resolved and the 
possibility of further invasion of the island was very real. 
Chapter Two:Pirates and Profiteers 
The East India Company 
Burke's statement that the constitution of the East India Company 
began in commerce, and ended in Empire,1 captures the changing interests, 
ambitions and the growth of the Company through the seventeenth, eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. From its earliest attempts to engage in a fruitful East 
Indian trade, the Company was obliged to adapt its modus operandi to local 
conditions. Equally it was obliged to manipulate local conditions to its own 
advantage. By the nineteenth century the Company's Eastern representatives 
were acting as both colonial field-officers and independent officials of state 
The Company's intervention in Gulf affairs and specifically the conclusion of 
the General Treaty in 1820, initiated a system that it hoped would promote 
security and tranquility throughout the Gulf and guarentee British hegemony. 
However, the external and internal pressures to which the Company was forced 
to respond, frustrated the fulfilment of these political ambitions. The growth of 
the East Indian Company away from its mercantile origins to the point that the 
Company came to resemble a sovereign government in all but name was a 
reflection of the emergence of English power and influence in the Persian Gulf 
during the eighteenth century. The growing tension between British parliament 
and the East India Company provides the context within which the system of 
independent states and the attempt to refashion the Gulf in the early nineteenth 
century can be explained.2 
The origins of the East Indian Company lie in seventeenth century 
mercantilism. Mercantilists argued that because preferential trade represented 
a flow of specie into a country, it increased the national concentration of 
precious metal, and therefore produced national wealth. The benefits of such 
simple, advantageous trade were summarised by Thomas Mun, himself a 
director of the East India Company, who wrote that: 
'The ordinary means therefore to increase our wealth and treasure is by Forraign 
Trade, wherein wee must ever observe this rule; to sell more to strangers yearly than wee 
1 / Burke (1881) p23. 
21 Upon the abolition of the East India Company in 1874. its power and authority were 
subsumed by the Government of India, a fully-fledged imperial extension to the Crown. 
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consume of theirs in value. For suppose that when this Kingdom is plentifully served with the 
Cloth, Lead, Tinn, Iron, Fish, and other native commodities, we doe yearly export the 
overplus to forraign Countreys to the value of twenty two hundred thousand pounds; by 
which means we are enabled beyond the Seas to buy and bring in forraign wares for our use 
and Consumption, to the value of twenty two hundred thousand pounds: By this order duly 
kept in our trading, we may rest assured that the kingdom shall he enriched yearly two 
hundred thousand pounds, which must be brought to us in so much Treasure. '3 
Thus it was that the forerunner of the East India Company, the United 
Company came into existence. An exclusive, albeit temporary, Royal charter 
for East Indian trade was granted in 1600 to a body of merchants who formed 
themselves as a regulated company 'for the better advancement and 
continuance of the said [East Indian] trade and traffick.' Special licenses for the 
export of specie that facilitated this trade were subsequently added to exclusive 
trading concessions, notwithstanding explicit legislation prohibiting such 
measures.4 In many respects the formation of the United Company was a 
desperate attempt to establish English trading operations in the face of 
Portuguese and Spanish dominance of the intercontinental markets. Several 
previous Tudor endeavours had proved abortive and the benefits of foreign 
trade, including plunder, accrued overwhelmingly to the advantage of 
England's Catholic rivals. Compared to its European rivals, in particular the 
Dutch, who more successfully broke down the Portuguese Eastern monopoly 
in the seventeenth century, the East Indian Company was a half-hearted and 
dispirited affair. Wide-ranging powers were granted to the Company under its 
first charter as a precaution against likely eventualities, but the wording of the 
charter itself embodied a vagueness that suggested a lack of clear planning and 
foresight. The Company was granted the power to: 
'make, ordain and constitute such and so many reasonable laws, constitutions, 
orders and ordinances as to them or the greater part of them being there and then present, 
shall seem necessary for the good government of the same company. ^ 
3 / Thomas Mun, 'England's Treasure by Forraien Trade.' written 1630, published 1664, 
puoted in Rubin (1989) p49. 
/ A license permitting the export of limited specie was included in the first Elizabethan 
East Indian charter. Active laws against export of specie remained on the statue book until 
1663, although they had fallen out of use sometime earlier. See Commons Journals for 
details. 
51 Ubert (1915) part b, chap 1 no page number. 
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Yet the general delegation of authority to the Charter company was 
not in and of itself a solid foundation for the British to break into hostile 
Eastern markets. In the seventeenth century the pursuit of Eastern trade was 
an exaggerated enterprise carried out in a hostile and unstable setting. Direct 
trade i.e. the exchange of goods between two nations with the surplus paid for 
in specie, was comparatively rare. Trade revolved around the purchase, transfer 
and resale of commodities at a higher price. Several mediating exchanges were 
needed to realise the greatest possible return so that a large proportion of trade 
was concerned with the transportation of goods, but there was no general 
security or framework within which trade could be undertaken. When the 
Company first sought to establish trade routes through the East at the start of 
the seventeenth century, the Moghul Dynasty ruled and controlled an area 
corresponding to the later British Empire from its traditional seat at Delhi; the 
Safavid Persians were the dominant local power in the Persia Gulf, although 
they were engaged until 1639 in a conflict with the Ottoman Turks who 
controlled an area to the west of the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf around 
the Red Sea; but the dominant regional power in the Persian Gulf at the start 
of the seventeenth century was Portuguese. The Portuguese and the Dutch 
between them operated an effective monopoly of the European and coastal 
spice trade for the first fifty years of the seventeenth century, and forcibly 
resisted English competition to open up the spice trade, underselling pepper on 
European markets and in the case of the Dutch engaging in war.6 Ilbert noted 
that: 
'In the seventeenth century the conditions under which private trade is now carried 
on with the East did not exist. Beyond certain narrow territorial limits international law did 
not run, diplomatic relations had no existence. Outside those limits force alone ruled, and 
trade competition meant war. '7 
61 See Lawson (1994) p39-45 for details of the Anglo-Dutch Wars. 
11 Ilbert (1915) p9. Lawson (1994) has suggested that together with a similar Dutch 
agreement, the Elizabethan trading charters formed a Protestant counter-claim to the Papal 
Bull that divided the world into Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence. 
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The intimate association of trade and war produced demands within the 
Company for the devolution of more extensive royal prerogative. The 
Company argued that a greater concentration of power was imperative for its 
continued success. Sir Joshua Childs, a director of the Company in the 
seventeenth century, justified his philosophy of, and his ambitions for East 
Indian trade to the king, writing in 1684 that: 
'The first consideration in my poor opinion, ought to he abstractively what powers a 
National East India Company ought to have for the public good to hold up against the Dutch 
and other foreign nations in India; and I say and will maintain it against all mankind by 
reason and experience, that it ought to be not less than absolute sovereign power in India. ** 
The Company then used its established position and moderate success 
to realise its sovereign ambitions. Legal and illegal payouts to parliamentary 
shareholders provided the Company with the necessary leverage to increase 
their delegated authority. In the first instance, the temporary charter under 
which the Company was regulated, was renewed and extended through 
widespread bribery of Government ministries and the later deposit of 
substantial revenue with the Treasury. The East India Company accordingly 
became the major underwriter of publicly-funded treasury debt, at a time when 
central funds were difficult to raise.9 Under such circumstances, the positive 
disposition of government towards the Company was no surprise and extensive 
power could be extracted as a quid pro quo. In addition, spectacular dividends 
were paid to investors that encouraged goodwill toward the Company 
Parliamentary subscribers who benefited from the Company's prosperity 
provided the Company with a significant and vocal ready-made political lobby 
As long as the prosperity of the Company was assured, this process appeared a 
closed circle: more power led to greater trade returns that in turn demanded 
more power. 
Accordingly the Company was granted additional powers through the 
course of the seventeenth century as a defence against European competition: 
8 / quoted in Sutherland (1951) p4. 
91 Lawson (1994) pp54-7 and pp74-77 for more detail about the financial contributions the 
East India Company made to the British Crown in return for its priveleges. 
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in 1617 it was granted the right to form its own naval squadron, the Bombay 
Marine; in 1661 the Company was given the power and command over 
fortresses and authorised to appoint governors and officials for government 
under English law and granted the right to make peace or war with non-
Christian people in the places of its trade for the most advantage and benefit to 
the Company; in 1669 it was granted Bombay at a nominal annual rent of £10 
by the Crown; in 1677 the Company was empowered to coin money and in 
1687 it was given full power to declare and make peace and war with heathen 
nations. Again, in the early eighteenth century, notwithstanding Child's Bill and 
the Redbridge affair,1 0 the Company benefited by the establishment of several 
municipalities in 1726; the licensed formation of a Company army in 1748; the 
application of the English Mutiny Acts in 1754; and power by treaty to dispose 
of territories acquired by conquest excluding those acquired from European 
powers without special license from the Crown which was acknowledged, as 
well as the Company's right to claim booty and plunder from enemies by way 
of recompense for the cost of hostilities, in 1758.11 By the late 1750's the 
Company was no longer formed of 'speculators and pirates,' but had 
appropriated the sovereign rights of the British Crown and existed as a 'state 
in the disguise of a merchants.' Burke noted: 
'Those high and almost incommunicable prerogatives of sovereignty, which were 
hardly ever known before to be parted with to any subjects, and which, in several states, 
were not wholly intrusted to the prince or head of the commonwealth himself were given to 
the East India Company.'12 
As a result, 
' The East Indian Company was no longer merely a mercantile company, formed 
for the extension of the Great British commerce; it more nearly resembled a delegation of 
the whole power and sovereignty of this kingdom, sent into the East. ''3 
This delegation of sovereignty necessarily called into question the 
relationship between East India Company and Parliament. It raised the 
1 0 / A petition of merchants was presented to parliament on 30/12/1693 after the Admiralty 
impeded the ship before departure and led to a condemnation of the East India Company's 
trade monopoly that was referred to a Committee of the whole house. See Commons Journals 
vol. 11 (1693) p43. 
1 1 / See Hbert (1915) for a general history of the growth of the East India Company. 
12/Burke(1881)p22/3. 
1 3 /ibid. 
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immediate question of accountability: 'to whom did the Company owe 
responsibility?' Formally, as Burke was to argue during the impeachment of 
Warren Hastings, the Company remained 'subordinately sovereign.' It 
exercised the powers of sovereignty in a foreign or extra-territorial 
environment, but its existence and therefore its power derived from the British 
Crown. As such, the Company was bound by a formal obligation to act in 
accordance with parliamentary procedures and to uphold the democratic values 
embodied therein. Burke asserted that the magnitude of the Company's powers 
did not free the Company from its obligations, but rather increased the degree 
of its subordinate responsibility because of the intimate trust that parliament 
had bestowed upon the Company: 
'In delegating great power to the East India Company this kingdom has not abased 
its sovereignty; on the contrary the responsibility of the Company is increased by the 
greatness and sacredness of the powers that have been entrusted to it.,14 
In practice, the mutual interdependence of government and the 
Company cancelled out the Company's formal accountability. 
At an early stage the relationship between the East India Company and 
the state had already become entrenched. The East India Company owed its 
existence to parliament, and was dependent on the renewal of the charter for its 
continued survival, but endeavoured to minimise parliamentary interference in 
its affairs; parliament on the other hand sought to liberate the benefits of 
Eastern commerce for itself and intervened in the affairs of the Company 
primarily to secure much-needed finances. Since the East India Company had, 
as a result of constant pecuniary demands, become the major creditor to the 
state, there was in practice, a mutual dependence upon each other.15 Parliament 
relied on the East Indian Company for its solvency as much as the Company 
relied on Parliament for its charter. The stability of this arrangement lasted until 
the Company involved itself in territorial expansion in the second half of the 
1 4/Burke (1881) p20. 
1 5 /For a brief summary of the relationship between the trading company and English state 
see Sutherland (1952) pp5-7. 
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eighteenth century, when the consolidation of vast Indian territories induced 
the bankruptcy of East India Company and allowed parliament the opportunity 
to reassert its high government, despite the fact that the Company had over the 
course of its tradings, and particularly since the turn of the eighteenth century, 
cultivated an alternative source of authority which in the case of India was the 
Moghul Empire, but in the Persian Gulf was indistinct and ill-defined. 
The development of this alternative source of power was directly 
related to the unstable and unprofitable nature of British trade resulting from 
the political turmoil of the South East Asian subcontinent that accompanied the 
decline of the Moghul Empire.16 For the first eighty years of trading in the 
East, the Company sought to extract trade concessions from the main local 
powers as opportunity presented itself. Concessions were granted at the ruler's 
discretion in the form of royal decrees -finnans. Occasional financial payment 
secured extended privileges but it was more by accident than conscious plan 
that the English were accepted into the Moghul Capitulations. Thereafter, a 
series of factories -holding warehouses- were established with Moghul 
acquiescence, to regulate English trade through India. Similar concessions that 
allowed the Company to trade in the Gulf were extracted from the Safavid 
Court of Persia as a quid pro quo in return for assistance against the 
Portuguese. The Company was granted permission to trade with Persia in 
1616, and secured the silk trade, which was conducted by royal monopoly 
after Spain declined the offer. Persia was thereafter used as a halfway trading 
stage at which Indian goods were exchanged for Persian silks. The Company 
exported pepper, Persian silk and Indian calico to Europe. Factories were 
subsequently established by concessionary agreement at Shiraz, Ispahan (both 
opened 1617), Jask (opened 1619) and Bandar 'Abbas (opened 1624).17 In 
addition a factory was opened at Basrah in Turkish Arabia in 1636. Such 
1 67 See Davies.C.C. Rivalries in India in Lindsey (1970). 
1 7 / See Kelly (1968) pp50-56. An additional factory was established at Basrah in Turkish 
Arabia in 1639. 
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privileges transformed, albeit formally, the early, episodic commercial activity 
of the East India Company into fully fledged concessionary trade with a 
potentially lucrative return. 
The impact of such concessions was nonetheless moderated by the 
repercussions of political instability. The formal authority of royal firmans 
was often ignored by the country powers of India who invariably harassed and 
frustrated English trade throughout the seveenth and eighteenth centuries. 
The compound effect of this harassment and unfavourable contemporary 
vissitudes of trade produced a general crisis of Company trade that catalysed 
the Company to build up its authority and revenues by guaranteeing the general 
conditions for trade. This shift can be seen in a resolution of the Company 
from 1688 that argued that: 
'The increase of our revenue is the subject of our care as much as our trade; 'tis 
that must maintain our force when twenty accidents may interrupt our trade; 'tis that must 
make us a nation in India; without that we are but a number of interlopers, united by His 
Majesty's royal charter, fit only to trade where nobody of power thinks it their interest to 
,18 
prevent us. 
During the course of the eighteenth century, the Company received 
several concessionsons that granted it the responsibility for overseeing and 
regulating Indian trade. The investiture by royal fiat in 1759 of the Commodore 
of the Bombay Marine with the dignity of Admiral of the Empire gave the 
Bombay Marine the right to fly the Moghul flag but implicitly assumed that the 
Commodore in accepting the above responsibility would subsequently 
guarantee the security of the Indian country trade. Such an obligation was a 
substantial undertaking given the widespread piracy practised on the Indian 
trade after the collapse of Portuguese authority in the Gulf. 1 9 Miles noted 
that: 
1 8 / Quoted in Ilbert (1915) p23. 
1 9 / Renegade English and French vessels were the major and most notorious perpetrators of 
regional piratical endeavours in the eighteenth century. See Qasimi (1988) and Kelly (1968). 
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'Since the expulsion of the Portuguese from Muscat the Arabian Sea had ceased to 
be policed and guarded by their warships no other power had stepped in to afford protection 
to sea-borne traffic, and the Indians, Persians, and Portuguese had in consequence suffered 
severely at the ravages done to the commerce by the Arabs, who fearlessly scoured the ocean 
in all directions with impunity. ' 2 0 
Naturally, the Company had extended protection to shipping before to 
minimise the losses caused by piracy, but as Kelly noted: 
'The dignity of the Mughal Admiral conferred upon the ('ompany's commodore was 
not an empty one; a duty devolved upon him and upon the Company to safeguard Indian 
maritime commerce. Protection had been afforded to shipping other than that under the 
Company's flag in the Persian and Arabian Gulfs before 1759, and it was possible that its 
continuance after that date could properly be regarded as a legal obligation upon the 
Company.121 
In effect, the Admiral formalised the obligation of the Company to 
guarantee Indian trade. It thus offered the Company a leading role on the 
Arabian seas. 
The Company's control over Indian trade was enhanced further by the 
recognition of Basrah as a consulate under the Ottoman system of 
Capitulations in 1764.22 The British Agent was thereafter permitted to charge a 
2% consulage levy against the value of goods shipped in cargo through Basrah 
by British protected boats. This was essentially an economic capitulation, 
allowing the Company a share of third party cargo trade.23 However, as it was 
an exclusive agreement, consulage also acted as a crude mechanism for further 
regulating Indian trade. The Company was subsequently in a position to refuse 
undesirable boats entry into British Indian ports. Since most shipping under 
British protection originated in India, in effect, the Company was handed 
control over a large part of the Indian trade - indeed practically all of it except 
the Arab trade in the hands of the Al Khalifah and the Qawasim. 
Qasimi has suggested that the English popularised and perceived a non-existent increase in 
piracy since this tended to transfer much of the carrying trade to English vessels. 
1 0/Miles (1966) p221. 
2 1/Kelly (1968) p61. 
2 2 / See Kelly (1968) pp52-3. 
2 3 / See Lorimer (1970) part II ppl57/8. 
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Simultaneously, parliament's interest in Company business and its 
desire to reassert its control over the Company were stimulated in the 1760's 
by a perceived irresponsibility. There was a general lack of imperial confidence 
towards the end of the eighteenth century during the crisis leading to the loss of 
the American colonies, and a growing dissatisfaction with the perceived 
oppressive nature of the East Indian trade that was visibly flaunted round 
London by returning Indian officers. The apparent use of the Company's 
exclusive trading monopoly for private aggrandisement produced a strong anti-
monopoly current that argued in favour of a more enlightened parliamentary 
control of Eastern trade. This opposition expressed itself through the sitting of 
a 1766 Commons Committee appointed to inquire about the state and 
condition of the East India Company, a 1772 Secret Parliamentary Committee 
into the Company's crash, the 1773 Regulating Act, Fox's and Pitt's India Bills 
and ultimately the impeachment of Warren Hastings2 4 The Company initially 
sought to defend itself against parliamentary interference and undertook in part 
to reform itself, but when it was obliged to prorogue Parliament in the 
aftermath of the Crash in order to stay solvent, it placed itself at Parliament's 
mercy and had no choice but to accept the reforms imposed upon it by Pitt's 
India Act. 
Under the articles of the India Act of 1784, British Home Government 
institutionalised its checks and controls over the affairs of the East India 
Company The Act established a duel structure of formalised parliamentary 
control regulating the non-commercial aspects of the Company's business An 
English Board of Control comprised of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, six 
members of the Privy Council and one Secretary of State was inaugurated to 
oversee the Court of Directors and reinforce the Company's responsibility to 
parliament. The creation of this Board of Control, formally curtailed the 
independence of the Company as sovereign actor distinct from parliament. 
2 4 / See Watson (1960) pp261-269. 
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The Company's field representatives still acted with a substantial autonomy on 
the ground, a fact that minimised the immediate ramifications of more direct 
parliamentary control. Yet the parliamentary assault of the 1790's transformed 
the role and nature of the East India Company. It exacerbated the shift towards 
a predominantly political role for the company, placing greater emphasis on the 
social costs of trade, the equitable exercise of the powers of the East India 
Company in the interests of humanity and civilisation, and against the French 
As Tuson noted: 
'From the late eighteenth century onwards the Factories were superseded by a 
complicated network of Residencies and Agencies whose primary functions were no longer 
economic but almost entirely political - their chief raison d 'etre being the protection of the 
sea and overland routes to India and the preservation of the imperial status-quo in the face 
of growing interference from other European powers.'' 
The emergence of political interests of state that supplanted the more 
insular economic concerns of the Company thus created the imperative for 
British intervention in the Arabian Gulf to secure a stable regional peace. 
I f this parliamentary activity of the 1790's is seen in the context of 
later developments, then it clearly set in motion the trend for parliament to 
commandeer the powers and rights bestowed on the Company and the imperial 
prize that went with them. Subsequent administrative reorganisations that 
instituted clear channels of authority and introduced greater accountability of 
personnel were effected through the nineteenth century, extending parliament's 
control over the Company and its Indian territories. Although formal double 
government continued until 1858, the power of the Company was broken by 
the 1820's and control over Eastern affairs was regularised through the 
Governments of India and Bombay. Privileges that were deemed inexpedient or 
undesirable were nullified over time. The Company's monopoly privileges were 
eroded in 1813 and 1833 by the liberalisation of trade; the charter in perpetuity 
was replaced by an unspecified and indefinite term in 1853 and the Company's 
naval force was disbanded in 1863. A comprehensive reform of Indian affairs 
/ Tuson (1978) Introduction p. xiii. 
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occurred in 1858 with the successful passage of Stanley's Act for the Better 
Government of India which fundamentally restructured the administration of 
the Eastern Empire. Thereafter India was governed directly by and in the name 
of the Crown through a Secretary of State. Additionally the property of the 
Company was transferred to the Crown; the Board of Control was replaced by 
a fifteen member non-parliamentary council; channels of communication were 
improved and the civil service was opened up. Conscious attempts were also 
made to separate the business of India from the general business of parliament. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer had been removed from the Board of Control 
in 1793 and a new position of President of the Board created. This President 
was eventually replaced in 1858 by the Secretary of State for India and a 
distinct Indian department of Central Government established. Viewed as a 
whole, the sum total of these reforms was to reconstitute the Company as a 
formal colonial government of the East, separating the powers of the Company 
from the Company itself. 
The interventions in the Persian Gulf between 1800 and 1820 that were 
ostensibly directed at the Qawasim, were spawn from this new political current 
that represented parliamentary hegemony over the East India Company. The 
Company's interest in the Persian Gulf had declined in late eighteenth century 
owing to adverse events and the Company's focus with the Indian mainland. 
Pestilence, piracy and war inhibited the potential of trade and encouraged the 
Company to withdraw from its factories: Bushire was abandoned in 1769 after 
a disagreement with Karim Khan Zand; Basrah deserted in 1773 after an 
outbreak of plague, and again in 1779 upon the death of Karim Khan.2 6 The 
Company had no real presence on the Arabian side of the Gulf before 1800. 
The Resident at Bushire started an annual tour of the Arabian Coast in 1806, 
but the English were content to recognise the Imam of Muscat as dominant 
sea-faring power and encourage him to monitor the Indian trade and contain 
/Lorimer (1970) part II p 166. 
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incidents of piracy. Attempts were made to isolate British vessels from piracy 
and instability through a series of treaties and alliances: an alliance was signed 
with the Imam of Muscat in 1798, friendly letters were exchanged with 
Rahman bin Jabir in 1810, friendly overtures were made to the Wahhabis and 
an unauthorised treaty of friendship was compacted by the Resident in 1816 
with the Al Khalifah.2 7 At the same time the Company disdained to extend its 
protection to third parties and was reluctant to involve itself in the maelstrom 
of Gulf maritime affairs. An appeal from the Amirs of Sind for naval protection 
against the Qawasim was rejected at Bombay on the grounds that piratical 
attacks on non-British ships were of no concern to the Company.28 However, 
the re-emergence of the French and the perceived danger that French passage 
through and influence in the Persian Gulf might pose to Indian interests 
stimulated the Company to accept responsibility for the general stability of the 
Persian Gulf. From 1790 imperial dictates and a perceived ethical altruism both 
demanded the immediate pacification and stabilisation of the Persian Gulf. 
The emergence of the French in the Persian Gulf forced the Company 
to take a more active interest in regional affairs in order to protect their 
possessions in India. Against the backdrop of the Napoleonic assault, policy-
makers in London believed that Napoleon would exploit a route to India 
through the Persian Gulf and instructed that all possible means to inhibit his 
progress should be utilised. In a letter to George Grenville, the Secretary of 
State for the Foreign Office, Henry Dundas, Secretary of State of War and 
President of the Board of Control, explained that i f Bonaparte were to attack 
India then: 
'Bonaparte will, as much as possible, avoid the dangers of the sea, which is not his 
element, but trusting to his own exertions and the enthusiasm of his followers, endeavours to 
accomplish his object by marching to Aleppo, cross the Euphrates, and following the 
example of Alexander, by following the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, and descending to the 
Persian Gulph, and thence proceeding along the coast to the Indus. ' 2 9 
I See Kelly (1968) pl26/7. 
/ See Kelly (1968) pl31. 
/ quoted in Kelly (1968) p63. 
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The Company's interest in India required the preservation of the Persian 
Gulf as a neutral buffer zone, free from any hostile European influence This 
could only be done, i f the Company itself was prepared to take a leading role in 
the Persian Gulf and was able to control the region. A strategic battle ensued, 
in which the conflict over India was transposed to the Persian Gulf. Lorimer 
mentions 'systematic depredations by French war vessels and privateers 
against British sea-borne commerce' during this period.30 For their part, the 
Company demonized the French hoping to discourage local Francophile 
sympathies. In a very ordinary communication the Resident in the Persian Gulf 
in 1808, Smith, warned JafFer Ali Khan to be careful against French, adding 
that his warnings may be superfluous since: 
7 trust your own discretion and the honorable character you bear will guard you 
against all their evil propensities and that the almighty who sees all our actions and hears 
all our secret thoughts will protect the good and just from the oppression of the wicked.,31 
Yet despite the Company's best endeavours, French diplomatic 
intrigues culminated in a series of alliances that undermined British pre-
eminence. The French reached an agreement with Persia under the Treaty of 
Firkenstein in May 1807 and established a Consul at Muscat in either 1807 or 
1808. Further the growing intimacy between the Ottomans and the French led 
to a rupture between the British and the Ottomans in early 1807. 
The Company could not directly confront the French with its military 
resources and therefore attempted to counter French diplomacy with its own 
diplomatic efforts. Sir William Jones and Sir John Malcolm were sent to the 
Persian Gulf in May 1807 to secure the Company's regional predominance. 
Their mission resulted in a Preliminary treaty with the Shah under the terms of 
which the: 
'Shah annulled all his previous arrangements whatever they might be, with other 
European powers, and undertook to refuse a passage through Persia to a European army 
proceeding against the British dominions in India. 
I Lorimer (1970) part II pl69 estimated French damage to Calcutta shipping in 1807 
alone was equivalent to £300,000. 
3 1/BLOIORLR/15/1/10 19/1/1808. 
32/Lorimer (1970) part n pl79. 
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However, since the French had undertaken to guarantee the Persians 
against Russia, the Company was obliged to promise British support for Persia 
against any hostile encroachment on that country by a European power and 
was drawn once more into the melee of regional politics. The French 
effectively broke the isolation that the Company had attempted to cultivate. As 
Kelly noted: 
'The result was to draw Britain into a lasting political relationship with the 
Ottoman and Persian Empires. ^3 
The immediate French threat receded by 1810 since Napoleon 
concentrated thereafter on the Continental Blockade and the French navy had 
suffered heavy losses, but Russian manoeuvres around Herat posed a similar 
threat to the Company's position in India. A further treaty was concluded 
with Persia in 1814 to offset this Russian danger, yet the Company remained 
vulnerable to any changes in the status quo. A deep nervousness pervaded the 
strategic considerations of the Company. In an attempt to improve its position, 
channels of communication between Residencies and Governments were 
restructured. The Basrah Residency was abandoned leaving three regional 
Residencies at Bushire, Muscat and Baghdad. The political business of the 
Company was concentrated in one residency, and all regional affairs were 
subject to approval only of the Government of Bombay, which in turn reported 
to the Government of India at Fort William. 3 4 The Company was subsequently 
more sensitive to both local and external instability.35 Accordingly, Egyptian 
moves towards the Arabian Littoral, the decline of the rise of Wahhabis and a 
resurgence of local piracy in the first twenty years of the nineteenth century had 
3 3 /See Kelly (1968) p63. Lorimer (1970) part II p214-216. 
34/Lorimer (1970) part n p214-216. 
3 5 / Early primitive means of communication gave the British personnel great licence at their 
postings. Accordingly the dominant influence of individual residents and agents is a striking 
feature of early British policy. Individual personnel such as Wilson, Stannus, Hennell, Bruce 
& Hajee Jaseem had a disproportionate & at times obstructive influence on Bahraini affairs. 
Before the introduction of a regular steam service, correspondence between Bahrain and 
Bombay took an average of either two weeks during the NE monsoon, or four to six weeks 
during the SE monsoon. The introduction of the telegraph greatly reduced the autonomy of 
the Resident and the potential for conflict between Government and its subordinates by 
promoting the importance and proximity of the Government and the Indian Office. 
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developments solidified the Company's resolve to pacify the area once and for 
all. 
There were still those who argued against further responsibilities, 
indeed the Court of Directors indicated in January 1819 that 'a pacific and 
unambitious policy' was the best course of action in the foreseeable future,3 6 
but a peaceful policy in the Gulf could only be followed by imposing the 
hegemony of peace from outside and imposing it on a community dedicated to 
piracy. Three expeditions, with the express aim of suppressing piracy and 
establishing maritime tranquillity were thus sent to the Gulf in 1800, 1809 and 
1820. Each expedition focused on the destruction of Qasawim 'piratical' 
settlements on the Arabian Littoral. However the success of the Qawasim in re-
establishing their community after the first two expeditions minimised the 
impact of the Company's military deterrent and failed to introduce the desired 
security of transit or pacifism. A more comprehensive restructuring of the 
Persian Gulf was thus contemplated before the Third Expedition in 1820 which 
heralded the beginnings of an unworkable nineteenth century paradigm for the 
management of the Gulf. 
7 Quoted in Kelly (1968) pl27. 
Chapter Three: Laying the Foundations 
The 1820's and the General Treaty 
Pre-invasion discussions within the higher echelons of the Company 
prior to the Third Expedition indicated the conscious intent behind the 
Company's intervention in the affairs of the Gulf. It was however a confused 
synthesis of separate policy objectives that quickly unravelled when put into 
application. Ostensibly, the Expedition was sent to establish a general peace 
throughout the Gulf and eradicate piracy; however, resettlement of the Gulf 
after the Third Expedition spawned an unworkable and impractical paradigm 
dominated by unresolvable contradictions. The Directors planned to use this 
expedition to accommodate or marginalise Persia, establish a permanent 
English military presence, bind the incumbent Sheikhs to good behaviour, and 
restructure the balance of power to exclude the Qawasim and other 
recalcitrant parties. The fact that these political ambitions were mutually 
exclusive was not an immediate cause for concern. Contradictory strands of 
policy that reflected the changing colonial attitudes were simultaneously 
followed by the contemporary Resident in the Gulf, Captain Bruce until 
Company policy approached the ridiculous. Out of the crisis engendered by 
Bruce's diplomacy in 1822, a system of independent Sheikhs including the Al 
Khalifah, was established as a mediating layer for managing the affairs of the 
Gulf, the dominant feature of which was the tension between non-
intervention and conspicuous Company patronage for the independent 
Sheikhs. 
The key foci of the Company's pre-Expedition plans in 1820 was the 
acquisition of a regional military base in the Gulf and the need for effective 
measures to suppress piracy. By asserting its moral obligation to redress 
piracy, the Company directly challenged Persia's traditional authority over the 
Gulf and asserted its own authority. It hoped to achieve a commanding 
position in the Gulf whilst Persia did not possess the means to confront it. Yet 
the Company also hoped to avoid intimate involvement in the day to day 
affairs and disputes of the Gulf. Britain sought the maximum advantage from 
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the situation whilst incurring the minimum obligation It proposed to lay waste 
to the main piratical settlements, establish a deterrent and then adopt a 
supervisory role, absolving itself from the practical management of Gulf 
shipping. Nepean, the architect of these plans, was committed to extending 
the regional influence of the Imam of Muscat, the Company's traditional ally 
in the Gulf, believing this the surest method of stabilising the local affairs of 
the region without involving the Company in the maelstrom of Gulf politics. 
Al Qasimi has suggested that the Third Expedition was the nadir of a policy 
designed to criminalise and neuter local trade rivals which the Company had 
pursued, unrelentingly despite Arab attempts to mediate a settlement 
Concentrating his research on the correspondence between Taylor and Bruce 
during 1816 and 1817, he has argued that desirous of securing control of the 
Indian trade, the British refused to countenance any other course of action 
apart from military engagement. He wrote that: 
'From this correspondence it becomes absolutely clear that what the British wanted 
was to allow Indian ships, whether belonging to their subjects or not, to transport all trade in 
the area at the expense of Arab ships. The British also wanted to grant their protection to 
goods and ships belonging to other nations, irrespective of their animosity to the Arabs of 
the Gulf, it also becomes clear that the Arabs were willing to allow British goods and ships 
to pass unmolested even to unfriendly ports. The desire of the Arabs to reach an agreement 
with the British was as great as their determination to fight when necessary, but the British 
appear to have been planning all along to use force, when it became available, to impose 
their domination on the Gulf.'' 
Certainly, the clear determination of the British to use force in the 
early nineteenth century is very evident, although it is arguable whether this 
was motivated quite so strongly by trade concerns, extending as far back into 
the 1790's, as Al Qasimi seems to suggest. The foremost consideration raised 
in private correspondence prior to the Third Expedition was the need to 
suppress piracy. 
To this end, the Company hoped that peace and security could be 
maintained by a mediating layer of anonymous territorial rulers subject to the 
most liberal British supervision, and as such showed no favouritism or 
V Al Qasimi (1990) p204. 
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commitment to any local party. As far as Britain was concerned, one proxy 
Arab ruler was as good as another. Francis Warden, who was co-ordinating 
the pre-invasion planning, informed Nepean during discussions that: 
'It must be perfectly immaterial to the British Government to what Power or Powers 
the different islands and ports on the Persian and Arabian shores may devolve, provided the 
main and sole object of our solicitude, the complete suppression ofpiracy, be attained. ^ 
By virtue of their incumbency, the dominant Sheikhs throughout the 
Gulf were favoured agents for affecting the suppression of piracy, but no great 
concern was paid to the rulers themselves. As long as the general layer of 
petty territorial independent chiefs survived intact, the personal character of 
these rulers was of no importance to the Company: any layer of petty 
independent chiefs would have effected British ambitions. As such Britain 
was prepared to recognise and deal with any impartial party that could 
guarantee the tranquillity of their territory and their subjects. Thus whilst on the 
one hand Britain exhibited friendliness towards the Al Khalifah, it was 
equally prepared to countenance their removal from power. In spite of the 
fact that friendly correspondence had been exchanged with the Al Khalifah 
Sheikhs since 1807 and a Treaty of Friendship concluded in 1816,3 serious 
consideration was given, in the pre-invasion planning stage of the Third 
Expedition, to the idea of removing the Al Khalifah. 
By 1820 the Al Khalifah had become adversely tainted by their 
association with the Qawasim who were also in alliance with the Wahhabis. 
At one stage the Resident reported that Bahrain was akin to a piratical 
settlement.4 As far as the Company was concerned, this perceived alliance 
between the Al Khalifah, the Wahhabis and the Qawasim called into question 
the Al Khalifahs' commitment to the suppression of piracy. It was considered 
21 Warden quoted Kelly (1968) ppl41/2. 
3 / BLOIORL R/15/1/10 Smith/Edmonstone no.39 dated 30/6/1807 mentions an exchange of 
letters. The Treaty of Friendship was concluded by Bruce under terms which gave Bahraini 
vessels favourable entry into Indian ports, but HenneUV ?? no.44 dated 15/1/1837 (BLOIORL 
R/15/1/72) mentions that no record can be found of it ever being ratified. 
"/ See Lorimer (1970) part np201. 
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as moral justification for any measures that the Company might choose to 
pursue against the incumbent rulers. Nepean wrote that: 
'We have no hesitation in offering our opinion that the protection recently afforded 
by the Shaikh to the Joasmees has been of a character that would in our opinion fully justify 
any measures which might be adopted for wrestling the authority he possesses in that island 
out of his hands. ^ 
Accordingly a suggestion that the Al Khalifah be deposed or removed 
from Bahrain was included in a draft plan submitted by Nepean to the Court of 
Directors which was subsequently discussed by the higher echelons.6 
Nepean suggested that in the aftermath of the expeditions the islands 
of Bahrain be made over to the Imam. However the Governor-General, at that 
time Mountstuart Elphinstone, dismissed Nepean's plan for the islands, 
believing such interference in the affairs of Bahrain unnecessary. Elphinstone 
was prepared to accept a guarantee from the Al Khalifah attesting to their 
pacifism and hostility to piracy as sufficient indication of their acquiescence 
to British objectives and saw no need to take action against the Al Khalifah 
unless confronted with firm evidence of piratical activity. In his reply to 
Nepean, Elphinstone directed that: 
'We should abstain from all interference in the pretensions which are advanced to 
the occupation of Bahrain under a distinct explanation to the Sheikh of that Island that so 
long as he restrains his tribe from the prosecution of acts of oppression on the high seas, and 
carries on those commercial pursuits in which they would appear to have formerly engaged, 
the ports of India shall be open to his vessels, and that he may rely upon experiencing from 
the British Government every degree of encouragement and of friendly intercourse; but that, 
on the contrary, if any indication of a piratical spirit should manifest themselves, we shall be 
compelled to adopt those measures of coercion which we are prosecuting against the 
Joasmees. '7 
Yet at the same time Elphinstone sent instructions to General Keir, 
commander of the Third Expedition, which directed him to make Bahrain 
over to the Imam of Muscat in the event of him having to take action against 
the Al Khalifah.8 Keir therefore sailed to the Gulf with two standing orders: 
V ibid. 
61 Nepean letter dated 14/4/1819 quoted in Kelly (1968) pl41. 
7 / Elphinstone in reply to Nepean dated 15/12/1819 quoted in Kelly (1968) pl62. The Third 
Expedition sailed from Bombay on the 3/11/1819 and it is unclear whether Keir was 
informed of Elphinstone's opinion on this matter. Keir's subsequent actions re: Bahrain were 
however consistent with general policy. 
8 / Kelly (1968) pl63. Orders were sent on the 26/2/20. 
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secure the general stability by entering into a compact with local rulers, and 
eradicate the pirates and piracy by force i f necessary 
The Third Expedition met with apparent success. Keir razed Ras Al 
Khaymah and then negotiated a General Treaty [see appendix two] which was 
signed by all major Arabian chiefs in January and February 1820.9 The formal 
content of this treaty was restricted to the question of piracy, the treaty also 
laid down a marker for a new regional modus operandi. Even though the 
Treaty appeared at first to merely codify the existing balance of power, the 
symbiosis of traditional forms of diplomacy and authority with those 
expressed in the treaty changed the dynamics of the Gulf. The subsequent 
history of the Gulf was determined by the changes that were introduced by this 
agreement. 
The substantial articles of the treaty embodied resolutions that 
prohibited 'aggressive' war and criminalised piracy and plunder. The concept 
of piracy was not admitted to by the seafarers of the Persian Gulf, but certain 
acts were considered by the East India Company to be a clear violation of their 
mercantile prerogatives. Piracy was thus defined in article two of the resultant 
compact as. 
'the killing of men and taking of goods without proclamation, avowal, and the order 
of a government. ' , 0 
However, the subtext that became apparent immediately was that 
Britain reserved the right to distinguish legitimate and piratical acts. The 
9 / The required guarantee of the Bahraini's peaceful disposition was proffered to General 
Keir by Sa'id Abdul Jalil bin Sa'id Yasal Tabatabee, who met Keir on behalf of the Al 
Khalifah Sheikhs in the aftermath of the attack on Ras Al Khaymah. The two parties 
subsequently concluded a Preliminary Treaty -see appendix- on the 5th of February 1820, 
under the terms of which, the Al Khalifah Sheikhs were admitted to the General Treaty in 
return for their verbal confirmation of their friendliness to Britain. Once this treaty had been 
ratified, the Al Khalifah and the state of Bahrain were recognised as legitimate, independent 
entities, even though their independence still needed to be established in the face of foreign 
claims for zakat, the on-going conflict with the Jalahimah and the potential threat of war 
with the Omanis. 
1 0 / Article Two, General Treaty with the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf. See accompanying 
Appendix Two. 
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eradication of piracy constituted a legitimate war, and in so defining the 
concept of legitimate war, Britain had invented a supervisory role for itself that 
maintained its hegemony. 
All signatories to the Treaty were granted the right to engage in 
legitimate hostilities, that were distinguished from piracies by the registering 
of their intention with British Authorities. 'Legitimate' war was regulated 
through the British Resident, but once registered with the British could be 
pursued upto the point of submission. This provision for legitimate war was 
also intended as an outlet for genuine conflict amongst the inhabitants of the 
Gulf that would isolate Britain from involvement in the intimate affairs of the 
Gulf. MacLeod, the Political Resident in 1822 and 1823, issued clear 
instructions to the Commanding Officer of the Persian Gulf Squadron that: 
'In cases evidently of lawful war even amongst the tribes themselves argument and 
remonstrances are the utmost obstacle we can oppose to the hostilities of the parties, 
whatever reason we may have to dread the consequences. If they persist we cannot interfere 
further unless we find their proceedings diverted from their legitimate objects to piracy. ' U 
However the general distinction between aggressive and legitimate 
war remained nebulous and complicated. In addition, the treaty called for a 
system of local registers supervised by the British to distinguish legitimate 
from piratical mariners and for the signatories to act collectively to deny 
piratical vessels rights of passage and harbour. 
The real impact of the General Treaty had more to do with its form than 
its content. Whilst the treaty appeared to be an innocuous agreement 
between independent rulers of territorial states -albeit signed by the Arabs 
after British intimidation- for the mutually desirable suppression of piracy and 
preservation of maritime tranquillity, the Arab chieftains signed the treaty with 
an authority that they could barely have claimed and would have found hard to 
justify. Notwithstanding, the treaty recognised them as independent and 
territorial sovereigns. Once the treaty was ratified, the authority of its 
1 1 / BLOIORL R/15/1/26 MacLeod/ Captain Faithfull undated, ree d 24/1/1823. 
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signatories had not only shifted dramatically, but was also formally guaranteed 
by English law. The novelty of the treaty lay in conjuring into existence a 
mediating layer of independent, territorial Sheikhs onto whom the Company 
hoped to pass its responsibility for the pacification and security of the Persian 
Gulf. The petty Arab chiefs were now recognised as independent territorial 
sovereigns and made responsible for the misdemeanours and aggressions 
perpetrated by those who lived in their demarcated territorial area of authority 
This created the imperative for the chiefs to assert an authority over these 
'subjects' and discourage piracy, even though the subject people themselves 
may have had little allegiance to the chieftain, lest they themselves incur 
penalties under the General Treaty. 
The conclusion of the General Treaty and the creation of this 
mediating layer of Arab proxies was expected and appeared to have 
established a stable Pax Britannica without substantially increasing Britain's 
obligations. When forwarding the treaty to Bruce, Keir wrote: 
7 am led to hope that the impression which has been produced by our success at 
Ras alKhyma, and Zayha and the conclusion of the above mentioned Treaties will completely 
settle the Arabian Coast of the Gulf. ' u 
Such sentiment appeared well founded. In contrast to the explicit 
hostility and intransigence collectively displayed by the local chiefs towards the 
British at Ras Al Khaymah in 1816, they now appeared to accept British 
supremacy. Britain appeared to have convincingly established its dominance 
and imposed a consensus for the suppression of piracy and the stabilisation of 
the Gulf. However the Treaty was apparently met with sharp rebuff by 
Elphinstone, and only reluctantly accepted by the Court of Directors.13 In the 
long term, it led to consequences far removed from the pre-invasion planning. 
A new modus operandi was certainly established, but one that acted against 
British interests throughout the nineteenth century, until the imperial authorities 
1 2 /BLOIORL R/15/1/21, Keir/Bruce 10/1/20. 
1 3 / See Kelly (1968) pl04-131 and Al Qasimi (1988) for a more detailed account of the 
Expeditions. 
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refashioned the system of independent Arab chiefs into a more formalised 
colonial relationship managed through Orders-in-Council. 
In many respects the Treaty was a failure The problems that the 
General Treaty sought to solve, continued unabated. The system of shipping 
registers designed to eliminate piracy had been already tried and abandoned as 
unworkable only fifty years previously. When the Agent and Council at 
Basrah introduced a system of British colours in 1767, by which third-party 
seafarers paid for the privilege to sail under a British flag, the measure was 
roundly condemned by the Court of Directors as the 'most extraordinary 
transaction.'14 It was noted then that such supervision would exacerbate rather 
than dampen the instability of the Gulf. The Agent was warned that: 
'You must expect constant complaints that no regard has been paid to the passes, 
which you have no power to redress, unless the fleet was kept whole years in the Gulf 
besides this we must be in a general state of war with all Arabs, and if no notice is taken of 
the insult, our credit is lost. ''5 
Predictably, the system of registers introduced under the General 
Treaty suffered the same problems and was rapidly abandoned and had fallen 
into abeyance by the mid-1820's without making any substantial headway 
against piracy. Thereafter the British maintained a close supervision of 
piratical transgressions against shipping, but could not suppress piracy, since 
the responsibility for redress was placed upon the independent Chiefs. 
Since the treaty codified only one side of the contemporary balance of 
power, it actually compounded regional instability The consensus reflected 
in the Treaty was artificially engendered by excluding those parties or issues 
which could not elicit broad agreement. Keir explained this in a positive light 
to Bruce, reasoning that the value of the treaty lay precisely in its broad and 
general nature: 
1 4 / See Lorimer (1970) part II pl60. 
1 5 / quoted Lorimer (1970) part II pp!60/l. 
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'All matters of a temporary or individual nature have been included in Preliminary 
Treaties., with the several chiefs that the General Treaty might he reserved exclusively for 
arrangements of a permanent nature or such as are common to the whole of the contracting 
Tribes and it will be observed that it has being so worded as to admit of the accession of 
future adherents. ''6 
Whilst the treaty appeared to create a peaceful pro-English bloc 
amongst the local chiefs, it did little to solve individual grievances and 
conflict which were the real causes of instability In reality, there was no 
consensus. At the same time the treaty united those antithetical to the pacified 
Arabs. Rahman bin Jabir for instance refused to sign, claiming that he was a 
Wahhabi subject and was subsequently obliged to wage war as a subject of the 
Wahhabis, i.e. in an alliance with them, i f at all. 
Additionally the treaty created new problems. It ignored the question 
of suzerainty, but in no way prompted the Persians, Ottomans and the Imam of 
Muscat to forgo their claims. The Treaty promoted an uneasy co-existence of 
counter-claims, that neither recognised nor refuted each other. This artificial 
stability was repeatedly shattered by attempts of the parties to pursue their 
claims surreptitiously. Further it impressed upon the local chieftains a greater 
responsibility to supervise and control their subjects and to suppress maritime 
disorders. This disrupted the natural relationship between the ruler and their 
subjects and caused unnecessary social fragmentation. Tribal disputes that 
might previously have been settled by emigration or conquest, became now a 
constant source of friction and the potential for discord was exaggerated in the 
short-term by the territoralisation of authority. Most importantly, where the 
chiefs could not guarantee their own independence, the burden then fell upon 
the Company. Britain was obliged to maintain their independence, i f it was to 
preserve the fiction of independent Arab chieftain, but by granting the Chiefs 
their independence, Britain had absolved itself of responsibility for the Chiefs 
and proscribed its intervention in the affairs of independent Arab states. 
British policy, in so far as it committed itself to the system of independent 
"7 BLOIORL R15/1/21, Keir/Bruce 10/1/20. 
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states was consequently dominated by the tension between intervention or 
non-intervention and the need to secure British interests in a system that acted 
against them. 
The General Treaty thus heralded the foundation of a new paradigm 
for the Persian Gulf. It established the foundations for a system of independent 
states, but from the moment of its inception this system was wracked by 
unresolvable contradictions that prevented its successful operation and tended 
to destabilise the Gulf. The most immediate assault upon the new paradigm 
was the implications of diplomatic initiatives in Tehran between 1820-1822, 
aimed at securing a military base, which compromised the independence of 
the very states that Keir was busily recognising. For approximately two years, 
from 1820-1822, the Company's representative at the Court of Tehran, the 
Minister Plenipotentiary at the Shah's Court, Henry Bullock and its Resident 
in the Persian Gulf, Captain Bruce, were involved in discussions with the 
Persian Government regarding the status of Bahrain. These negotiations 
resulted in an unratified treaty between Captain Bruce and the Prince of Shiraz 
in August 1822 that appeared to admit the reasonableness of Persia's claim 
to suzerainty over Bahrain.17 Bruce's Treaty appears as one of the most 
singularly spectacular instances of diplomatically shooting oneself in the foot 
when placed against the General Treaty. However the actual events of 1822 
have been clouded by the controversy surrounding these negotiations and 
somewhat exaggerated. The Company's representatives at Tehran and 
Shiraz, Bullock and Bruce, did indeed encourage Persia to subdue Bahrain, 
but their action was consistent with the apparent demands of a British policy 
that was momentarily locked in contradiction and riven with confusion. 
"/This agreement was subsequently used as a foundation for Persia's presentation of its 
claim over Bahrain to the League of Nations in the 1920's. 
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During the pre-Expedition discussions, British policy was dominated 
by the apparent contradiction of interests vis-a-vis Bahrain as a mediating 
link in the fight against piracy and the need for British military base in the 
Gulf. The successful fulfilment of these ambitions required two diametrically 
opposed and mutually exclusive courses of action. Britain had either to uphold 
the independence of Bahrain as recognised by the General Treaty and hold the 
Bahraini Chief accountable for piratical transgressions by his subjects or in his 
territories, and so deny Persian influence over the island, or conciliate Persia 
in order to secure a base by encouraging or acquiescing in Persian 
encroachments and attacks on the Al Khalifah. This simultaneous diplomatic 
pressure produced two contradictory strands of policy which imbued British 
diplomacy with a seemingly schizophrenic lustre. Bullock and Bruce acted 
with an singular, common commitment to the need for securing a regional 
base. Whereas as Bullock's diplomacy passed by without controversy, Bruce 
who was more moderate, suffered censure and disgrace because his actions 
were no longer appropriate given the changing political configuration of the 
Gulf in the aftermath of the General Treaty. 
Contemporaneous with the conclusion of the General Treaty, Keir had 
reported the receipt of a letter from the Prince of Shiraz in early 1820 
requesting four or five British ships to help transport his army to Bahrain, 
which he speculated was destined to elucidate Britain's attitude to the island.18 
From 1820 onwards, the Prince of Shiraz had adopted the policy of annually 
attempting to invade against Bahrain in the hope of reducing tribute to the 
centre and making good his own taxation. Britain declined the offer since it 
compromised their adopted policy of non-intervention in the local affairs of the 
Gulf, but Bullock, who was negotiating the use of either Kishm or Ras Al 
Khaymah as a British base, suggested that the Company could cooperate, quid 
pro quo, in return for a base. He informed the Court that 
/BLOIORLR/15/1/21 Keir/Bruce 10/1/1820. 
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'such a grant would not be demanded without the proffer of reciprocal advantages, 
the British Government as a preliminary testimony of their desire to strengthen the power of 
Persia had directed you to transfer to the authorities of the Shah such parts on the Persian 
Coast as you might have occasion to reduce, or such as might voluntarily consent to 
acknowledge the supremacy of Persia, and that Islands which were now independent might 
by acts of mediation or compulsion be induced to submit to the Persian Authority.' 
Indeed to avoid ambiguity Bullock clarified the implicit substance of 
his position with particular reference to Bahrain, indicating that: 
'the British Government had learned the desire of the Shah to subdue the Island of 
Bahrein, and it seemed probable that the Atoobee Shaik might be induced by the mediation 
of the British Government to pay a tribute to Persia. 2 0 
At the same time these discussions were taking place, Bruce reported 
a Persian force had been assembled to assist the Imam against Bahrain, but 
was being held back until the Imam agreed to pay annual tribute on account of 
Bahrain and surrender his brother as a hostage against Bahrain's revenues.21 
Bullock's discussions could therefore only have been interpreted as British 
acquiescence in Persian designs and could only have encouraged the Shah to 
prosecute further his ambitions against Bahrain. In this instance the invasion 
was abandoned since the Imam refused to agree to the Persian conditions 
by which Persia would offer assistance and disbanded his invasion army.22 No 
further mention was made of this exchange, since it represented a positive step 
towards the creation of a British military base. However plans to subdue the 
islands were renewed in 1822, whilst in the meantime the Company had 
dismissed the idea of a permanent base and withdrawn the Marine from the 
Gulf in 1821, preferring instead to exercise its authority against piracy through 
the mediation of the independent Sheikhs. The priorities of the Company had 
shifted, yet no circular was passed around spreading the news. This new 
policy only crystallised in relation to the new situations and events that Britain 
had to manage. For whatever motives, Bruce mistook the Company's 
ambivalence towards the Al Khalifah as a disinterest in the abstract 
1 9 /BLOIORL R/15/1/21 Bullock/Keir dated 10/3/1820. 
2 0/ibid. 
2 1 / BLOIORL R/15/1/21 Bruce/Elphinstone dated 7/3/1820. 
2 2 /BLOIORL R/15/1/21 Keir/Bruce dated 22/3/1820 enclosed in Bruce/Elphinstone dated 
26/3/1820 reports the disbanding of Persian troops and the cancellation of invasion plans. 
54 
independence of Bahrain on a diplomatic level, and in the absence of higher 
orders continued to advocate an anachronistic policy that threatened to 
compromise Britain's new interests. Bruce accordingly began to negotiate 
away the very independence of Bahrain and the Al Khalifah that Keir had 
recognised not two years previously. 
The negotiations that led to the Treaty of Shiraz started when Captain 
Bruce received an unsolicited royal firman from the Prince of Shiraz on the 
28 t h June demanding his presence in Persia, which he reported back to Warden 
and requested permission to travel.23 Having received no direction from 
Bombay on the correct course of action, but moreover two additional firmans, 
received on the 4 t h and the 11 t h of July,24 Bruce decided to go to Shiraz in a 
private capacity lest his non-attendance sever the amity between Persia and 
Britain.2 5 He therefore left the linguist and broker in charge of the Residency 
and sailed to Persia on the 22 n d July, arriving in Shiraz on the 1 s t of August, 
where he was 'met with the greatest attention.'26 On the 2 n d of August Bruce 
presented himself to the Prince Regent of Shiraz before a full court. He 
reported that the Prince Regent was: 
'very gracious and affable and asked a good deal about Bahrain saying it belonged 
to Persia and that they had been too long allowed to throw off their allegiance but that this 
year he trusted to bring them under proper Government. 
In addition, the Prince Regent assured Bruce that Persia now trusted 
British ambitions and sanctioned the need for a military base in the Gulf, 
whereas previously Persian officials had been reticent to acquiesce in this 
request panicking over possible British designs on Persia itself. Bruce did 
record his comments at court, but a comprehensive account of a follow up 
meeting with the Prince Regent's Minister, Zekee Khan, was sent in dispatch 
number thirty five. 
2 3 /BLOIORL R/15/1/25 BruceAVarden no.25 dated 28/6/1822. 
2 4 /BLOIORL R/15/1/25 See Bruce/Warden nos. 28-30 dated 28/6, 9/7 and 17/7/1822. 
2 5 /BLOIORL R/15/1/25 Bruce/ Secretary to Government of Bombay no.49 dated 9/11/1822 
offers an apology for Bruce's behaviour and attempted to provide an explanation. 
2 6 /BLOIORL R/15/1/25 See Bruce/Warden no32 dated 6/8/1822 and no.35 dated 3/9/1822 
for account of proceedings at Shiraz. 
2 7 /BLOIORL R/15/1/25 BruceAVarden no.35 d.6/8/22. 
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After his appearance at court Bruce met Zekee Khan on the 8 t h of 
August to discuss the question of Bahrain, Bruce's position in the Persian Gulf 
and the possibility of establishing a British military base. The conversation 
between the two was subsequently transcribed in the form of an agreement, 
signed by both parties and touted as the Treaty of Shiraz -see appendix. 
Regarding Bahrain, Bruce the Treaty noted that: 
'The island of Bahrein which has always been subordinate to the province of Fars 
and its possessors, the Bein Attabee Arabs, who have of late been unruly and disobedient 
and had applied to the commanding Officer of the British Forces for a distinguishing Flag: 
this Flag if it has been granted, to be withdrawn and no assistance to be rendered to the Bein 
Attabee Arabs hereafter.128 
In addition the Treaty discussed the stationing of British troops, 
granting them the right to station on any Island on the coast of Persia, but 
attempting to make their presence conditional only on Persian weakness and 
binding Britain to withdraw them once Persian forces were sufficient to insure 
tranquillity of the Gulf. It also sought to make British troops available for 
Persian requisition. Article Four stated that: 
'Should His Royal Highness during the period the British Troops are stationed in 
the Gulf require the services of one or two Cruizers from the Station to proceed to any of the 
Islands or Ports of Persia, they are to be furnished, and particularly so on the present 
occasion when an expedition is in contemplation against Bahrein to reduce it to obedience, 
His Royal Highness promising after the service may be over to dismiss the vessels with 
proper honour and respect. a 9 
However the Treaty was not a binding agreement and neither party 
bound themselves to honour its terms. Its preamble and conclusion imply that 
the agreement was conceived as a formal discussion paper to submit to higher 
authority. The conclusion indicated that: 
'The Vekeels of the two Governments who now exchange engagements agree to 
present them to their respective Governments for their consideration and approbation and 
for the guidance of each other in the case of a change of Governors. 3 0 
The qualified language of diplomacy used in this document lends 
credibility to Bruce's claim not to have concluded a Treaty, but merely to have 
notarised private discussion for higher consideration. 
7 BLOIORL R/15/1/183 PP136-1340. See appendix two. 
7 ibid. 
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At his meeting with Zekee Khan, Bruce was led to believe that the 
Prince of Shiraz had the prior agreement of the Shah to conclude agreements 
in trust. Bruce was also convinced of Persia's resolute ambition to sail against 
Bahrain in the winter. The inevitable success of such an expedition and the 
desire of the Prince of Shiraz to mediate a settlement that made Bahrain 
subordinate to Persia without recourse to hostilities persuaded Bruce to enter 
negotiations over the status of Bahrain. In addition, Bruce reasoned that 
placating Persia by sacrificing the independent state of Bahrain would stabilise 
the Gulf and prevent hostilities and piracies, reasoning that: 
'The Island of Bahrain reverting again under the Authority of Persia will tend more 
to the tranquility of the Arabian Side of the Gulf than almost any other act and will at once 
do away the constant petty acts of aggression and retaliation existing between the different 
branches of the Ben Attobee Arabs, particularly between Abdella bin Ahmed and Rahman 
bin Jauber. 3 1 
It is understandable why Bruce, believing himself to be acting in a 
private capacity, acquiesced with Persian diplomacy. However, his 
negotiations were not appreciated in Bombay. Bruce's ambition to secure a 
British military base revived Persia's regional influence, compromised the 
system of independent states and weakened the confederacy against piracy. 
Since Britain could not hold Persia accountable for piratical outrages 
conducted by its subjects or in its territories, the expansion of Persian territory 
undermined Britain's moral and real authority in the region. When reports of 
events in Shiraz reached the Governor in Council they were met with horror. 
The Governor in Council observed that: 
'the Treaty which has been the result of those negotiations is not only unauthorized, 
but entirely inconsistent with the views of the Government and with the obligations of the 
public faith... 
...It acknowledges the King of Persia's title to Bahrein of which there is not the 
least proof and which the British Government cannot assert without injuring the pretensions 
of the Imaum and the Utoobees.- It promises our aid against every power possessed of an 
Island in the Gulph; and expressly against he Uttobees with whom we are bound by a Treaty 
of Friendship and with whose conduct we have every reason to be satisfied... 
3 1 / BLOIORL R/15/1/25 Broce/Warden no.35Pol dated 3/9/18822 
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...The effect of this Treaty would be to compromise the dignity of the British 
Government and to overturn every part of the policy which it has adopted in relation to the 
powers of the Persian Gulph. 
A rapid rearguard action was immediately launched to wipe Bruce's 
endeavours from the slate. Bruce was instantaneously removed from office, 
'the more clearly to mark his [the Governor in Council's] disapprobation of the 
whole proceeding. ' 3 3 Elphinstone informed the Prince of Shiraz that: 
'Captain Bruce had been merely directed to return to his duty at Bushire and had 
received no authority to proceed to Shiraz and no powers or Credentials to enter on any 
negotiation whatever with your Royal Highness. The treaty which he had concluded is 
therefore his own act and not that of this Government. 
In addition, the Prince Regent of Fars was simultaneously informed 
that the Treaty was invalid. Elphinstorie explained that as far as there was a 
considered British policy regards the compact: 
7 accordingly disavow it and desire it to be considered exactly as if it had never 
been written. 3 5 
The Company then restated British policy before the Al Khalifah, 
reaffirming their commitment to the independent Sheikhs. The Al Khalifah 
were informed that: 
'by some unfortunate mistake on his part Captain Bruce the Resident at Bushire 
having proceeded of his own accord to Shiraz, has concluded without any authority or 
powers from this Government a Treaty with the Prince Regent of Fars, entirely in opposition 
to the intentions of the British Government and in contradiction to its engagements with 
yourself and the Powers in the Persian Gulf. 
They were further assured by Elphinstone that: 
'The British Government considers the relations with your state as existing on the 
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same force as from the first and that it is my wish to preserve them undiminished. 
This excessive reaction did not reflect any dereliction of duty by 
Bruce, but was rather an indicator of the changing priorities of British policy 
in the Gulf. Bruce may have been naive in his dealings at Shiraz, but he 
3 2 / BLOIORL R/15/1/26 Farish,Secretary to the Government of Bombay/Bruce no.l491Pol. 
dated 1/11/1822. 
3 3 / ibid. 
3 4 / BLOIORL R/15/1/183 Elphinstone, Governor-General/Hoossein Alle, Prince Regent of 
Fars dated 30/10/1822. 
3 5 / ibid. 
M / BLOIORL R/15/1/183 Elphinstone,Governor-General/Sheikh of Bahrain dated 
30/10/1822. 
3 1 / ibid. 
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acted within the framework of general policy, albeit one that was made 
obsolete by compact between Keir and the Sheikhs. Much the same 
encouragement was given to the Persians against Bahrain less than two years 
before the infamous Treaty of Shiraz, so it would be unfair to portray Bruce as 
driven by insensibility. His fall from grace was determined by the changing 
political configuration of the Gulf. The implications of the General Treaty 
were never explicitly codified: no line was ever drawn excluding Persia and 
Turkey from the Persian Gulf. This commitment to the independent states 
only emerged as a reaction to events, and specifically to the negotiations with 
the Prince of Shiraz. Whilst these events of 1822 appear to negate Britain's 
commitment to the independent Arab states and Bahrain in particular, they 
should be seen, not as an aberration of policy, but as an integral part of the 
process that re-affirmed Britain's commitment to the independent Sheikhs 
after the General Treaty had been signed. Rather than compromise British 
policy, the affair of the Treaty of Shiraz as a whole, reaffirmed the system of 
independent Arab states and, established a precedent for the exclusion of 
external powers from Bahrain's affairs under cover of the sanctity of 
Bahrain's independence. As a result of the negotiations at Shiraz, Persia was 
excluded from its traditional role in the Gulf. To illustrate this point, the 
Governor of Bombay informed Bruce's replacement after the fact that: 
'The nominal supremacy of Persia over some of the Arabs in the Persian Gulph can never 
be felt but as an obstruction to all measures for preserving the tranquility of that sea. 
In the aftermath of the Treaty of Shiraz, the paramount importance of 
the independent states and the public defence of the independent states 
transcended other British policy considerations. Thereafter, Britain became 
the chief advocate of Bahrain's independence as a necessary prerequisite for 
fighting piracy and preserving an unrivalled British sphere of influence. The 
abstract independence of the Chief of Bahrain was a significant obstacle that 
inhibited the development of external influences in the Gulf and was used as a 
/BLOIORL R/15/1/29 Bombay/MacLeod no.658Pol. dated 16/5/1823. 
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mechanism for preserving Britain's local hegemony. For the rest of the 
nineteenth century, the active propagation and defence of Bahrain's 
independence was of quintessential importance in securing British dominance 
in the Persian Gulf, since it provided Britain with the only means to thwart 
relative claims by foreign powers that would otherwise have been difficult i f 
not impossible to refute. Those powers whose strength and influence 
imperilled that of Britain were arbitrarily labelled as external powers and 
found their schemes upon Bahrain confronted with greater British 
belligerency. Yet in contrast, to this over-riding commitment to the system of 
independent chiefs, the British steadfastly refused to involve themselves in 
local Arabian disputes throughout the 1820's declining involvement in the 
internal affairs of the Gulf. 
A conscious policy decision was taken to avoid intimate British 
involvement in the local quarrels amongst Arabian Chieftains In the aftermath 
of the Expeditions, the Company followed a supposedly strict policy with 
clearly demarcated boundaries of acceptable intervention in the local affairs of 
the Gulf. The Company's role was restricted to the necessary minimum 
intervention. This policy was reaffirmed by Elphinstone who reflected that: 
[It] 'has repeatedly and expressly been declared to be to confine our views strictly 
to the suppression of piracy when it actually subsists, and to abstain from taking part in the 
disputes of the states of the Gulf, even when within the reach of our maritime power, then is 
absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of that object. 39 
This conscious non-intervention in the disputes of the Persian Gulf was 
implicit in the granting of independence to the Arab states. However, the 
absence of conspicuous British patronage for the proxy Arab chieftains 
prevented the system of independent states from achieving a stable 
equilibrium. For the next decade, the Company consistently rejected demands 
made upon it by the Sheikhs of Bahrain to guarantee their position against the 
Al Jalahimah and the Imam of Muscat. The Al Khalifah's enemies exercised 
their legitimate right to wage war against the Al Khalifah and the Persian Gulf 
/ Bombay Secret Proceedings vol.49 Consn. 1 dated 3/1/1821 quoted in Kelly (1968) pl81. 
60 
was dominaed by this belligerency. In order to promote some harmony 
amongst the independent Arab chiefs, the Company was forced to intervene 
covertly whilst eschewing direct intervention This non-intervention was 
unsurprisingly perceived by the Arab chieftains as a lack of British interest in 
their security and provoked an animosity amongst the incumbent rulers which 
left them generally ill-disposed towards the Company officials. 
Once the policy of non-intervention had been adopted, the downfall or 
replacement of individual chiefs was not a matter of British concern. The 
British were obliged by their own mandate not to intervene in any situation 
that posed a threat to the Al Khalifah, but constrained themselves to merely 
watch events unfold and countenance the deposition of the local chieftains. 
This course of inactivity was the only policy open to the British under the 
system of independent states. However, subsequent British attempts to 
mediate and suppress conflict suggest that the British found it impossible to 
minimalise their responsibilities and involvement in local affairs because the 
system of independent states generated more problems than it solved. There 
was a constant pressure on the Resident to broaden the limits of acceptable 
intervention and assume wider responsibilities to ensure the pacification of the 
Gulf, even if this meant ignoring the myth of independence. 
The independent chiefs were called upon to penalise instances of piracy 
and were penalised themselves when their subjects committed piratical 
injustices, according to the strictures of the General Treaty. 4 0 Yet whilst the 
Bombay administration sought to limit the Company's involvement in the 
Gulf, the Residents' found it difficult to let the internal dynamics of power to 
/ The Al Khalifah were immediately called upon after the General Treaty to surrender all 
piratical vessels and subsequently at every occasion when pirates appeared to be under their 
jurisdiction. See BLOIORL R/15/1/22 Bruce/Keir for details of Brace's visit on 12/1/1820. 
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stabilise the Gulf for fear of losing moral authority. Both the emergence of 
anti-British sections amongst the Arabs and the potential for regional 
instability undermined the British position. The question of surreptitious 
intervention in the internal affairs of the Gulf whilst preserving neutrality 
therefore emerged in discussion between MacLeod and Newnham, secretary to 
the Governor-General at Bombay, who contemplated withholding registers 
to boats and restricting the movement of vessels to promote peace. These 
discussions were the start of a near-constant tension throughout the nineteenth 
century between the Residents in the Persian Gulf and the Governments of 
Bombay & India as to the importance and application of British neutrality. 
The Residents applied a constant pressure on their superiors, seeking a 
redefinition of non-intervention that would permit moderate interference in 
local affairs. From their position in the field, the license to ban conflict, or 
make subjective judgements about the efficacy of individual conflicts would 
have made the work of the Resident and the promotion of British interests 
considerably easier. The Resident was faced with a seemingly unending series 
of 'legitimate' disturbances to the stability of the Gulf, yet was restrained by 
the self-imposed policy of non-intervention from taking those measures that 
would produce the desired tranquillity of the region. 
Local conflict was unavoidable as long as the British declined to 
interfere in the local dynamics from which it was generated, but the pressure 
from the Residents was balanced against a reticence of central administration 
to assume full responsibility for the Gulf. However, no compromise was 
available. The scope for selective intervention, excepting mediation and 
negotiation was non-existent. As Newnham explained to MacLeod, the 
relations with the Arabs under the general treaty: 
'will no doubt give great weight to our endeavours to prevent hostilities by means of 
explanation and mediation, and will even perhaps entitle us to go war with any other power 
in the Gulf, but when such a war shall once have been announced we can have no further 
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control over the proceedings of the Belligerents than maybe be necessary to prevent a 
renewal of the system of general depredation. ' 4 I 
The consensus in Bombay was that attempts to impede the Arabs in 
legitimate aggression would not merely contradict British policy, but in effect 
would transform Britain into a rent-an-army Newnham explained: 
'any of those chiefs who thought himself aggrieved would he entitled to demand 
redress at the hands of a power which prevented his seeking it by his own means. ' 4 2 
However this did not stop the Residents from taking their own 
initiatives in departing from central policy. 
Motivated by an apparently sincere and conscientious desire to effect 
British ambitions and preserve maritime tranquillity, the Residents repeatedly 
involved themselves in proscribed affairs and employed proscribed means in 
their day-to-day work, thereafter presenting their actions to central 
government as fait accompli. The preservation of one consistent British policy 
thus often took the form of unravelling contradictory initiatives that the 
Residents had pursued independently. Accordingly, British diplomacy 
assumed a seemingly inconsistent and haphazard quality. On the one hand it 
left the Al Khalifah to defend themselves, on the other it discouraged and 
inhibited the successful prosecution of any scheme against the Al Khalifah by 
forbidding and restricting hostilities. Immediately after the General Treaty had 
been concluded the Al Khalifah were plunged into conflict with their 
traditional enemies, the Al Jalahimah. 
The Al Jalahimah had been expected to assist in the expedition 
against the Qawasim given their enmity towards the Wahhabis and their 
alliance with the Sultan of Muscat. However, they sailed to Persia instead and 
sought protection from the Prince of Shiraz, declaring themselves to be 
Persian subjects. Rahman bin Jabir declined to sign the General Treaty on the 
4 1 /BLOIORL R/15/1/29 Newnham/MacLeod Pol. no.320 dated 15/3/1823. 
4 2/ibid. 
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grounds that he was under the protection and jurisdiction of Persia, but bound 
himself not to wage war against the Al Khalifah independently. Although 
Rahman bin Jabir had built up a semblance of territorial authority around his 
principal fort at Demaum, the British considered him to be pirate. Thus 
despite the legitimacy of his claim against the Al Khalifah which the British 
did not attempt to suppress, Rahman bin Jabir was mandated to pursue this 
claim in conjunction with either Persia or the Imam of Muscat, both of whom 
Britain recognised as possessing the sovereign right to undertake legitimate 
Accordingly, the Al Jalahimah planned an invasion of Bahrain in early 
1820 with assistance from the Persian Governor of Fars. This attempt was 
unsuccessful and in the process precipitated a British order for the destruction 
of the Al Jalahimah vessels owing to his piratical activities. Although 
prosecution of this order would have settled the conflict and delivered the Al 
Khalifah from their perennial enemy, this order exceeded the self-imposed 
limits of British jurisdiction since the Al Jalahimah were formally Persian 
subjects and was consequently rescinded. This turn of events clearly indicated 
to the Al Jalahimah their freedom from responsibility to the British. 
Thereafter, aware that their Persian protection could be used as a shield to 
escape British retribution, the Al Jalahimah continued their attacks on Bahrain 
with relative impunity. The Al Jalahimah meticulously avoided conflict with 
British shipping or conflict with the British themselves, but continued to plan 
further invasions, harass Bahraini dhows and engage in hostile activities 
against Bahrain that the British deemed piratical throughout the 1820's. 
/ An friendly agreement between Rahman bin Jabir and the Resident was concluded as 
early as 1808. See BLOIORL R/15/1/10 Rahman bin Jabir/Smith rec'd 13/4/1808, enclosed 
in Smith/Edmonstone n.d. See also R/15/1/22 Bruce/Elphinstone dated 2/2/1820 for account 
of meeting with Rahman bin Jabir. 
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The destabilising nature of this indecisive conflict encouraged Britain 
to mediate a settlement in 1822 in the interests of general peace. Additionally 
MacLeod gave orders for a cruiser to be sent to the pearls banks in the 
vicinity of Bahrain during the pearl season.44 At the same time it was stressed 
that Britain maintained a strict neutrality in the conflict and would not 
guarantee any settlement between the parties. Initial attempts at mediation 
were therefore indecisive, but an agreement was successfully brokered by the 
Company's Resident in the Persian Gulf, Colonel Stannus and signed in 
February 1824.45 However, this provided only a temporary respite. The Al 
Jalahimah subsequently blockaded the land port of Qatif demanding tribute 
and started to harass local shipping. This provocative act led to a resumption 
of hostilities between the Al Khalifah and the Al Jalahimah that continued 
through 1824 and 1825. The Resident, Colonel Stannus, displaying an overt 
concern over 'the violent proceedings that were daily taking place not only 
against the p[e]ople of Katiff but also against the people of Bahrein, Koweit 
and other Neutrals' sent two ships from the Bombay Marine to impose peace 
until orders were received, even though this represented a significant 
departure from standard policy. This action curtailed the conflict, in effect 
inhibiting the Al Jalahimah whilst preserving the Al Khalifah as incumbent 
rulers and so tacitly compromising British neutrality. 
The requested orders sent to Stannus reaffirmed the established policy 
of neutrality, instructing Stannus to retire from Demaum and maintain strict 
neutrality as long as non-combatant vessels were not harassed. Unable to 
intervene more forcibly, Stannus thus wrote to both parties offering the good 
offices of the British Government at any stage, but indicated as well the 
unwillingness of the Company to interfere in any way shape or form in the 
conflict. Assured that any action would not subsequently provoke a British 
4 4 /BLOIORL R/l/27 MacLeod/Hardy, Senior Commanding Officer of the Marine in the 
Persian Gulf no date c. mid-1823. 
4 5 /BLOIORL R/115/1/32 Stannus/Newnham no i l dated 7/2/1824 reports the conclusion of 
the feud and appends an agreement. 
65 
reaction, the Al Jalahimah pursued the blockade and campaign against the Al 
Khalifah with renewed enthusiasm. Abdullah bin Ahmed was informed of the 
implications of the central policy by Stannus to the effect that: 
'I have apprized Rahma of his being at liberty to prosecute his attacks on Katiffa 
and to engage in offensive measures with Bahrein without opposition from our Cruizer.-
...Our earnest wish is to prevent disturbances in the Gulf, but the moment that war is 
resolved on- The parties must exercise their judgement as o the manner of carrying it on and 
depend entirely on their own resources we d[o not] assume the right of forbidding hostilities 
and cannot consistently with entire neutrality place any restriction on the progress either as 
to limit or duration unless they should infringe on the rights of neutrals in which case it 
46 
would become our duty to interfere and punish the defaulters. ' 
Thereafter Stannus attempted mediation on several occasions but 
without success.47 The conflict dragged on through 1826, until the Al Khalifah 
were finally secured in their position when Rahman bin Jabir died in combat 
with one of the Khalifah.48 Although Rahman's son, Basher bin Rahman 
vowed to carry on his father's fight against the Al Khalifah, the danger 
thereafter posed by the Al Jalahimah did not disturb the Al Khalifah and a 
final settlement was mediated before the British in 1828.49 However, the 
threat from the Imam of Muscat was an equally disturbing source of unrest, 
which posed a threat to the Al Khalifah until the very end of the 1820's. Again 
this was a conflict in which the British appeared reluctant to involve 
themselves, although the tendency of the Resident to intervene unilaterally to 
the benefit of the incumbent Al Khalifah is clearly visible. 
When the Imam attempted to invade Bahrain in 1816, the British 
encouraged both the Imam and the Al Khalifah to desist from hostilities. 
These exhortations and Britain's flat refusal to assistant the Imam forced the 
Bahrainis to defend themselves. As a result, the attempted invasion was beaten 
461BLOIORL R/15/1/38 Stannus/ Abdullah bin Ahmed dated 22/4/1826. 
4 7 /BLOIORL R/15/1/38 Memorandum of letter Stannus/Imam of Muscat, October 1826 
mentions unsuccessful visits by Stannus to Demaum to effect peace. 
4 8 / BLOIORL R/15/1/40 Stannus/Newnham no.85 dated 14/12/1826 reports an account "of a 
decisive action between Rahman bin Jaber and a Bahrein Buglow, in which the former after a 
heroic defence, set fire to his magazine and involved both vessels in utter destruction.' 
4 9 / BLOIORL R/15/1/48 Extract from Court of Directors in the Pol Dept dated 23/12/28 on 
Persian Gulf reporting the feud between Jabir and Sheikh of Bahrain satisfactory adjudicated 
by Resident enclosed in Morris/Res no. 1213 Pol dated 12/10/29. 
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back, but notwithstanding the failure of this invasion, the Imam refused to 
surrender his claim over Bahrain. It was expected that after signing the 
General Treaty that the Imam would immediately sail against the Al Khalifah 
Keir reported that . 
'His Highness previous to his leaving Ras al Khyma commented to me that his 
proceeding to Muscat was with the view of making preparations for an independent attack on 
Bahrain. M 
However, before hostilities broke out, the invasion was pre-empted by 
the offer of annual tribute to the Imam from the Al Khalifah which the Imam 
accepted, believing this to be accord with British wishes. The Imam informed 
Keir that an agreement had been reached implying his subservience to the 
British was the deciding factor: 
7 understand from the General Contents of your Letters that it was rather your wish 
that I should make Peace with them, and as I have a great desire to act in strict conformity 
with your wishes I again write another letter. ^l 
These arrangements placated the Imam temporarily although the Al 
Khalifah's refusal to render more than MT$12,000 ex gratia led the Imam to 
resuscitate invasion plans in 1822.52 The Imam requested British assistance, 
should the need arise, to make an attempt against the Al Khalifah in the event 
of non-payment of tribute, but this was declined. However the Imam forged 
an alliance with the Prince of Shiraz which was looked upon favourably by the 
British Resident, Captain Bruce who was midway into his negotiations with 
the Prince of Shiraz. The Imam subsequently abandoned his invasion plans 
owing to the small size of his own force and the difficulties in mounting an 
expedition from Muscat as opposed to Bushire after the Persians had 
disavowed their interest under pressure from Britain 
Reports surfaced again in June 1828 of the hostile intentions and active 
preparations of the Imam against Bahrain. Contemporary reports from 
the Native Agent at Muscat had indicated a general peace, tranquillity, and 
5 0 / BLOIORL R/15/1/21 Keir /Bruce dated 10/1/20. 
5 1 /Lorimer (1970) part Hp847 and BLOIORL R/15/1/21 Imam /Keir enclosed in Keir/Bruce 
dated 21/3/20. 
5 2 / Lorimer (1970) part II p852. 
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friendliness towards the Al Khalifah, so the Acting Resident, Hennell, 
reported that rumours of imminent invasion were unsubstantiated and without 
foundation. He explained that his opinion was: 
'grounded upon a report received from the Agent at Muscat of H.Higness having 
sent up several valuable presents, accompanied by a communication couched in the most 
friendly and amicable terms to Shaik Abdoolla ben Ahmed the Chief of that Island' and 
secondly 'upon my knowledge of the Imams general character for openness and sincerity.,54 
The traditional disposition towards the Imam and friendliness between 
Muscat and the British partly excused and obscured the preparations that were 
nonetheless being made. Unexpectedly, as far as the British were concerned, 
the Imam wrote to the Government of Bombay in July 1828 by the HCC 
Benares, requesting the Government of Bombay's sanction for a war with the 
Al Khalifah.55 This took the British completely by surprise On being informed 
of the Imam's letter by HCC Benares, Hennell reluctantly concluded that: 
'there is but too much reason to believe that he [the Imam] has formed a fixed and 
settled determination to attempt the redirection of Bahrain to his Authority at all risks and 
hazards.. ' and thus 'lay before Government the almost inevitable prospect of a war which 
however it may terminate can hardly fail to be attended while it lasts with both serious and 
disastrous consequences. M 
In what can only be construed as a major failure of intelligence 
operations, the British had failed to take cognisance of the Imam's 
preparations. The Imam had circumvented pre-emptive British mediation and 
complied with the terms of the General Treaty. 
Once the Imam's intention had been formally communicated and 
registered, there was subsequently no basis on which the Company could 
legitimately reject it or actively intervene to prevent the invasion. The Imam's 
invasion plans was thus registered as a legitimate aggression and the Imam 
given license to pursue hostilities. Little concern was voiced within the 
Company over the possibility that the Imam might take control of Bahrain, 
5 3 / See BLOIORL Hennell/Newnham no.40 d.24/6/1828 and R/15/1/38 Hennell/Goolab, 
Native Agent at Muscat d.2/9/28. 
5 4 /BLOIORL R/15/1/47 Hennell/Newnham, Chief Secretary. Government of Bombay no.60 
Political d. 30/8/1828. 
5 5 / BLOIORL R/15/1/47 Agent at Muscat/Hennell dated 13/8/28 mentions Imam's letter by 
the Benares. 
5 6/ibid. 
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since such an eventuality merely represented the fulfilment of Elphinstone and 
Nepean's earlier plans. A degree of unease was expressed regarding the 
ensuing instability that threatened to engulf the region Some sections of the 
administration reconsidered the role of Britain in the Gulf and the question of 
intervention. Britain's commitment to preserve stability and therefore proscribe 
the conflict was emphasised as more important than the rights of the Imam to 
engage in legitimate hostilities. Nonetheless Buta, the Secretary to the 
Government of India at Bombay indicated that: 
With regard to the general affairs of the Persian Gulf, we should look upon 
ourselves as the head of a Naval confederacy for the entire suppression of Piracy, and act 
accordingly. Our superior strength makes the Arbitor to whom others will appeal, and we 
must take the disadvantages as well as the advantages of such a position. ' 3 ? 
He then looked at the implications of this policy on the question of 
neutrality instructing that: 
'It is desirable still to abstain from all interference in any Wars not arising from 
piratical courses; but as the attainment of our principal object that of gradually introducing 
peaceable habits amongst the various Tribes in the Gulf will greatly depend upon their 
ceasing to have recourse to arms upon every occasion in not giving guarenteed or involving 
Government, you are to take every opportunity of impressing the different chiefs with our 
desire of their remaining at peace with each other, which it is hoped may be gradually 
effected by your showing favour and consideration to those who evince a disposition to 
conform to the Government upon this point. 
The Resident was still bound not to intervene beyond the offer of 
mediation in legitimate wars, but was to exert every possible means to promote 
peace. Policy thus separated into two strands: one maintained British 
neutrality, as is evident from Hennell's reply to Abdullah bin Ahmed below, and 
another extended British mediation beyond its previous limits. The Resident's 
non-guarantee of the Bahrainis and British attempts to protect the Imam of 
Muscat in the aftermath of the invasion illustrate the scope of this covert 
intervention. 
At the end of August, a plea was received from Abdullah bin Ahmed 
requesting that the British prevent the Imam's advance The Shuyukh, having 
overviewed the situation asked that . 
5 7 / BLOIORL R/15/1/46 Buta/Resident dated 22/9/1828 no. 1094A Pol. 
5 8/ibid. 
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'you will restrain the oppressor from injuring us without any cause being given by 
plunder or piracy- If you cannot do this, we trust you will prevail on him to wait two months 
in order that we may prepare our territories and assemble our forces after this war.-
notwithstanding therefore Tahnoon being a party to this agreement, he is supporting Syed 
Said against us. We hope therefore that you will forbid his opposing himself to us. ' 5 9 
Abdullah bin Ahmed hopefully suggested the British were obliged to 
intervene after their mediation of the problem in 1822, and indicated that only 
the British intervention would avert conflict. However whilst Hennell's reply 
undertook to forbid Sheikh Tahnoon from involving himself in the quarrel, it 
declined Abdullah bin Ahmed any assistance. By way of explanation, a succinct 
commentary on the obligations intendent upon the British under the treaty of 
friendship was offered. It is worth quoting in full since it remains the most 
detailed explanation of British policy under the General Treaty and was itself 
subsequently used to decline interference: 
7 cannot however pass over in silence that part of your letter which hints that the 
British Government as being party to the General Treaty is bound to restrain one Tribe from 
commencing Hostilities against another. After the many explanations that have been 
afforded you upon his part by Captain Stannus, any further exposition on my part must be 
quite unnecessary, but I may be allowed to observe that the British Authorities both in India 
and this Gulf have held one invariable line of conduct viz: that of declining all interference 
in the feuds and wars of the arabian chiefs beyond that of a mutual friend desirous on all 
occasions of maintaining the general peace and sparing the effusion of Blood by an 
unbiased and unprejudiced mediation.... 
... From this principal of non-intervention in lawful and acknowledged war it must 
be sufficiently apparent to you that altho' the English government are always most desirous 
of promoting peace and concord yet that I conceive no objection can exist to yourself 
strengthening yourself against the attacks of your enemies by such alliances as you may 
conceive best adapted to that purpose.160 
Both Hennell and Wilson, Resident in the Gulf between 1827 and 
1833, attempted to negotiate between the two parties, but the Imam had 
formed a fixed resolve to gain possession of the islands, by the time they 
involved themselves. This may have been averted by a British guarantee of the 
terms of settlement. Although Wilson had no authorisation to offer such a 
guarantee, taking his lead from Buta, he struck a position that whilst explicitly 
5 9 / BLOIORL R/l 5/1/47 Abdullah bin Ahmed/Resident d. 24/8/1828 enclosed in Hennell/ 
Newnham no.60 Political d.30/8/28. 
6 0 / BLOIORL R/15/1/47 Hennell/Abdullah bin Ahmed d.30/8/1828 enclosed in Hennell/ 
Newnham no.60 Pol same date. 
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denying a guarantee, implicitly offered as much, writing to the Abdullah bin 
Ahmed that although: 
'the British Government will never guarentee any Treaty whatever but if a peace is 
made, it will not see it broken by either party which may be the aggressor. ' 6 ! 
However the Imam could not be discouraged. A formal declaration of 
war was sent to Abdullah bin Ahmed via the Resident in late August, arriving in 
Bushire on the 7 th of September.62 An accompanying letter indicated the 
Imam's intention to sail in effect, four days later on the 11th September. Hennell 
wrote immediately to both parties counselling caution, but also stressed in his 
letter to the Imam that the Company had no plans to interfere.63 It is unclear 
whether this letter reached the Imam. The Imam's fleet sailed on the 13th 
September, and arrived at Kishm on the 17th September.64 Here it was joined 
by Sheikh Tahnoon although he had been prohibited from involvement by the 
British.65 Over and above this efforts there was little else that the Resident to 
do to deter the Imam. Hennell thus adopted the policy of strict non-
intervention, instructing from all Company ships to remain invisible whilst the 
Imam was in the area. Under a letter dated 7/9/28 he advised that: 
'If the Imam takes up a position off Bahrein, advisable that HC Cruizers stay out of 
sight during operations unless for some special purposes: lest sinister interpretations be 
formed and false reports get abroad of our having assisted or cooperated with the Imam in 
his enterprize. "** 
On the 5 t h November the Imam summoned to the Al Khalifah to 
surrender and that same evening captured the fort at Sitra fort. Six days later 
the Omani attempted a general landing, but were beaten back by the 
inhabitants of Bahrain and forced to retire.67 The Imam gave up the idea of 
further aggressive measures against Bahrain and sought mediation, initially 
/ BLOIORL R/15/1/42 Resident/Abdullah bin Ahmed dated 24/8/1829 enclosed in 
Wilson/Newnham no.80 Pol. dated 5/9/1829. 
6 2 /BLOIORL R/15/1/47 see Hennell/Newnham no.62 d.7/9/28 and enclosures. 
6 3 /BLOIORL R/15/1/47 Hennell/Imam d.7/9/1828 enclosed Hennell/Newnham no.62 
d.7/9/1828. 
6 4 / BLOIORL R/15/1/47 Hennell/Newnham no.68 d. 11/10/28 
6 5 / see Lorimer (1970) part II pp852-854. 
6 6 / BLOIORL R/15/1/47 Hennell/Hammerton d.7/9/1828 enclosed in Hennell/Newnham 
no.62 d.7/9/28. 
6 1 / Lorimer gives a detailed account of the incident see pp852-855. A report of events is also 
found in BLOIORL R/15/1/48 Assoo, Native Agent at Bahrain/Resident dated 16/11/28. 
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through Wahhabi offices. However when a Wahhabi mediator arrived on the 
15th of November Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Khalifah rejected his mediation 
under the excuse that he was 'not of sufficient consequence to become a 
mediator.'68 The Imam thereafter proposed his terms of settlement through 
another Beni Saudi mediator. These optimistically included a demand for the 
restoration of zakat, but were unsurprisingly rejected 6 9 Unable to effect his 
ambition for the subjection of Bahrain by either peaceful or aggressive 
measures, the Imam forwent his claim and subsequently sailed for Muscat on 
the 20th of November without a proper resolution to the conflict.70 Hennell's 
explanation of British obligations under the General Treaty had however drawn 
attention to the distinction between legitimate and aggressive war of which the 
Al Khalifah had been previously unaware Abdullah bin Ahmed thus 
immediately announced his intention to pursue the Imam back to Muscat and 
informed the Resident that 'we wish to make war on them in the same manner 
as they have made war upon us.'7 1 Seven 'Utub craft sailed at the end of April 
undertaking minor piracies at Muscat and returning in mid-June. At the same 
time, Abdullah bin Ahmed indicated his desire for Britain to mediate peace.72 
This new turn of events was not welcomed by the British Government. 
The Imam's failure to capture Bahrain had weakened his authority and the Al 
Khalifah's attempts to seek retribution hastened his decline. The Imam had 
been a trusted ally and central lynch-pin of previous British policy. The British 
had relied on the Imam to control local shipping and promoted his authority. 
His threatened collapse provoked an intense bipartisanship amongst the 
6 8/BLOIORL R/15/1/47 Agent, Bahrain/Wilson d.24/11/1828 enclosed in Wilson/Newnham 
no.85 d. 12/12/28. 
69/ibid.The other terms of settlement demanded that friendly relations should exist between 
the two parties.and that Bahrain should provide troops at Imam's request for further 
expeditions. 
7 0/ibid. 
7 1 / BLOIORL R/15/1/48 Abdullah bin Ahmed /Resident dated 28/12/1828. 
7 2 /BLOIORL R/15/1/48 contains an account of the conflict reported by the Native Agent and 
letters from Abdullah bin Ahmed.Agt/Res dated 3/5/1829 reports departure of vessels; 
Rahman/Res dated 28/5/29 reports desire for British mediation; and Rahman/Res dated 
16/6/1829 reports return of Utub and piracies. 
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administration that strongly opposed the Bahrainis' aggression. The Secretary 
to the Government of India at Bombay, at this time Morris, agreed with the 
Resident that: 
'It would be most unwise to allow the power of this deserving Prince and useful 
Petty state to be destroyed and that of a combination of chiefs substituted in its place.' Since 
'This would be alike injurious to our ally from whom we have often derived aid and to the 
interests of the trade of India which his Father and him have been alike zealous and 
successful in promoting. ' ? 3 
Worse still, from the point of view of the British, the Gulf threatened to 
become a huge imbroglio of warmongering independent chieftains who fought 
constantly amongst themselves whilst exercising their right to wage legitimate 
war, and in the process eroded British influence and destroyed the stability of 
the region. Wilson noted that: 
'If any attempt were made to alter the former footing of things there could be little 
hopes of anything like permanence to the peace for men will hardly he satisfied with such 
changes.,74 
Thus it was agreed that Britain would dissuade the Al Khalifah from 
their attempts against the Imam, disregarding Britain's supposedly neutrality in 
order to preserve the system of British control and prevent the Gulf from 
degenerating into a state of generalised disturbance Accordingly, after 
contracted negotiations during which the Resident applied significant pressure 
on the Al Khalifah, a reconciliation was effected on the 2 n d of December 1829, 
a principal condition of which was the mutual recognition of each other's 
independence and the mutual surrender of claims for tribute.75 
The successful conclusion of the conflicts with both the Al Jalahimah 
and the Imam of Muscat in favour of the Al Khalifah thus established the Al 
Khalifah as unchallenged incumbents. Their success was to a great extent 
dependent on the covert intervention of the British. Whilst the orthodoxy of 
non-intervention remained in place throughout the 1820's, Britain had covertly 
/ BLOIORL Morris/Resident no.698 dated 1/7/1829. 
7 4 /BLOIORL Draft letter Wilsor^Rahman dated 19/6/29. 
7 5 /BLOIORL R/15/1/50 Draft Letter Wilson/Imam dated 5/1/30 records conclusion of peace. 
In the aftermath of this invasion Morris directed the Resident to inform the Imam that the 
Governor-General considers 'the British government to be so far bound to, and connected 
with its ally the Imaum of Muscat as to prevent bis ruin and downfall by every means in its 
power.' Morris/Res R/15/1/52 no.467 Pol dated 12/4/1830. 
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intervened in these conflicts to prevent the proliferation of instability to the 
unconscious benefit of the Al Khalifah. This interposition, and the Company's 
insistence that legitimate conflict be registered as distinct from piracy changed 
the nature of conflict between the Arab communities, and were significant 
factors that preserved the Al Khalifah in power The system of legitimate 
conflict tended to restrict alliances amongst aggressors and so removed the 
need to maintain defences against an alliance of enemies, an undertaking that 
the Al Khalifah had found difficult at the best of times. Moreover British 
measures taken to limit conflict tended to freeze the existing balance of power 
in the Gulf, and in denying the dispossessed an opportunity to pursue their 
attacks on Bahrain unhindered, frustrated the success of such attacks and 
supported the incumbent Al Khalifah. 
By the end of the 1820's the Al Khalifah had defeated their traditional 
enemies and secured both the state of Bahrain and their position as rulers. The 
system of independent states appeared to have reached a stable equilibrium 
once the disaffected Al Jalahimah had been marginalised. The Imam had had his 
power curtailed and the British had set a precedent in defending the existence 
of the independent states against foreign aggression or rapprochement by 
Persia. By 1830, the British acknowledged the Al Khalifah as personal rather 
than anonymous rulers of Bahrain, but still maintained a policy of non-
intervention in the affairs of the independent states. It might reasonably have 
been hoped that the 1820's was a decade of teething problems and that now the 
new paradigm had been firmly established, in the 1830's the system of 
independent Arab states would be instrumental in the peaceful management of 
the affairs of the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, the stability and coherence of 
the system of independent Arab states was inhibited over the next two 
decades by renewed foreign claims against Bahrain and internal feuding 
amongst the Al Khalifah. The change in the balance of regional power in the 
1830's exposed the fundamental weaknesses at the core of the nineteenth 
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century paradigm. The combined effect of these factors prevented the 
emergence of a durable and independent state of Bahrain. Indeed, the Sheikhs 
of Bahrain became an impediment to British authority and undermined 
Britain's influence in the Gulf. 
Chapter Four: An Untimely Intervention 
Interlopers and Invaders 
This chapter will consider relations between Britain, Bahrain and 
external powers in the 1830's and 1840's. Having laid the foundations of the 
system of independent states in the 1820's and invented a role for itself as the 
protector against piracy, Britain hoped that affairs of the Gulf would tend 
towards stability and pacifism. In practice, however the efficacy of the 
independent Sheikhs to act out their role as agents for stability was moderated 
by the problems that revolved around their status as independent Chiefs 
During the 1830's and '40's, unresolvable contradictions were exposed at the 
core of the system of independent Sheikhs that prevented its functioning as a 
viable mechanism for securing British hegemony. In part, the dogged attempts 
of external powers to raise claims of suzerainty and zakat over Bahrain 
undermined the independence of Bahrain. The magnitude of these approaches 
was consistently exacerbated by Britain's policy of non-intervention in the 
affairs of the Gulf. Additionally, Britain's refusal to guarantee absolutely the 
status of the independent Arabian chiefs worked against British interests. The 
Al Khalifah began to encourage other powers to extend their authority over 
Bahrain, even though their actions compromised their own independence and 
Britain's imperial authority. After catastrophic Egyptian success in 1840 in 
undermining Britain's position due to the voluntary submission of the Al 
Khalifah, the question of controlling the region came to be seen not just in 
terms of excluding other powers, but also constraining the independent chiefs 
Britain was thus moved to increasingly ignore the myth of independence and 
impose its authority on the Al Khalifah. 
The main protagonists who raised a claim against Bahrain during the 
first half of the nineteenth century were the Persians, the Ottomans, the 
Wahhabis and the Egyptians. These interested parties refused to accept 
Britain's declaration of the independence of Bahrain in the General Treaty, and 
persisted in pursuing their claims of zakat and tutelage. Relations between 
Britain and these powers fell into a predictable routine with Britain 
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counterpoising the sovereignty of the islands to any attempt on the part of 
external powers to establish their suzerainty over the islands, and then denying 
third parties the practical scope for realising their ambitions. Yet Britain was 
unable to gain acceptance for the system of independent rulers amongst other 
powers with a regional interest, except through displays of force The British 
were unsure how to react to the question of zakat. As its reaction to growing 
Wahhabi influence over Bahrain in the 1830's showed, Britain tried to treat the 
surrender of religious tithe as a purely religious question. This approach 
however ignored the wider significance of zakat relations. 
The Wahhabis had began to extend their influence during the early 
1830's concomitant with the re-emergence of their internal political cohesion 
and the accession of Turki bin Saud, Amir of the Nejd. They immediately 
requested tribute from both Bahrain and Oman, which was proffered by 
Abdullah bin Ahmed in 1830. In return the Wahhabi promised to guarantee 
Bahrain from external attack although the Al Khalifah were sceptical of 
Wahhabi ambitions since the mainlanders maintained their arch-enemy, Basher 
bin Rahman, at Tarut Island.1 When the Wahhabi chieftain demanded further 
tribute from the Al Khalifah and the surrender of the fort of Demaum in April 
18332 his demands were rejected and Abdullah bin Ahmed initiated a campaign 
against the Wahhabis with the assistance of the 'Amair section Beni Khalid 
tribe.3 
Conflict between the Abdullah bin Ahmed and the Wahhabi Amir raged 
the next three years, manifesting itself as a series of piratical incidents, for 
which the Resident appears to have attempted to exact specific retribution and 
compensation. In the absence of wider British interference, the Wahhabi 
1 / See Lorimer (1970) part II pp856/7. 
21 BLOIORL R/15/1/61 Agent Sharjah/Resident dated 24/4/1833. 
3 / BLOIORL R/15/1/61 Agent/Resident dated 16/7/33 reports that Abdullah bin Ahmed 
returned to Bahrain and decided to break with Wahhabis. 
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continued to demand tribute according to traditional precedent and in 
accordance with traditional customs, Abdullah bin Ahmed therefore offered 
fealty. This act admitted his dependence on the Wahhabis, but the Bahrainis 
immediately renounced or withheld zakat when they felt strong enough to fight 
of an attack. Relations between the Wahhabis and the Al Khalifah through the 
1830's and 1840's thus fluctuated between amity and hostility proportionate to 
the relative balance of power. Wahhabi overlordship was momentarily restored 
in 1836, Abdullah bin Ahmed, weary of a joint Persian/Omani attack, agreed to 
paid a nominal tribute to the Amir in return for his assistance against external 
attacks, but this tribute fell into abeyance with the Egyptian invasion of Hasa, 
and relations between the two parties became increasingly strained. A 
significant number of inhabitants of Saihat in Al Hasa migrated to Bahrain and 
the Bahrainis initiated a blockade of the Wahhabi coast.4 
During the 1840's, when Civil War broke out in Bahrain, the Wahhabi 
Amir showed a close interest in the dynastic struggle of the Al Khalifah, 
actively playing of one side against the other. In 1843, Faysal bin Turki helped 
Muhammed bin Khalifah deal with the splinter Al Khalifah on condition that 
Muhammed bin Khalifah acknowledge the supremacy of the Wahhabis and pay 
back-dated tribute.5 Muhammed bin Khalifah predictably refused to surrender 
tribute to the Wahhabi and hostilities broke out between the two parties. 
Periodic skirmishes occurred for the next two years without any decisive 
outcome, until the defection in early 1847 of the 'Amair tribe to the Wahhabis 
tipped the balance between the two combatants in favour of the Wahhabis. 
Muhammed bin Khalifah thus rapidly arranged a settlement with the Wahhabis, 
once again acknowledging Wahhabi supremacy and agreeing to surrender an 
annual tribute of 84,000 Riyals.6 
4 / See Lorimer (1970) part II pp868-70 and pp879-880 for overview of relation between the 
Al Khalifah and the Wahhabis during the 1840's. 
5 / See Lorimer (1970) part II p879. 
61 ibidp880. 
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It is unclear what attitude the Resident took towards this early Wahhabi 
influence and the outbreak of conflict between Bahrain and the Wahhabis. 
Britain did not consider the Wahhabis as a regional rival worthy of concern., 
but the question of zakat remained problematic. On no account was Britain 
prepared to acknowledge that tribute or zakat was an admission of dependence 
which gave the receiving party a right to interfere in Bahraini affairs. Where 
comment was absolutely necessary, the British attempted to restrict the 
importance of zakat by treating it as a wholly religious phenomena. When the 
question arose in 1855, the Resident noted that: 
As regards the tribute paid by Bahrein to which the Wahabee Ruler would seem to 
refer as a proof of dependency Whether it be viewed as a religious contribution as its name 
implies extorted from the fears of the late Abdullah bin Ahmed the Chief of the Island 
without direct subjugation or whether it be viewed as a condition of the tenure of the 
territory possessed by the Chiefs ofbahrein of the mainland which is more directly open to 
invasion by the Wahabees and which is in the tenure of which the British Government takes 
no concern the question has always been carefully avoided hv the British Authorities in the 
Gulf7 
But the problems surrounding tribute did not disappear with Britain's 
refusal to acknowledge the significance of the payment of zakat. The demand 
for zakat remained the commonest method by which external powers attempted 
to establish a right of interference in Bahrain affairs. In a non-religious context, 
the payment of tribute expressed relations of submission that did give suzerain 
authority to the recipient. Since the relationship between the Wahhabis and the 
Al Khalifah did not affect Britain's ability to manage the Gulf in the 1830's no 
explicit comment was required. These submissions could not however be 
ignored, when tribute was surrender to more powerful nations. In such cases, 
demanding or surrendering zakat was a direct challenge to Britain's hegemony 
in the Gulf. The co-existence of other suzerain powers with the right and 
ability to interfere in regional affairs, undermined the ability of the British to 
punish piratical transgressions by manipulating the Sheikh of Bahrain. 
7 / BLOIORL R/15/1/132 Kemball/Anderson, Sec. to Gov't of Bombay dated 10/8/18955. 
See also Secret Letter No. 166 dated 31/5/53 and Hennell/Bombav Secret Letter no.336 dated 
22/10/51. 
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Ever since the Treaty of Shiraz, Britain was aware of the need to deny 
other regional powers an opportunity to extend their influence. This could only 
be done by squaring up to any challenge offered. The British sought to 
popularise a position of mutual neutrality towards the independent Arab states 
amongst other powers, but with little success. The British argued that since 
Britain did not covertly interfere in Bahraini affairs, this right should be 
surrender by other interested parties who ought therefore to relinquish claims 
over the islands. Kemball explained that: 
'The policy involved in this conduct is founded upon principles which have now met 
with universal recognition- A foreign power has no right to force upon a particular state a 
certain individual as a ruler; it leaves that question for the decision of the state itself, but it 
has a right to demand that other foreign interests shall observe the same forebearance. ** 
This contorted sophistry, however, won few converts. To protect 
Bahrain's independence and its system of managing the Gulf, Britain was 
obliged to go to the brink of war with its regional rivals. Even then, Britain was 
not able to defend its regional authority owing to factors outside its control. 
When Egypt disregarded the diplomatic principle of mutual neutrality and 
invaded the Gulf in the late 1830's, Britain was helpless to prevent the system 
of independent states falling apart. 
The Egyptians had swept through Central Arabia in the late 1830's 
under the command of Khurshid Pasha, overcoming the Wahhabi Amir, Faysal 
bin Turki, after a protracted campaign towards the end of 1838.9 This victory 
gave them control over the territory neighbouring Bahrain, and encouraged 
them to attack the islands of Bahrain. Both Britain and Al Khalifah were aware 
of the likelihood of an Egyptian invasion and the probable success of such an 
endeavour. Hennell had previously reported rumours of a secret agreement 
between Khurshid Pasha and the Imam of Muscat whereby the latter agreed to 
pay 30,000 Crowns in tribute i f placed in possession of Bahrain, Lahsah and 
Qatif.1 0 Indeed Hennell even observed that: 
8 / BLOIORL R/15/1/143 Anderson/Kemball no.288 Secret dated 20/11/54. 
9 / BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Khurshid Pasha's success is reported in Hennell/Secret Committee 
dated 24/1/1839 Secret. 
1(7 BLOIORL R/15/1/72 Hennell/Willoughby no.48 Pol. dated 8/6/37. 
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'There can be little doubt however that if no events occur in Europe to shake the 
power of Mahomed Ally Pasha in Egypt and Syria, his authority will gradually but surely be 
extended over the tribes inhabiting the Coast of Oman.'" 
Yet there was no obvious course of policy for the British to follow. 
Britain fell back on its adopted policy of wait-and-see. 
As a precaution against Egyptian encroachment, Abdullah bin Ahmed 
had made indirect approaches to the Resident in January 1839 to inquire about 
closer relations and Britain's willingness to defend him against Khurshid Pasha. 
The Bahrainis could not enlist a sufficient force to beat off any Egyptian 
advance and looked to Britain for protection. Nonetheless, strict adherence to 
Britain's policy of non-intervention in the Persian Gul f precluded any guarantee 
of the Sheikh's position, and Britain declined any assistance. A reply was 
deliberately withheld from the Sheikh rather than outrightly refuse his request. 
But the net result was that the British chose to leave the Sheikh isolated and 
exposed to an Egyptian attack. This one act imposed an inevitable conclusion 
upon the impending crisis and transformed the independent chief of Bahrain 
from an agent of stability and support-prop for British supremacy into a 
destabilising impediment that compromised British authority. 
When the British formally recognised the Al Khalifah as independent by 
compacting the general treaty, Britain expected the Chiefs to refrain from 
compromising their independence, but their very independence prevented 
Britain from prescribing any course of action. As long as the Bahrain Sheikh 
was purportedly independent, then the British had to acknowledge that: 
'we possess no right to guide or control the external relations of Sheikh Mahomed 
ben Khuleefah. ' n 
The Sheikh enjoyed the sovereign right to determine his foreign policy 
in his own interests. Once exposed before the Egyptians and rejected by the 
1 1 /BLOIORLR/15/1/71 Hennell/Willoughby, Secretary to Government, Bombay no.13 
Secret dated 22/2/39. 
1 2 / BLOIORL R/15/1/138 Kemball/Malet no.57 dated 11/2/53. 
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British, the Al Khalifah unsurprisingly exercised this sovereignty to protect 
their position by responding to the Egyptians in time-honoured fashion. 
In the first instance this meant that the Al Khalifah sought assistance 
from a stronger regional ally to face down the Egyptians. Abdullah bin Ahmed 
thus approached Persia.13 It was reported in January 1839 that. 
'the Chief of Bahrain has applied to the Persian Government for permission to 
place himself and his Island under its protection in the event of any expedition against his 
territory being contemplated from Nedgd.,14 
A Persian envoy, Hajee Qassim, eventually left Bushire on the 3 r d of 
March to offer Bahrain Persian protection in return for their tribute,15 but 
Qassim failed completely to achieve any constructive outcome on his visit to 
Bahrain. Persia became frustrated with the machevellian diplomacy of the Al 
Khalifah and subsequently withdrew from any further immediate involvement in 
Bahrain affairs.16 In consequence, when the Egyptians approached Bahrain, 
the Al Khalifah were compelled to submit voluntarily in order to protect 
themselves. 
Egyptian encroachment on Bahrain was first felt after the defeat of 
Faysal, when Khurshid Pasha sent a letter to the Bahrain Shuyukh requesting 
one of the Amir's sons at Lahsah and restitution of the tribute formerly paid to 
the Amir Turki. 1 7 To complement these overtures, a French medic in the 
service of Khurshid Pasha, Monsieur Anton visited Bahrain on the 27 t h of 
1 3 / Hennell admitted that strictly speaking there was no concrete evidence indicating the 
Sheikh's desire for closer relations with the British at this time although indirect approaches 
were made to the Resident in October 1838 through Suleiman bin Jassim. It is clear however 
that Hennell was aware of the Shuyukh's desire for British protection and assistance against 
the Egyptians. See BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell/Willoughby, Secretary to Gov't Bombay 
no. 13 Sec. dated 22/2/1839 and the instructions given to Maitland to refer any further 
inquiries from the Sheikh to Bombay. 
1 4 / B L O I O R L R/15/1/71 Hennell/Secret Committee dated 24/1/1839 Secret. 
1 5 / op.cit. Hennell/Secret Committee dated 15/3/1839 reports departure of Hajee Qassim 
adding that Hennell believes the envoy will subsequently reside in Bahrain and receive and 
remit tribute. 
1 6 / Three months later, when Khurshid Pasha 'seized' Bahrain, Persia merely sent Hennell a 
rukum instructing him to testify the validity of the Persian claim over Bahrain and write 
accordingly to the Egyptians since both countries shared the same interests in the face of this 
common enemy. See BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell/Secret Committee dated 4/5/1839 no.43. 
1 7 / ibid. 
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February and subsequently stayed three weeks. He brought correspondence 
from Khurshid Pasha to the Resident that clearly indicated the Egyptian's 
ambitions against Bahrain and his means of pursuing them. Citing alleged 
instances of Bahraini espionage, Khurshid Pasha stated his desire to subject the 
island, and his hope that the through this pre-emptive forewarning, his British 
friends would sustain no losses and enjoy additional advantages after a 
successful Egyptian occupation. The Resident was informed that: 
'Fugitive Arabs in conjunction with the Heads of the Island Sheik Khuleefa, are 
daily plotting against my Government attempting to seduce the Chiefs of the Province of 
Nedgd which have now submitted to me I consequently have determined to make myself 
master of this Island by force, the moreso, as it forms a principal part of Nedgd and has 
always been tributary from the period that Saood ruled over the latter country and therefore 
most justly ought to become subject to the Viceroy of Egypt who is now Lord of Nedgd 
Lahsah and Kateef ecf. 
Being aware that many Traders in the Island of Bahrein are commercially 
connected with the English, I have considered it my duty to communicate with Your 
Excellency as English Consul General, in order that these Merchants may be aware of my 
intentions, not wishing that as friends of the British Nation, they should sustain any loss, but 
on the contrary desiring to favour them in every respect that depends on me and upon my 
Government, I hope that from the moment that island submits to H.H. Mahomed Ali many 
more advantages will be derived by these Merchants and by the British Government itself as 
the greatest harmony now reigns between the two States.'' 
The Egyptian advance caused great concern both in the immediate 
sphere, and in the context of European diplomacy. The Resident, however had 
no standing orders for dealing with so abrupt an approach and was uncertain 
what course of action to pursue. In the first instance, Hennell wrote requesting 
orders from Bombay as to the correct course of policy and attempted to freeze 
the conflict until his orders were received. At the same time, he was aware that 
doing nothing would create a diplomatic hiatus and give the Egyptians the 
initiative. Hennell therefore planned a reply that requested Khurshid Pasha to 
postpone any planned operation against Bahrain until Hennell had received 
communication from his superiors at Bombay, and did not to express any 
opinion in the absence of specific authorised instructions save to note that 'the 
hostile intentions avowed by Your Excellency will be viewed with deep 
1 8 / BLOIORL R/15/1/71 reported in Hennell/Secret Committee dated 28/2/1839. 
1 9 / B L O I O R L R/15/1/71 Khurshid Pasha/HenneU dated 24 Zil Hadar 1254 a h. enclosed in 
Hennell/ Willoughby, Bombay no. 14 Sec. dated 2/3/1839. 
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concern by my Government.' Notwithstanding Hennell doubted whether the 
Egyptians were willing to postpone their offensive. Rather he believed that the 
Egyptians would be more inclined to attack with haste in order to pre-empt 
any British opposition and interference. On the 2nd of March he informed 
Willoughby, Secretary to the Governor-General of Bombay that: 
'If the means of transport can be procured I am inclined to think that Khoshid 
Pasha will attempt the conquest of the Island without delay in order to anticipate any 
interference of remonstrances which may be offered by us.'"' 
The Resident's impression of the Egyptians' preparations and strength 
were reinforced by Monsieur Anton's presence and exaggeration which left 
Hennell believing that an invasion would be launched eight days after the 
departure of the Frenchman. Accordingly, a much stronger reply was handed to 
M. Anton confessing Hennell's deep concern at hostile Egyptian actions and 
pressing upon Khurshid Pasha that any conflict was best avoided.22 
Monsieur Anton subsequently left on the ninth of March in possession 
of Hennell's reply to Khurshid Pasha. Hennell did not believe that his paper 
diplomacy would prevent an Egyptian attack. He observed that: 
'An intimation from the British Government that Bahrein was under its protection 
and that any attack upon it would be viewed as an act of hostility towards itself would I 
doubt not be sufficient to put an end to the designs of the Egyptian ruler upon that Island. ' 2 3 
Accordingly, Hennell advocated more aggressive British measures to 
confront the Egyptians that ignored the policy of non-intervention and 
guaranteed the Sheikh of Bahrain. Under despatch to the Government of 
Bombay dated the 22nd February he reasoned that: 
'in some points of view there would be an advantage in counterbalancing his 
increased and increasing influence in this Quarter by maintaining the independence of the 
Shaik of Bahrein the only power in the Gulf who might be supported by our naval means 
alone and perhaps without any considerable expense being incurred in addition to that 
which our policy in this quarter at present involves. " 
Hennell intuitively advocated the one policy that would have protected 
British interests even though this meant turning British policy on its head. His 
emphasis remained that of confronting the Egyptians rather than reassuring the 
/ B L O I O R L R/15/1/71 Hennell/Secret Committee dated 28/2/1839 and Hennell/ Khurshid 
Pasha dated 28/2/1839 enclosed in above. 
2 1 / BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell/Willoughby, Bombay no. 14 Secret dated 2/3/1839. 
221 BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell/Secret Committee London dated 6/3/1839 Secret. 
2 3 / BLOIORL R/15/171 Hennell/Willoughby no. 13 Secret dated 22/2/1839. 
2 4 / BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell/ Sec. Gov't of Bombay no. 13 Secret dated 22/2/1839. 
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Al Khalifah, but his proposed course of action undercut any Egyptian advance 
by protecting Bahrain from the dynamics of tutelage and submission This 
recommendation was temporarily lost, however, when Admiral Maitland 
arrived in the Gulf in mid-March on board HMS Wellesley carrying Hennell's 
orders. 2 5 Britain thence launched a two-pronged attack to stand up to the 
Egyptians. 
The HMS Wellesley was sent to Bahrain as a demonstration of British 
naval power to dissuade the Egyptians from extending into the Gulf. To 
maximise the advantage gained from Maitland's presence, HMS Wellesley was 
despatched to visit Bahrain, Ras Al Khaymah and Lingah. British officials at 
Bombay believed that Maitland's visit would itself stop further Egyptian 
adventures against Bahrain, at least temporarily i f not permanently. Even the 
Resident believed that Maitland's presence in the Gulf would turn Khurshid 
Pasha's attention away from Bahrain towards Baghdad and Bussore.26 Unlike 
Hennell's proposal, this show of strength was essentially cosmetic and did not 
protect the Al Khalifah. Lorimer mentions that Maitland was authorised by the 
Government of India to 'strongly use his influence' to deter the Egyptians from 
attacking Bahrain, and was additionally instructed to provide every support to 
the Bahrainis in their resistance, without himself engaging in actual hostilities.27 
This specific prohibition of hostilities restricted Maitland's opportunity to act 
decisively against the Egyptians and still prescribed any British action to defend 
Bahrain. 
/ BLOIORL R / l 5/1/71 His arrival is reported in Hennell/Secret Committee dated 21/3/1839 
Secret. 
2 6 / ibid. 
2 7 / Lorimer (1970) part II p863. Similar instructions appear to have been passed to Hennell, 
since he intimated his intention at the start of May to send a Cniizer to Bahrain with 
duplicate orders should the need arise. See BLOIORL R/l5/1/71 Hennell dated 2/5/1839 
Secret. 
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However Hennell's letter dated 22nd February had a significant impact 
upon the Government of India. His clarion warnings of the imminent success 
of the Egyptians and the urgent necessity for Britain to defend Bahrain led the 
Government of India to revise its orders. Under date of 18/4/1839 Admiral 
Maitland was informed that he was now: 
'in the event of the Shaikh of Bahrain having claimed British interposition and 
offered to place his territories under British protection, to assure him of the temporary 
protection of Her Majesty's squadron in the Gulf and to intimate to Khurshid Pasha that he 
had donee so, and that it was incumbent on the Egyptians to abstain from further military 
proceedings until both officers should receive orders from their respective Governments.' 
Additionally Maitland was authorised, in the event that no satisfactory 
response was received from the Egyptians, to the effect that he 
'might inform Khurshid Pasha that he would be held responsible, if he crossed over 
to the islands of Bahrain, for commencing hostilities against the British Government, whose 
officers were authorised to defend the principality against invasion until the pleasure of Her 
Majesty's Government should be known; and after making this declaration, the Admiral 
might exercise his discretion as to the best means of defending Bahrain. J 8 
Admiral Maitland thus attempted to intimidate the Egyptians by 
posturing around the Gulf in a British gun-boat, but Britain did not offer to 
explicitly guarantee the position of the Al Khalifah. 
Maitland visited Bahrain the penultimate week in April. He concluded 
that an immediate or imminent Egyptian attack was unlikely,29 and thus 
reassured set sail on the 27 t h April for Ras Al Khymah and Lingah. Hennell 
informed Willoughby on the 22 n d of May that: 
7 have no doubt that the display of interest taken in their Affairs by the British 
Government , and the will timed Arguments of His Excellency and Mr. Edmunds will 
produce a powerful effect upon the minds not alone of the Tribes on the Coast but also upon 
those in the interior and will I trust in a very material degree check the progress ofKhorshid 
Pasha's encroachments in the direction of Oman, 3 0 
Yet at the same time Hennell could not ignore the Egyptian threat and 
thus sent a forceful correspondence, authorised by Bombay, which protested 
against Khurshid Pasha's designs on Bahrain and threatened a break in friendly 
relations. Although the letter has not been traced, Hennell reported its contents 
to his superiors, noting that: 
2 8 / Lorimer (1970) part II pp863/4. 
2 9 / BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell dated 2/5/1839 reports meeting. A fuller report of the visit 
is found in Captain Edmunds' transcript of the voyage, mention of which is made in 
Hennell/Willoughby no.55 Secret dated 22/5/1839. 
3 0 / BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell/Willoughby dated 22/5/1839 no.55 Secret. 
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'In this letter I inform the pasha that I have been instructed to remonstrate strongly 
against him pressing his designs upon Bahrein and further to inform him explicitly that his 
proceedings are in direct opposition to the understanding existing between His Highness 
Mahomed Ali and the Government of Great Britain and that should he not attend to the 
remonstrances of the British Authorities such conduct would probably lead to an 
interruption of the amity now existing between the two states. ' 3 I 
This aggressive approach momentarily stopped the Egyptian military 
advance, but the Al Khalifah still felt pressurised by the Egyptians and exposed. 
Accordingly, the Pasha was able to convince the Bahrain Sheikhs to 
acknowledge Egyptian suzerainty and offer tribute without needing to engage 
in hostilities. News of Bahrain's voluntary submission was communicated to 
the Resident through one Mr. Effendi at the end of May and was met with total 
surprise and incredulity.32 
Egyptian control over Bahrain struck a piercing blow at the heart of the 
system of petty independent states. Concern was expressed about the 
probable domino effect the surrender of the Al Khalifah would initiate and the 
possible collapse of the system of independent states, but there was little the 
British could do to contain or redress the situation. On hearing M. Effendi's 
report Hennell announced that: 
7 fear this unfortunate concession will have a sinister effect upon our endeavours to 
induce the Maritime Arabian Chiefs on the Coast to continue for the purpose of opposing the 
encroachments of the Egyptians.3 
At the same time Hennell floundered for any explanation as to the 
Sheikh's voluntary submission, inquiring rather bemusedly: 
'What motives could possibly have induced the Shaikh of Bahrain to acknowledge 
/if he has really done so/ the supremacy of Mahomed Ali by consenting to pay him tribute 
after the support and encouragement he has received from the British Government to 
maintain his independence inviolate is beyond by power to explain, unless it be that he 
considers the engagement entered into rather in the light of an alliance than an admission of 
subjection to the authority of the Pasha.134 
When pressed for an explanation, the Sheikh explained that his 
voluntary submission had secured 'virtual immunity' from attack and since 
Britain had appeared unwilling to defend Bahrain it was a small sacrifice to 
make to ensure his security,35 but Hennell was initially unable to rationalise the 
3 1 / BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell dated 2/5/18839. 
3 2 / B L O I O R L R/15/1/71 Hennell no.57 dated 30/5/1839. 
3 3 / BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell/Secret Committee dated 6/6/1839. 
3 4 /ibid. 
3 5 / See Lorimer (1970) part II p865. 
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situation. At first he refused to accept the accuracy of Mr. EfFendi's report 
until it had been independently verified by HCC Give 
It was however impossible to ignore the problem posed by Mr 
EfFendi's report. Even the merest possibility that EfFendi's report was correct 
obliged Hennell to act before HCC Clive returned on the 13th June and 
confirmed the Egyptian/Bahraini agreement. Hennell therefore returned a 
contumacious protest to the Pasha refusing to acquiesce or admit even for one 
moment any of the points of agreement between the Pasha and the Bahrainis: 
namely that Bahrain was a dependent of Nejd or that Muhammed Ali held any 
right to possess the island.36 Hennell contemplated launching a counter-attack 
to drive the Egyptians away, but had no authorisation for the deployment of a 
land force. The Egyptian/Bahraini condominium was thus a fait accompli that 
could not be unravelled or ignored by Hennell burying his head in the sand. 
Hennell continued to execute the necessary diplomatic protests, but the 
diplomatic initiative had passed to Cairo. Hennell admitted that his actions 
were meaningless in the absence of a will to militarily re-establish the 
independence of the Al Khalifah. He thus reported to Bombay that since: 
'under any circumstances I presume the employment of a land force to assist them 
in the maintenance of their independence is out of the question, the preservation of the 
Maritime Chiefs from the Egyptian yoke must therefore depend in a great measure upon the 
language held by H.M.Minister to Mahomed Ally and the measures they may think fit to 
adopt in the event of no greater attention being paid to their remonstrances than hitherto 
appears to have been exhibited by the Viceroy. 
Fortunately a favourable response from Muhammed Ali suggested that 
the Egyptian presence in Bahrain might be withdrawn. Hennell used this 
opportunity to pressure Khurshid Pasha censuring him on the 4th of July to the 
effect that: 
3 6 / B L O I O R L R/15/1/71 Hennell/Khurshid Pasha dated 29/5/1839 enclosed in Hennell no.57 
Secret along with the articles of agreement between Muhammed Ali and Abdullah bin 
Ahmed. 
3 7 / BLOIORL R/15/171 Hennell/ Secret Committee dated 6/6/1839. 
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'You appear to be exceeding your own authority in intimidating Chiefs of the 
Arabian Shore given that you have communicated to me the absence of any orders for the 
like. J S 
In addition Hennell undertook a whistle-stop tour of the Gulf in an 
attempt to boost British prestige amongst the Arab Chieftains, wistfully 
reasoning that he had checked the influence of the Egyptians: 
'by having given encouragement and confidence to those disposed to maintain their 
connexion with the British and proportionally lowering the hopes and pretensions of [the] 
opposite party. 3 9 
However the apparent rift between Muhammed Ali and Khurshid Pasha, 
and the development of the English/French conflict over Egypt had a much 
greater impact on the Gulf than Hennell's Gulf tour, since Khurshid Pasha was 
induced to withdraw from Bahrain and the Gulf in the summer of 1840.40 
In the aftermath, the British asked themselves how the Egyptians 
succeeded -albeit temporarily- in establishing a position at the heart of the 
British system for controlling the Gulf and why Britain was unable to prevent 
such an occurrence. Abdullah bin Ahmed's voluntary submission was 
inexplicable and a cause of resentment. There was no recognition however of 
the contributing factor that the general nature of British diplomacy made to the 
Egyptians success. As an incumbent High Government, the British had become 
aggressive advocates and defenders of the status quo. Their diplomacy 
therefore assumed an entrenched defensive character that eschewed hostilities 
unless absolutely necessary.41 There was no need for the British to act pre-
emptively since it was assumed that unless disturbed, the status quo was itself a 
sufficient guarantee of Britain's position and standing. Accordingly, British 
diplomacy tended to be responsive: diplomatic inertia was only replaced by 
action when actual disturbances occurred, and the diplomatic initiative lay with 
those parties, such as the Egyptians, who sought to disturb the status quo. As a 
3 8 / BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell/Khurshid Pasha enclosed in Hennell/ Willoughby Secret B 
dated 4/7/1839. 
"/Reported in BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell/Carapbell, Egypt dated 15/7/1839. 
4 0 / Khurshid Pasha evacuation was reported in BLOIORL R/ l 5/1/79 Hennell/Reid, Sec. 
Gov't, of Bombay, no.62 Secret dated 2/6/40. 
4 1 / For instance MaiUand was only given the freedom to act as he saw fit after a series of 
incremental expansions to authorised activity had failed to avert the imminent threat of 
hostilities. 
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result, Britain's own control over events was tenuous and British initiatives 
were focused on solving problems rather than pre-empting them. Events often 
ran a far greater course than was desirable and solutions were found to crisis 
without any solution to the underlying problems. 
The Egyptian invasion highlighted a difference in Britain's and the Al 
Khalifahs' understanding and use of concept of independence. Britain's 
commitment to the existence of an independent territorial ruler of Bahrain 
under a British aegis was a mechanism for attempting to preserve a British 
sphere of influence without deriving additional responsibilities. The Al 
Khalifah enjoyed their position as Chiefs at the Company's pleasure. Indeed, 
amongst the British, it was argued that since Bahrain and the Al Khalifah owed 
their position to Britain that it could be expected, by reciprocal arrangement, 
that the Chief of Bahrain would restrain himself from acting against British 
interests or directives especially with respect to his foreign policy. The Al 
Khalifah on the other hand believed and acted as i f their independence entitled 
them to act free from restraints. British hegemony was compromised by this 
fundamental misunderstanding. The British did not expect the Al Khalifah to 
compromise their standing once they had refused to guarantee the Al Khalifahs' 
position. They realised too late the unfortunate consequences of this oversight, 
but there was no other option for the Al Khalifah save for that they pursued. 
The Bahrain Sheikhs valued their position more than their independence and 
felt that by sacrificing the latter they might protect the first when both were 
under threat. Fortuitously, Britain was given an opportunity to reassert its 
regional authority when the Egyptians withdrew from the Gulf, even though 
they had secured their suzerainty over Bahrain. To take full advantage of the 
situation, the British began to consider more direct strategies for managing the 
Gulf. 
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Private discussions between London, Bombay and the Resident 
contemplated the assumption of protectorate status over Bahrain; a British 
invasion of the island; and the occupation of Bahrain by a third party- the most 
favoured choice being the Imam of Muscat. The Al Khalifah were now a 
liability for Britain. The Government of Bombay requested Hennell to submit 
his opinion on the desirability of closer relations with the Bahrain Sheikh 
Initially Hennell appears to have favoured closer relations, observing that: 
7 ventured to submit an opinion that apart from considerations of more general 
policy I was disposed to consider the establishment of a regular and permanent Authority 
over the Maritime Arabs of the Persian Gulf as rather conduicive than otherwise to our 
views for the suppression of piracy and the continued tranquillity of this Quarter. The 
extension of such an Authority over the Petty States would probably be attended with the 
great advantage of putting an end to their perpetual feuds and quarrels which have tended 
perhaps more directly than any other cause to cherish the predatory habits.42 
However, Hennell rapidly changed his mind. Even though the Al 
Khalifah were British proxies, Hennell felt their perfidy in submitting to the 
Egyptians and their growing oppressions nullified the benefits of closer 
relations. He subsequently argued that Britain's position was best defended by 
supporting Bahrain independence and dealing with the Sheikh in the existing 
framework.43 
Hennell cogently laid down the different issues that had any bearing on 
the question. He identified five factors had to be taken into account. On the 
one hand a small revenue would accrue to the British from closer relations with 
Bahrain, and the announcement that Britain had taken Bahrain under its 
protection would produce an end to interminable wrangling over tribute and 
stop external powers from intriguing against the island. On the other hand, 
Britain could not defend the Sheikh's mainland possession with its naval means 
alone and would inevitably dragged into Arab feuds with the possibly that much 
time would be wasted compelling the Sheikh to abide by British decisions, 
4 2 / BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell/WIlloughby no. 13 Secret dated 22/2/1839. This initial 
opinion was originally submitted under date 11/2/1839 and then revised in the above 
communication. The letter of 11/2/1839 could not be traced. 
4 3 / See ibid Secret Letter no. 13. 
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Britain would in effect bind itself to protect Bahrain from all external 
aggressions, and additionally, in Hennell's own words: 
'In taking Bahrein under British Protection it must however he borne in mind that 
we place ourselves in direct collision with the claims upon that island entertained by the 
Governments of Persia and Muscat, claims the justice of which, if we have not openly 
acknowledged we have assuredly never opposed. A 
In conclusion Hennell submitted that this diplomatic conundrum could 
only be resolved pragmatically . 
'The question however for consideration appears to me to be whether the 
advantages to be desired from Bahrein becoming tributary to the British Government in 
return for being guarenteed against all external enemies would afford an adequate 
equivalent to the consistent embarrassments which so close and intimate a connexion with an 
Arab Chieftain occupying the position of Abdoollah ben Ahmed would certainly create.45 
After due consideration, the drawbacks associated with closer relations 
between Britain and Bahrain induced his superiors to reject the idea. British 
policy therefore crystallised in consideration of the trade-off between the need 
to ensure a unity of purpose between Bahrain and Britain and the 
embarrassment attendant upon closer relations with Bahrain. Instead of 
responding constructively to underlying causes that provoked the Al Khalifah's 
submission, the British rejected the idea of guaranteeing Bahrain or associating 
themselves to any greater degree with the Al Khalifah. They thus rejected the 
opportunity to construct an alliance of parties that would support British 
interests and perpetuated the conditions in which the independent chiefs were 
an obstacle to British ambitions. 
Britain still had to find a system for managing the Gulf that precluded a 
repeat Egyptian disaster. Attention therefore focused on the desirability of 
occupying Bahrain by force. Bombay solicited Hennell's opinion on the fitness 
of the Bahrain for invasion in March 1840.46 Hennell's reply was decidedly 
against such a venture, pointing out the inevitable hostility and opposition that 
it would provoke. He noted that: 
'In respect to the practicality of British Troops talking up a position on the Island 
of Bahrein I have no hesitation in expressing my conviction that this can never he done 
under an amicable arrangement with Shaik Abdoollah ben Ahmed. The jealous and 
suspicious temper of this Chief will not allow him even to set foot voluntarily on the deck of 
4 4 / ibid. 
4 5 /ibid. 
4 6 / The suggestion of occupation was apparently first made in Bombay/Hennell no.478 dated 
28/3/1840. See BLOIORL R/15/1/90. 
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a British vessel, and I feel assured that he would at once reject any propositions of the above 
nature... 
.. The Shaik entertains a deeply rooted dread of the power of the British 
Government but he is brave and energetic, and unless he found himself deserted by his 
adherents, would not 1 am inclined to think submit to have his Island occupied by a foreign 
power without a struggle, except unless so powerful a force were brought against him. as to 
preclude all hope of a successful opposition. A7 
An interesting variation of this plan was however proposed by Hennell 
based upon the idea of a third-party invasion. He suggested that Britain would 
be justified, in the light of Abdullah bin Ahmed's unfriendly disposition, 'in 
supporting the claims of HH the Imam of Muscat on the Island of Bahrein 
should such a course be deemed expedient.'48 It was noted that i f the Imam 
could be persuaded to invade, this would preclude European interference and 
Bahrain would revert to a staunch British ally who would pay greater attention 
to British interests. Indeed so deep was the friendship existing between the two 
parties that Hennell stated that: 
'our influence in the Persian Gulf will be almost as equally promoted and 
maintained by aiding HH in obtaining possession of that Island as if we took it for 
ourselves. A 9 
Although the Imam was well-disposed to such a plan, he could not be 
induced to invade Bahrain without British assistance and subsequently retired 
to Zanzibar, effectively putting an end to British scheming. Britain thus was 
obliged to make do as best it could with the system of independent chiefs, 
making sure that the chiefs could not undermine British interests. 
The Al Khalifah therefore remained the independent chiefs of Bahrain. 
Britain still exercised its authority by directing the Bahraini chief to pursue 
pirates and upholding the sanctity of Bahrain's independence to ward off 
Turkey and Persia. However, Britain withdrew its grant of those elements of 
sovereignty that allowed the Bahraini Sheikhs to compromise Britain's 
position. In effect it ignored the myth of independence to impose its will. The 
Shuyukh was surreptitiously presented with unwritten political and ethical 
precepts not to transgress. He was expected not to compromise his 
4 7 / BLOIROL R/15/1/90 Hennell/ Reid no.73 Secret dated 8/6/40. See also Hennell/Reid 
no.48 Secret dated 21/5/1840. 
4 8 / BLOIORL R/15/1/90 Hennell/Reid no.62 Secret dated 2/6/1840. 
4 9 / BLOIORL R/15/1/90 Hennell/Reid no.97 Secret dated 4/8/1840. 
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independence by encouraging external influences, nor exacerbate regional 
instability through his contumacy. Britain could not prevent Persia and Turkey 
from raising claim over Bahrain, but Britain now intended to covertly dictate 
the Bahraini Chiefs response. 
Although British interference in the internal affairs of Bahrain had no 
basis in international law, it was underwritten by Britain's superior military 
prowess and resources and not something that the Bahraini Chief could 
indefinitely resist. Britain was aware that an open right to interfere exclusively 
in Bahraini affairs would not be admitted by any rival party. Accordingly, 
various contingencies were adopted under which Britain would identify itself 
more closely with the Sheikh through treaties and even take Bahrain under its 
protection in the event of foreign powers appearing in the Gulf . 5 0 Hennell was 
specifically directed in a letter from Malet, the then Secretary to the Governor-
General at Bombay, under date 14/12/1847 to inquire as to the Sheikh's 
position on closer connections with British Government and the advisability of 
a new treaty with Bahrain as a pre-emptive measure against other foreign 
intrusions.51 In the immediate short-term however, there was no credible 
regional rival to Britain's authority and Hennell therefore concluded that: 
'There appears to me to be at present an absence of circumstances, sufficiently 
pressing, to render it advisable for the British Government to involve itself in the 
embarrassment likely to arise out of a closer or more intimate connection with the present 
Ruler of Bahrain. 6 2 
Britain therefore disregarded the diplomatic niceties and sought to find 
a stable equilibrium for managing the Gulf behind the veneer of purportedly 
independent states. Relations between Britain and Bahrain entered a new phase 
of semi-coerced unity. Nonetheless, Britain was reluctant to abandon the myth 
5 0 / See BLOIORL L/P&S/5/346 Secret Committee, Bombay/Secret Committee London no.23 
d. 15/3/48 & no.49 d. 19/6/48; L/P&S/5/453 enclosure to secret letters no.23: Hennell/Malet 
28/12/47 and no.31 d.21/1/48, Sec Committee, Bombay Board Minutes 22/2/48 & 7/3/48. 
5 V BLOIORL L/P&S/5/453 enclosure to letter no.23: Malet/Hennell no535 14/12/47. See 
also letter dated 18/10/47 Secret Committee, London/ Secret Committee, Bombay. 
5 2 / ibid. 
94 
of semi-coerced unity. Nonetheless, Britain was reluctant to abandon the myth 
of independence in its entirety lest it associate itself too closely with the Al 
Khalifah. Britain thus found that its attempts to control the Sheikh of Bahrain 
were not totally effective. Ultimately the attempt to stem the instability 
promoted by the Al Khalifah at a time when Bahrain was degenerating into civil 
war proved not only unsuccessful, but forced Britain to openly intervene in the 
internal affairs of Bahrain, jettison the myth of independence and accept 
responsibility for widespread oppression that its proxy rulers had committed. 
Chapter Five: Settling the Question 
Towards a New Regional Order 
This chapter will seek to examine the ramifications of independence 
within Bahrain. It will explore the manner in which the recognition of the Al 
Khalifah as independent sovereign rulers in the 1820's produced burgeoning 
oppression. It will consider the collapse of internal political authority in the late 
1830's and 1840's that grew out of this oppression and Britain's decision not 
to openly enter into closer relations with the Al Khalifah after the Egyptian 
fiasco. As a result of these two factors, by 1845 Bahraini affairs were 
dominated by a bitter conflict between two feuding parties that had engulfed 
the island in Civil War. This war dragged on for the best part of fifteen years 
until the British intervened decisively, and in so doing, broke the myth of 
independence. 
In the aftermath of the Egyptian crisis, Britain became more insistent 
that the Al Khalifah show reciprocal goodwill and deference to British 
interests. Britain imposed a settlement of an internal tribal dispute upon the Al 
Khalifah mid way through 1839 reasoning that: 
'The interest however which we have taken in his concern and the opposition we 
have shown to the hostile views of the Egyptian Ruler upon his Island entitles us in my 
opinion to require him to meet our wishes on the point in question. '' 
Such was the forcefulness with which British demands were presented 
thereafter, the sheikhs was often left with no alternative in the long run but to 
acquiesce, yet no durable pressure could be brought to bear through which the 
sheikhs would consider British interests as an integral factor determining his 
own policies and diplomacy. Whilst Britain maintained the charade of non-
intervention, hiding behind Bahrain's mythical independence and refusing to 
involve itself in the affairs of an independent state, the fundamental relationship 
between the Al Khalifah and the British remained unchanged and ipso facto 
unstable. The Al Khalifah by virtue of their independence retained the license 
to engage in any oppression they saw fit and were only subject to British 
sanction a posteriori. Accordingly, the Al Khalifah could still exercise a 
disruptive influence. 
1 / BLOIORL R/15/1/71 HennellAVilloughby dated 22/5/1839. 
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As noted in Chapter One, the Al Khalifah had always exercised a 
tendency for oppression, but this had been traditionally under-exploited owing 
to the weak position of the Al Khalifah clan. The threat of migration and the 
renunciation of allegiance kept a check on their despotic tendencies which 
focused on the Baharnah. The Native Agent noted that by tradition: 
'No fixed taxes are taken from the Inhabitants, but whenever the Sheik requires 
money, he levies forced contributions particularly on the Bhareinys (or Aborigines of the 
Island), who being descendents of the old Persian settlers and consequently Sheahs in their 
religious tenets, are greatly oppressed. J 
However the recognition of the Al Khalifah as independent rulers freed 
them from traditional restraints and encouraged their despotic and 
irresponsible tendencies with disastrous consequences for the peace of the 
region. The right of the subject populace to migrate was weakened by the 
responsibility the British placed upon the Sheikhs' to penalise their subjects. 
Britain accorded support to rulers who wished to keep their populace in check, 
in order to protect their system of accountability throughout the region. The 
ruling clique accordingly used these advantages to pursue the exactions 
unchallenged. 
The British were aware of this growing injustice. The Native Agent 
reported a litany of abuse during the 1830's, but except on one instance when 
their Native Agent was wronged, turned a blind eye to the Al Khalifah's 
internal oppression as i f the increased propensity and prevalence of oppression 
was one of the perks of the ruling clique. Describing the two years from 1836 
to 1838, Lorimer noted that: 
'The lot of the Sheikh's subjects in Bahrain was growing, from day to day less-
endurable; and the islands were being rapidly depopulated by emigration. The towns were in 
a state of ruin and decay, and house rents had fallen to one eighth of what they had been 
only a few years before. Six sons of the Shaikh pretended to exercise separate and 
independent power, and their attention was chiefly devoted to extracting money from 
merchants and other men of means. The ordinary subject in Bahrain had no acknowledged 
rights; his domestic animals, even, were frequently seized on the pretext of corvee and were 
not returned. 3 
The unrestricted growth of oppression during the 1830's paralysed 
the effective workings of government. This absence of government was 
2 1 BLOIORL R/15/1/71 Hennell/Willoughby no. 15 Secret dated 2/3/1839. 
3 / Lorimer (1970) part Up858. 
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reported after a feud between two families in 1838 went unpunished, the 
Native Agent noting that the people 'say that now there is no government in 
Bahrein whoever has power to do so rights himself with his own hands.'4 The 
banyans had already reached this conclusion a few years previously and 
responded by migrating wholesale with disastrous consequences for the 
Bahraini economy. 5 Yet the British maintained a policy of non-intervention 
and thus had no open grounds to object to the Al Khalifah's misgovernment 
Accordingly, civil society continued to disintegrate until the nexus of political 
power itself became contentious. 
The paralysis of social activity on the island of Bahrain in the 1830's 
encouraged the fragmentation of authority within the Al Khalifah clan. In the 
mid-1830's, the Native Agent reported that: 
'The power of the Bahrein Chief has of late years been much weakened by the 
contumacious conduct of his sons and the divisions which have arisen among his other 
relations. £ 
Lorimer also noted that contemporaneously: 
'The sons of Shaikh 'Abdullah, also, had now provided themselves with retinues of 
100 to 300 desparadoes each, and openly defied their father's authority; anarchy and 
confusion had overspread the whole Shaikdom.' 
Thus, in a very short space of time, the cohesion of the Al Khalifah was 
not only fragmented but superseded by the formation of two distinct factions, 
the followers and relatives of Muhammed bin Khalifah and the supporters of 
the incumbent Sheikh, Abdullah bin Ahmed, both of whom blamed the other 
for the present unmanageable state of affairs, and in view of the diminishing 
base from which to extract resources, competed with each other for advantages 
and power. Once these groupings had become distinct factions, a physical 
divorce occurred with Muhammed bin Khalifah retiring to the mainland. 
4 / BLOIORL R/15/1/79 Merza Muhammed AhVResident d.22/10/38. 
5 1 BLOIORL R/15/1/66 Agent/Resident d.23/1/34 noted that All the Hindoos are leaving 
Bahrain for the Persian Coast as fast as they can as there is no longer any Government in 
Bahrain.' 
6 1 BLOIORL R/15/1/71 HennellAVUloughby no. 15 Secret dated 2/3/1839. 
1 1 Lorimer (1970) part np867. 
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Open conflict broke out in June 1842 when Abdullah bin Ahmed forced 
Muhammed bin Khalifah to flee to the mainland whence he sought Wahhabi 
assistance. In the short-term Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed regained control over 
both major islands of Bahrain, but a hostile coalition against Abdullah bin 
Ahmed rapidly crystallised and he was defeated Muhammed bin Khalifah was 
proclaimed Sheikh and Abdullah and his supporter were exiled to Demaum. An 
immediate counter-attack in conjunction with the Sheikhs of Sharjah and 
Dubai was proscribed by the British, 8 who preferred to see peaceful mediation 
and settlement between the parties and wanted to freeze the new configuration 
of Bahraini politics, but this turn of events did not decisively terminate the 
Civil War. Sheikh Abdullah and his sons, who were hereafter known as the ' Al 
Abdullah,' doggedly pursued their claim against the Al Khalifah from their 
exile over the next thirteen years. Almost immediately, Abdullah attempted to 
force the British into supporting his cause, by arguing that he was due 
assistance under the General Treaty, and deserved support because he had 
rejected Wahhabi overtures. Notwithstanding, the Resident declined to 
permit or involve Britain in any further conflict, especially one that would 
materially benefit the ex-Chief. Abdullah began wandering around the coast of 
Al Hasa, and eventually Abdullah resettled in Demaum, where owing to enmity 
between Muhammed bin Khalifah and the Wahhabis, he was given every 
encouragement in his intrigues. 
An uneasy peace was established and held together through the latter 
half of the 1840's, but each year, imminent invasion of Bahrain was expected at 
the close of the pearling season and British intervention was requested. The 
British recognised the legitimacy and existence of discontent without vilifying 
it, but denied the Al Abdullah the opportunity to successfully pursue their 
claim. Whilst refusing to directly intervene, Britain undertook to prevent 'any 
8 / Lorimer (1970) part II p873. 
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maritime expeditions which are likely to disturb the peace of the Persian Gulf.' 9 
Elliot, the Secretary to Governor-General of the Government of India, was thus 
informed by the Government of Bombay that: 
appears to the Governor General very desirable that Maritime hostilities 
between the Chief of Bahrein and his refugee subjects in Kenn should be prevented.- If 
British Force in the Persian Gulf should not be sufficient for that purpose, it should 
temporarily be strengthened. ' I 0 
This commitment to maritime tranquillity, even though Britain declined 
to formally declined to admit as much, effectively guaranteed Muhammed bin 
Khalifah's position since it sought to freeze the status quo ante as was. 
Britain's position was however untenable and subject to assault from all sides. 
Britain had no sanction over the Al Abdullah and the intemperate oppression of 
Muhammed bin Khalifah reinforced the legitimacy of the ex-Chiefs claim. 
Without any control over the rebels, Britain could not indefinitely prevent an 
invasion when the balance of power was shifting so rapidly against Muhammed 
bin Khalifah. Neither could Britain prevent the Sheikh from seeking out foreign 
assistance to bolster his position, even though this yet again compromised his 
independence with adopting a position of explicit support for Muhammed bin 
Khalifah. These two pressures squeezed Britain's do-nothing policy until 
Muhammed bin Khalifah attempted to bolster his authority by encouraging 
Turkish influence in Bahrain in 1847. 
Turkish influence over Bahrain was by its very nature antithetical to 
British strategic considerations. The Board of Directors therefore responded by 
ruling that any Turkish attempt upon Bahrain 'ought to be resisted by the 
British Naval Force in the Persian Gulf,' and frustrated Turkish attempts to 
gain a foothold. 1 1 In acting thus, the British denied Muhammed bin Khalifah 
the opportunity to strengthen his position against the Al Abdullah. It was 
unsurprisingly then that Muhammed bin Khalifah thereafter turned to the 
9 1 BLOIORL L/P&S/5/461 enclosure to secret letter no.51/57? Elliot, Secretary to the 
Government of India with Governor General /Bombay no.328 no date- early 1849. 
1 0 /BLOIORL L/P&S/5/461 enclosure to secret letter no.51/57? Elliot/Bombay no.345 
23/3/49. 
1 1 /See Bombay/Hennell no.334 & reply Hennell/ Bombay no.35 10/5/1847 quoted in 
R/15/2/84 Haworth/ F.Sec of State India in For Dept no.295Sec 1/9/1927. 
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British to protect himself. Early in 1849, the Al Khalifah accordingly made a 
unilateral offer to sacrifice a degree of their sovereignty in return for closer 
relations with Britain. In a letter to Hennell under date 9/2/49, couched in 
exaggerated prose, Muhammed bin Khalifah expressed his wish that Bahrain 
become a British protectorate. 1 2 
It is not clear whether Muhammed bin Khalifah's offer was a response 
to Hennell's approaches the previous year or a more subtle attempt by 
Muhammed bin Khalifah to free himself from British interference by calling 
Britain's bluff. Contemporary reports from the Native Agent suggested that 
the offer had been thoroughly discussed amongst the island's nobles and was in 
all probability a response to the collapse of Bahrain's political and economic 
stability. It was recorded that the Sheikhs: 
'have no control over any of them /the seceders- rb/, nor have they any power over 
the people of Guttur, the inhabitants also such as the Pearl Divers and Sea faring persons 
have no means of subsistence after the departure of the Merchants from Bahrein and will 
leave the Country. The Sheiks therefore are in great distress. ''3 
The British had already considered the advantages to be gained from 
closer relations and accordingly disdained the idea. When weighing up the 
proposal, the British believed that prosperity and stability would return to 
Bahrain i f Britain took an closer interest in Bahraini affairs. Yet since they were 
responding to the Sheikh's offer and not making a proposition for closer 
alliance, British attention was drawn to the Al Khalifah's burgeoning 
oppression, which underpinned the contemporary internal political crisis and 
had spiralled alarmingly through the previous fifteen years. The undue 
I 2 /The letter read as follows: 'After compliments: Your letter by the hand of Humad ben 
Mhd has reached me, and I have understood what you wrote. Thus I beg to inform you I 
perceived that all the countries in this quarter are dependent upon one or other of the Sultans 
as for example the Coast of Fars is dependent upon the Persians, and likewise the people of 
Koweit and the Wahabee Territories are dependent upon Turkey, and I, as I have at heart, am 
dependent upon the Exalted (British) Government, and subject to it; and I am certain you 
will not consent to injury accruing to the dependencies of the Sirkar- accordingly my request 
of you is, if you approve of what I have at heart and I am bent upon, that you will cause the 
return to me of those who have seceded from my territories, to the advantage of the country 
and its inhabitants- otherwise, if you account me dependent upon others, Be pleased to 
acquaint me with whatever is comfortable to the policy of the British Government." 
BLOIORL L/P&S/5/461 enclosure to Secret Letter no. 51/57 Muhammed bin Khalifah/ 
Hennell d. 9/2/49. 
1 3 /BLOIORL L/P&S/5/461 enclosure to no.51/57? Hennell/Malet no. 19 14/3/49 enclosing 
extract from Hajee Jasseem/Resident 25/2/49. 
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responsibility that the Company would be forced to take for Muhammed bin 
Khalifah i f the two parties were more intimately linked discouraged Britain 
from concluding any agreement with this unpalatable ally. Even still, a negative 
consideration had to be weighed carefully before Muhammed bin Khalifah's 
proposition was rejected. The British were concerned that accepting the 
Sheikh's proposal was the only sure way of preventing him from seeking 
foreign patronage in the event of his overtures being declined. Hennell 
forwarded the matter to Bombay and London, noting that: 
'Were I quite satisfied that in case of his proposition being rejected, Sheik 
Mahomed been Khuleefa would rest content in his present position as an independent Chief 
I should have no hesitation in repeating my decided opinion that the inconvenience 
attending a closer connexion with him, would outweigh the advantages arising from such an 
arrangement. It is however evident from the tenor of the Sheik's letter, that he is strongly 
impressed by the tranquil and flourishing conditions of Koweit, and the commercial on the 
Persia Coast; the first as a dependency of the Ottoman Porte, the last, as a subject to the 
Persian Government 
..It will remain for the Government to decide whether the loss of our influence, 
likely to accrue in this quarter from the contingency of Bahrein becoming a dependency of 
either Persia or Turkey is of sufficent importance to counterbalance the trouble and 
embarrassment which may arise from accepting the proposition of the Chief of that Island, 
that he should henceforth be considered a subject of Great Britain. It is with diffidence and 
some hesitation I venture to add, that my own opinion inclines to the negative.'' 
After due consideration, Elliot wrote back indicating the Governor 
General's distaste for closer relations. 
The British were not the only party to notice Muhammed bin Khalifah's 
growing oppression. The impending disaster that dominated the Gulf in the 
1850's was fuelled by the irresponsible behaviour of the incumbent sheikh. The 
chiefs rapacity lent credence to those who sought to depose him. Hennell 
noted in August 1850 that: 
'this oppressive and arbitrary conduct has alienated from him his best adherents, 
and any change in the Government of Bahrein would be handed with satisfaction by nearly 
all the inhabitants. 
"VBLOIORL L/P&S/5/461 enclosures to secret letter no.51/57? Hennell/Malet no.2 Secret 
d.28/2/49. 
1 5 /BLOIORL R/15/1/120 Hennell/Malet no.308 dated 13/8/1850. The Native Agent 
retrospectively explained how this alienation occurred, reporting that: 'The fear of retribution 
from Ameer Faysal had deprived him of the effective aid of the Beni Hajir Bedouins, upon 
which he was in the habit of depending in consideration of his alliance by marriage with 
their Chief and finally the influence of the Ameer or a rising disaffection towards himself 
threatened at an early date to range the inhabitants of the Guttur Coast on the side of his 
opponent' See R/15/1/130 Kemball/Malet dated 3/4/1852. 
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Each year the credibility and seriousness of rumours of an impending 
rebel attack grew stronger since the resources of the refugees were greatly 
strengthened by the migration and defection of many Bahrainis who had 
suffered from Muhammed bin Khalifah's oppressions. In response, Britain was 
rather perversely obliged to offer conspicuous patronage to the incumbent 
sheikh and give license for his oppressions in order to salvage the system of 
independent states, when given a free choice in the matter months previously, it 
had rejected closer relations. 
Eventually, the Al Abdullah assembled an overwhelming invasion force 
and contemplated their imminent restoration, but in the Autumn of 1850, when 
the refugees looked poised on the brink of success, Hennell informed 
Commodore Porter, the Senior Commanding Officer of the Persian Gulf 
Squadron, that regardless of the views of the local population: 
'the invasion of Bahrain by the fugitive Uttoobees resident on the island of Kenn is 
a step directly opposed to the views and policy of the british Government, and I am in 
possession of instructions to oppose any such attempt. '16 
The potential restoration of the Al Abdullah through recourse to arms 
marked a crisis point in the system of independent states. It indicated that in 
addition to the weaknesses of the British-sponsored independent chieftains in 
relation to external powers demanding zakat, the independent chief of Bahrain 
no longer had the requisite authority and means to guarantee and protect his 
own power from Bahraini pretenders. Britain was revulsed by the sheikh's 
oppressions, but the deposition of Muhammed bin Khalifah was an assault to 
Britain's authority in the Gulf that undermined the system of independent 
sheikhdoms. Britain had either to abandon the system of independent states as 
unworkable by allowing one of its proxies to be deposed by a third party or 
abandon the myth of independence and intervene to protect Muhammed bin 
Khalifah. Under such circumstances, Hennell made no attempt to conceal his 
positive support for Muhammed bin Khalifah and even offered Muhammed bin 
1 6 / BLOIORL R/15/1/120 Hennell/Porter no.306 d. 10/8/1850. 
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Khalifah the services of a cruiser to assist in his defence. Commodore Porter 
was notified by the Resident that given the circumstances: 
7 shall therefore inform the Sheikh of bahrein that he is at liberty to take his own 
measures for preventing his enemies from executing a measure so highly detrimental to his 
interest so long as these measures are confined to the Arabian coast and further that in the 
event of his apprehending an attack upon Bahrein by Sea, the Government will be prepared 
to support him by the presence of one or more of its vessels. ' r 
As a result of the substantive favouritism Britain bestowed on 
Muhammed bin Khalifah, the crisis subsided without further incident. A 
watershed had however been traversed. Britain had abandoned the myth of 
non-intervention to intervene when the security of a proxy chiefs was in 
question. 
In the aftermath, Britain's policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the 
Persian Gulf was not abandoned immediately, indeed an apparent continuity 
was maintained until 1855 but it underwent a transformation, at least in internal 
discussions. Non-intervention was now interpreted as a policy of: 
'no more interference in the affairs of that quarter than is absolutely required by a 
due attention to British interests. ''8 
Whilst this change was subtle, it was clear that continued instability 
was by definition detrimental to British interests. Since no settlement to conflict 
between the Al Abdullah and the Al Khalifah could be found that was 
acceptable to both parties, Britain could therefore, extrapolating from this new 
foundation of policy, align itself with one or other of the combatants in the 
hope of bringing a swift end to hostilities out of a due deference for its own 
interests. Britain thus began to offer more favourable support to Muhammed 
bin Khalifah. Simultaneously, the Resident suddenly realised the intimate links 
between the Al Abdullah and the Wahhabis, and by association, the close 
association between the refugees and the Ottoman Porte, although in truth the 
more menacing associations with the Ottoman Porte were to be found in 
1 7 / BLOIORL R/15/1/120 Hennell/Porter no.306 d. 10/8/1850. 
1 8 / Extract of paragraph 2 of Secret Committee, Government of Bombay Despatch d.6/12/50, 
quoted in BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Malet/Hennell no.l7A d.12/1/51 
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Muhammed bin Khalifah's approaches that were initiated in November of that 
Britain's conspicuous patronage of Muhammed bin Khalifah did not 
however avert disaster. The Al Abdullah responded by seeking patronage from 
the Wahhabi Amir and the Gulf fragmented further into mutually opposed 
strategic blocs. The threat of war again arose in early 1851 after Bahraini 
merchants pressurised Muhammed bin Khalifah to settle the question of tribute 
with the Wahhabi Amir. The Sheikh offered Faysal 2,000 Crowns for the 
year's tribute,2 0 but in the language of 'feudal' diplomacy the offer was 
interpreted not as a legitimate peace offering, but as a sign of weakness. Faysal 
responded with even greater vehemence, and rejected the offer. Hennell 
attempted to mediate this initial conflict,2 1 although negotiations rapidly broke 
down under the pressure of Arabian brinkmanship: since Muhammed bin 
Khalifah had refused a meeting with Faysal, the Amir refused to negotiate with 
'Al i , the Sheikh's brother, and overlord of Doha.2 2 On the 13th of May, the 
Native Agent reported the 'failure of all negotiations for peace and the 
prospect of immediate hostilities between the Chief of that Island and Ameer 
Faysal the Ruler of Nedjd.'^A week later he noted that the Al Khalifah Sheikhs 
had organised a blockade of Qatif. Three weeks later even still, he reported the 
outbreak of war. Muhammed bin Khalifah, feeling himself to be secure, had 
exaggerated the conflict by a cavalier assault against the Wahhabis, however, 
before Britain chose to respond, Faysal marched to the Qatar Coast in early 
June. The chief of Doha, its influential merchants, and the settlements at 
1 9 / Hennell requested orders on how to deal with this encroaching Turkish influence in the 
Autumn which confounded Bombay since no association between the Abdullah and Turkey 
had ever before been reported. See BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Malet/Hennell no.378 dated 
18/10/51 and Goldsmith/Hennell dated 17/4/52. Muhammed bin Khalifah's overtures are 
reported in Hennell/Malet no.389 dated 18/11/1850 in R/15/1/120. 
2 0 / See BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hennell/Malet no.130 3/5/51 enclosing letter from Native 
Agent/Resident d.26/4/51. 
2 V BLOIORL R/15/1/125 See Malet/Hennell no.2689 d.23/6/51. 
2 2 / BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hennell/Malet no.130 d.3/5/51. 
7 3 1 BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Native Agent/Resident d. 13/5/51 enclosed in Hennell/Malet 
no. 158 d.27/5/51. 
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at Bidda, Wakrah and Fuwairat subsequently repudiated their allegiance to 
Bahrain, drastically altering the balance of power and threatening the very 
integrity of Bahrain.2 4 The fugitive sons of Abdullah immediately set sail from 
their asylum in Persia.25 In response, Muhammed bin Khalifah escalated the 
blockade of Qatif, and fomented a scheme to destroy Bidda, but he remained in 
dire peril. The Resident was thus obliged to underwrite Muhammed bin 
Khalifah's locus tenens, justifying his intimate involvement in the 'Utub quarrel 
with reference to the collusion of all the hostile parties arrayed against 
Muhammed bin Khalifah and the Ottoman Porte 
Hennell became particularly fearful that the success of the Al Abdullah 
would represent an extension of Turkish influence in this Quarter and thus 
wrote to Colonel Sheil, Consul General and HM's Special Envoy with 
Plenipotary Powers at the Court of Tehran to request authorisation for active 
measures to thwart the invasion.26 In the meantime, although he was still 
unsure of the correct policy to adopt, Hennell attempted to mediate a possible 
settlement. Britain clearly held a pivotal role in this dispute: the success of the 
invasion depended upon securing British acquiescence, but British intervention 
would explicitly contradict its formal policy of not overtly interfering in the 
quarrel between the Al Abdullah and the Al Khalifah. Whilst Britain had 
promised to guarantee the Al Khalifah from the Abdullah, it had not envisaged 
any situations arising where it would be necessary to deploy its military power 
on Muhammed bin Khalifah's behalf. Britain had expected to pre-empt the 
outbreak of conflict through its moral intervention. With the threat of imminent 
war, however, the outcome of this conflict depended entirely upon whether 
2 4 /BLOIORL R/15/1/125. See Hennell/Hammerton no. 189 d.6/6/51 and Hennell/Malet 
no.203 d.18/6/51. 
2 5 / Lorimer (1970) part II suggests this was at the request of Faysal (see p885). However, no 
mention of this arrangement could be found in the records. Rather it appears the Al Abdullah 
set sail on the grounds of unsolicited opportunism. See BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hennell/Malet 
no.236 d. 15/7/51. 
2 6 /BLOIORL R/15/1/125 see Sheil/Hennell no date, reply to Hennell/Sheil 19/5. It was a 
natural act for the Resident to take. The Consul General at Tehran having previously 
functioned as responsible authority for Persian Gulf official. Hennell was merely 
resuscitating the old chain of command. 
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Hennell chose to honour the commitment to Muhammed bin Khalifah with 
British Naval power. 
The Wahhabi Amir had professed a desire not to estrange the Company 
during negotiations at the end of June, but Hennell remained ill-disposed 
toward the Al Abdullah exclaiming when they left Kenn that: 
7 do not consider they possess any further claim upon the good offices of myself or 
the liberal intentions of their relations ofBahrain. a 7 
Additionally Muhammed bin Khalifah exploited Hennell's insecurities 
professing his intense hostility to falling under Turkish suzerainty and strong 
desire to be considered 'a dependent of the English.'28 It appears that during 
the course of his mediations, Hennell had already resolved to diffuse the 
situation one way or another without adversely affecting the position of 
Muhammed bin Khalifah when Sheil's reply to his earlier enquiry was received 
late June. This confessed an absence of authority with which to authorise 
Hennell to send the Gulf Squadron to Bahrain, but suggested a possible 
interpretation of current policy that would permit such action: Sheil argued that 
i f the Wahhabi were intimated connected with the Ottoman Porte, then by 
virtue of the Al Abdullah's connection with the Wahhabi, all the hostile parties 
arrayed against Bahrain had therefore to be stopped with active measures.29 
Hennell immediately communicated this interpretation of policy to Commodore 
Porter and suggested that i f Porter was in agreement, then the Persian Gulf 
Squadron should assemble at Bahrain, and 'do all in your power to delay the 
vessels, so far as this can be done by the employment of your naval means, 
confining any coercive measure entirely to the sea.'30 Accordingly HCC Clive 
and HCC Tigris arrived off Bahrain on the 9th of September. 
211 BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hennell/Malet no.236 15/7/51. 
*/ BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hennell/Malet no.203 d. 18/6/51. 
7 9 I BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Sheil/Hennell no date rec'd late June 1851. 
"/ BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hennell/Porter d. 1/7/51. 
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/ BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hennell/Malet no.236 15/7/51. 
/ BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hennell/Malet no.203 d. 18/6/51. 
/ BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Sheil/Hennell no date rec'd late June 1851. 
/ BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hennell/Porter d. 1/7/51. 
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The despatch of these cruisers decisively swung the military and 
strategic balance in favour of Muhammed bin Khalifah. On arrival, Porter 
disdained the Sheikh enthusiasm for immediate offensive measures against the 
Kenn fleet, but a British ship joined the blockade to allow the pearlers to set to 
sea, minimising the economic dislocation caused by the war.31 Eventually the 
Al Abdullah gave up trying to draw out the conflict in the hope of waning 
British interest and peace was concluded through the mediation of Said bin 
Tahnoon on 28th July 195 1 3 2 The blockading fleet returned a day later, Doha 
was restored to Ali bin Khalifah, brother of the Sheikh, and Muhammed bin 
Abdullah and Fay sal retired inland.33 Muhammed bin Abdullah was settled at 
Demaum furnished by Faysal with 300 bags of dates and 2,000 Crowns.34 A 
normal state of affairs resumed, but it was clear that this return to the status 
quo ante was in no small measure due to British intervention. Somewhat 
poignantly, and honestly, Porter afterwards reported that: 
'After the defection of Bidda and the successful forcing of the blockade of Kateef by 
the sons of the Ex-Bahrein Chief I think that had it not been for our interference and the 
opportune arrival of the Squadron in Bahrein the Ameer would have succeeded in his views 
upon that Island.'3 
Hennell's actions did not met with complete satisfaction when reported 
to his superiors. His intervention exceeded that prescribed by his standing 
orders, but nevertheless his action was not disowned. The outcome of 
Hennell's intervention was evidently beneficial to British interests. And thus 
since there was no alternative policy which would prevent a successful invasion 
by the Al Abdullah in these circumstances, Malet therefore informed Hennell 
that: 
3 1 /BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Porter/Hennell no. 124 d.21/7/51 Mubarak bin Abdullah 
subsequently ran the blockade, 150 died, including Bushire bin Rahman bin Jabir and Rashid 
bin Abdullah 
3 2 /BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hajee Jasseem/Resident d.28/7/51 enclosure to Hennell/Malet 
5/8/51. 
3 3 /BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hajee Jasseem/Hennell d.2/8/51 enclosure to Hennell/Malet 
5/8/51. 
3 4 /BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hennell/Malet no.305A d.22/9/51 Although this last fact nearly 
drove Muhammed bin Khalifah to initiate another conflict, he was placated by his brother. 
3 5 / BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Hennell/Malet d.5/8/51 enclosing Porter/Hennell d.31/7/51. 
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'As your measures were taken in consequence of a letter from Colonel Sheil... the 
Right Honible the Governor in Council is pleased to permit you to maintain the attitude you 
have assumed pending orders M 
At the same time, however, this letter restated the Government's 
previous commitment to neutrality unless hostilities broke out, and the 
illegitimacy of pre-emptive British intervention with a view to solving the 
situation once and for all. Having temporarily solved the question of Civil War, 
Britain's favouritism towards the Al Khalifah became increasingly unpalatable. 
Muhammed bin Khalifah became increasingly maverick in his conduct, 
making no attempt to temper his oppression or consider the consequences of 
his actions. Not only did the Company cease to benefit from his continued stay 
in power and were adversely tainted by their support of this oppressive despot, 
British 'standing' threatened to be engulfed by revolution and/or invasion. The 
British therefore reverted to their previous policy of strict non-intervention and 
neutrality, distancing themselves from the incumbent Sheikh. This shift 
corresponded to the appointment of a new Resident, Captain Kemball, and is 
evident from the Spring of 1852. In stark contrast to Hennell, during a meeting 
with the Sheikh in April 1852 Kemball insisted that: 
'he[Muhammed bin Khalifah-rb] must be fully aware that the policy of Government 
had hitherto enjoined upon its Agents the observance of a perfect neutrality in the quarrels 
and internal dissensions of the Arab Tribes provided only that its arrangements against the 
revival of piracy were duly respected and the limits of the Restrictive Line were not 
transgressed. 
The Sheikh's overtures, designed to gauge the depth of his British 
support were thus thoroughly rebuffed. Having reverted to the previous policy 
of neutrality, Kemball exercised greater caution that his predecessor, reporting 
that: 
'it was not my purpose to impress him with such a sense of security as should lead 
him to relax his efforts in his own defence or to permit him to infer a pledge of protection 
which circumstances might deny me the opportunity or it might not be consistent with the 
policy of Government hereafter to redeem.' 8 
However, privately, Kemball recognised the dangers of re-asserting 
neutrality, noting that under the circumstances this tended to encourage greater 
Turkish influence in Bahrain: 
/ BLOIORL R/15/1/125 Malet/Hennell 24/9/51. 
/ BLOIORL R/15/1/130 Kennell/Malet dated 3/4/52. 
/ibid. 
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'The first impulse of Sheik Mahomed ben Khuleefa on finding himself assailed from 
such a quarter would be to throw himself unreservedly upon our protection and support and 
were these denied him in his hour of need it must be evident that his next and only resources 
would be to solicit the aid of his former opponents or in words at the jyicrifice of his 
independence to acknowledge virtually his subjection to the Ottoman Porte. 
The preservation of British neutrality had to weighed against the 
advantage that the Ottomans would accrue. Through 1853 and 1854 non-
intervention became an increasingly difficult position to sustain, since it 
appeared to sanction an outcome to the conflict, be it Muhammed bin Khalifah 
accepting Turkish overlordship, or the refugees who were intimately associated 
with the Wahhabis successfully regaining control of Bahrain, that would 
adversely affect British interests. The British therefore began to consider means 
of pre-emptively solving the dispute. 
In response to a projected invasion by Faysal in February 1853, British 
neutrality vis-a-vis the 'Utub dispute was restated, it was noted that 'the 
condition still exists which prompted the deviation from our usual policy of 
non-interference in the summer of 1851:'40 Muhammed bin Khalifah continued 
to be ever-fearful of his security, but refused to address the root cause of his 
precariousness: namely his alienation from his subjects. Kemball noted in May 
1853 that: 
'His disaffected subjects and recursant debtors flying his authority were daily 
joining their standard [i.e. the Al Abdullah- rb] and finally their intrigues with the refugees 
on Kenn as also with his descendents on the Guttur Coast whose allegiance could not be 
relied on necessitate his maintaining constantly a state of preparation and rendered him 
liable at every moment to be taken at disadvantage. A1 
Instead the Sheikh hatched a scheme to blockade the Al Abdullah and 
force them to move by blocking off their principle means of existence. The 
Resident was informed of this plan during his annual tour in 1853, but refused 
to involve British personnel or give Muhammed bin Khalifah free license even 
though Kemball was suitably impressed that the Sheikh: 
'really thought that he had no alternative but to pursue this course unless the 
British Government would guarentee his protection from the dangers which threatened 
him. ** 
3 7 BLOIORL R/15/1/130 Kemball/ Malet 29/5/1852. 
*7 BLOIORL R/15/1/138 Kemball/Malet no.57 dated 11/2/53. 
"V BLOIORL R/15/1/138 Kemball/Malet no.128 dated 20/5/1853. 
4 2 / ibid. 
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Two factors prevented the British from acquiescing or assisting the 
Sheikh. The Resident was neither convinced that that British influence was 
sufficient to effect this end, nor could such interference be reconciled to 
professed neutrality. He noted that: 
'such a consummation is hardly obtainable by British influence- more direct 
negotiations with Ameer Fysul for this purpose were they otherwise unobjectionable- could 
lead to no result unless coupled with a Guarentee for the regular payment of the stipulated 
tribute by Sheikh Mahomed ben Khuleefa and moreover their removal by our means from the 
only spot whence they can be allowed to prosecute the recovery of their inheritance would be 
tantamount to a denial of their right and inconsistent with our professions to exercise no 
interference in the quarrel of the Uttoobee family.' 
Kemball thus refused to grant the Sheikh an open license to execute his 
plans, and instead negotiated a compromise whereby the British promised to 
interdict if the Al Abdullah began to move from port and acknowledged the 
legitimacy of any actions Muhammed bin Khalifah might take in these 
circumstances to stop it. Without British involvement however, Muhammed bin 
Khalifah's plan floundered, and the prospect of war still loomed. 
A skirmish between the refugees and the Al Khalifah in June 1854 
threatened to escalate into an all-out conflict, but the despatch of HCC Clive 
and HCC Tigris averted further hostilities and the Abdullah agreed to 
recompense the Bahrain Sheikh. Yet whilst conflict was on this occasion 
prevented, Commodore Porter was want to report that: 
'However satisfactory the cessation of hostilities thus effected, even though it were 
limited to the season of the Pearl Fishery, there are I fear indications of an approaching 
struggle between the rival branches of the Uttoobee family which a mere friendly 
interposition on my part consistently with the declared Policy of Government may be 
ineffectual to avert. A 
Less than a month later, despite reports that the Al Abdullah had begun 
to negotiate their differences with the Sheikh, an unexpected attack involving 
over 2,000 man was attempted by the refugees. Fortunately, from the British 
point of view, lest it appear as a result of Hajee Jasseem's 'culpable reticence' 
that the British were in collusion with the refugees, this invasion was defeated, 
but as Kemball noted 'its failure was a matter of accident.'45 Kemball 
/ BLOIORL R/15/1/132 Kemball/Malet no.6 27/7/1853. 
4 4 / BLOIORL R/15/1/143 Commodore Porter report on vents enclosed in Kemball/Anderson, 
Bombay no.248 Political dated 18/7/54. 
4 5 / BLOIORL R/15/1/143 Kemball/Anderson no.262 dated 20/7/1854. 
I l l 
immediately set sail for Bahrain intending to restore British standing and 
dissuade Muhammed bin Khalifah from exercising his right to declare war not 
because of some forbearance towards the refugees, but to prevent a potentially 
embarrassing situation for the British. Indeed, as a result of this surprise attack, 
British enmity towards the Al Abdullah reached its apex. Kemball fulminated 
that: 
'while no reliance can be placed upon the forebearance and professed neutrality of 
Ameer Fysul it is evident also that the exiles at Demaum. taking advantage of the support he 
affords them, are little disposed to shape their operations by the Rules of open and 
proclaimed war and seek only opportunity at a period of profound peace to make a 
sudden descent upon the Island.' 
However, if Resident failed to persuade Muhammed bin Khalifah not to 
attack, he noted that: 
'Our position would become one of much embarrassment. The occurences of 1851 
would be repeated and our part therein being confined to the defence of the Island would 
probably terminate in no more satisfactory result.' 
At the same time two possible solutions to the conflict presented 
themselves to Kemball and he therefore requested orders as to the expediency 
of wider interference, explaining to his superiors that: 
'In order to obtain a final solution of this difficulty the choice of two alternitives 
seems open to us, either to revert to our previous position of neutrality between the Chiefs of 
Bahrein and the Wahabee Ruler, or otherwise, to assume at once the office ofArbitar.' 
During a meeting with Muhammed bin Khalifah on the 4th August -
Kemball had arrived the previous day- the Sheikh pointed out British 
complicity in this latest escapade. Kemball reported that he: 
'dwelt with much earnest upon the magnitude of the danger he had so narrowly 
escaped and in expressing his fears for ttye future even ascribed indirectly to British Policy 
the difficulties in which he was involved.' 
Muhammed bin Khalifah in effect reiterated the points he had made at 
an earlier interview with Hajee Jasseem, arguing that the external assistance 
offered to the Al Abdullah altered the balance of power and that the Al 
Abdullah only continued to remain a potent threat because the British 
prohibited the Sheikh from taking any offensive measures. He had previously 
informed the British Agent that: 
/ibid. 
/ ibid. 
/ ibid. 
/BLOIORL R/15/1/143 Kemball/Anderson no.lA dated 21/8/1854. 
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'Had it not been for the English, these people would never have come down upon us 
for we were lulled into security.... you know that we had it in qur power to seize them but 
refrained least they /the English/ should say why did you do so? 
Not only was Kemball unable to deny these substantive allegations, he 
was so affected as to forget about maritime security and offer to assist 
Muhammed bin Khalifah in his defence. He reported that: 
Concurring as I did in the force and validity of these arguments I now informed the 
Sheikh that tho' my visit to Bahrein had been undertaken with the view if practicable or 
restoring tranquility -I was prepared nevertheless under certain contingencies to afford him 
assistance in defending the island and those contingencies having in my opinion arisen it 
only remained to determine the mode pf procedure which should he most consistent with the 
instruction I hold form Government. 
Consequently, upon Muhammed bin Khalifah's suggestion, Kemball 
proceeded to send Muhammed bin Abdullah twenty four hours notice of 
evacuation by HCC Give. 5 2 In sending notice for evacuation to the Al 
Abdullah, Kemball did not confine himself merely to assist Muhammed bin 
Khalifah in his defence as per 1851, but initiated a more encompassing 
intervention that sought to settle the dispute once and for all by denying the Al 
Abdullah the opportunity to successfully prosecute their claim over Bahrain and 
thus, effectively nullify it. 
The collective patience of the British had been exhausted. British policy 
in relation to the 'Utub quarrel became decidedly pragmatic and its neutrality 
was abandoned in order to settle the dispute. Kemball initially justified his 
position with reference to the greater good. He reasoned that this minor British 
injustice towards Muhammed bin Abdullah was a prerequisite to the re-
establishment of maritime stability, explaining in despatches that: 
'Whatever the hardship to Mohamed ben Abdoolla it would seem but right that the 
pretensions of one individual which have so often compromised the public tranquility should 
yield to considerations of the general safety and that he should be at length called upon to 
relinquish the struggle by accepting the proffered bounty of his rival in any form that may be 
considered eligible.153 
The reply from the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Anderson, 
gave Kemball retrospective authorisation to pursue the Al Abdullah. It also 
documented the more pragmatic underpinnings of British policy. Having noted 
5 <7BLOIORL R/15/1/143 Hajee Jasseem/Resident received 23/7/1854 enclosed in 
Kemball/Anderson no.242 dated 20/7/1854. 
5 1 / BLOIORLR/15/1/143 Kemball/Anderson no.lAdated 21/8/1854. 
5 2 /Reported ibid. 
5 3/ibid. 
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the inability of Muhammed bin Khalifah to recover his rights independently 
since 1842 -but omitting to mention the Britain's assistance to Muhammed bin 
Khalifah in times of danger- Anderson pointed out the inescapable instability 
that stemmed from the 'Utub dispute, noting that: 
'It has been abundantly proved that Sheik Mahomed bin Abdullah's claims can only 
be supported by the sacrifice of the tranquility of a great part of the Persian Gulf while the 
power of the present chief, even if eventually overcome, would be sufficient to render that 
absence of tranquility of very long duration, and then after he shall have been overcome, the 
means which are now employed by his rival might then be adopted by him. 
Lest continued instability further undermine British standing and 
maritime tranquillity, Anderson thus acknowledged the pressing need to act 
against the Al Abdullah. 
Despite repeated professions of friendship and innocence and other 
attempts to seemingly evade responsibility, Muhammed bin Abdullah was thus 
encouraged to sign a Treaty of Reconciliation -see appendices- at the 
Resident's insistence on the 24th May 1855. Under the terms of this treaty 
Muhammed bin Abdullah acknowledged that: 
from this day hence forward Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah on the part of himself 
and his relatives does renounce all pretension to Chiefship of Bahrein and does bind himself 
to abstain for the future from any designs upon that island and its dependencies ' } S 
In return, the Sheikh received the tithe from certain Bahraini villages 
and was, after the British had revised their policy given the apparent amity 
between the two parties, additionally permitted continued residence at 
Demaum. The Treaty was gladly approved by KembalPs superiors, who 
gushingly flowered him with commendations and praise.56 It appeared in the 
Summer of 1855 that with the Resident's conspicuous support for Muhammed 
bin Khalifah assured, the dispute had been conclusively settled and a return to 
stability and prosperity was imminent. 
5 4 / BLOIORL R/15/1/142 Anderson/Kemball no.288 Secret dated 20/11/54. 
5 5 / See Appendix Three. 
5 6 / BLOIORL R/15/1/132 Anderson/Commodore Jones, Acting Resident no.289 dated 
23/10/55 and no.384 dated 20/12/55. 
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The reconciliation was however short-lived. Quarrels over its terms and 
conditions, and an intransigence on the part of Muhammed bin Khalifah to 
honour them, led to sporadic aggression on both sides. The threat of a 
recommencement of hostilities, new invasion scares, and a renewed enthusiasm 
on the part of foreign powers to push their claims over Bahrain demanded a 
more enduring solution. Britain blamed Muhammed bin Abdullah for the 
instability. Kemball's successor, Captain Jones noted that: 
'Sheik Mahomed ben Abdullah has but the one fixed purpose...Rooted deep as it is, 
neither warning, nor threat, serves to eradicate the feelings for revenge which under every 
condition is actuating him at Demaum and which has led him to beak every form of pledge 
that he has ever subscribed to.157 
Since no trust could be placed in this Sheikh, Jones argued that: 
'The simple question now is, how long is forebearance to be exercised with people 
so constituted who regard temporizing as pusillanimity, and pervert its humane object to the 
worst of purposes? Toleration of annually recurring evils from the act of the viciously 
disposed -it should be remembered- is damaging to small communities struggling for 
commercial existence amid continued anarchy, especially on coasts so hard featured as 
those bounding this Gulf. 
The prosperity of years indeed can be laid waste in a day by men actuated with the 
spirit of the nomadic races of Arabia such as are now actively in arms against the territories 
of the Chief of Bahrein; for we know destruction is inherent in their nature and, locust like, 
where they tread, a desert remains behind. In short 1 lean to the opinion that it is incumbent 
on all conservative Government to render such pests to society innocuous by any means at 
their disposal. *** 
Britain thus resolved to outlaw the Al Abdullah from the Gulf and 
forcibly remove them from Demaum in the Winter of 1859 and abandon its 
policy of non-intervention in its entirety. 
The injustice of this action was noted at the time, however there was no 
ethical foundation to British policy with regard to the 'Utub quarrel. As Jones 
later admitted when tried to explain British toleration towards and support for 
Muhammed bin Khalifah: 
'Sheikh Mahomed ben Khuleefa being our own adopted protege, and however 
deserving of immediate chastisement, it was ptoin to me that present endurance was 
preferable to hastily undoing the policy of years. 
Yet the end of the conflict did not led to the re-emergence of stability 
in the Gulf, since Muhammed bin Khalifah was left in a position that allowed 
him to undermine British influence. Britain's involvement in the Civil War had 
/ BLOIORL R/l5/1/179 Jones/Anderson dated 11/10/59. 
/ibid. 
/BLOIORLR/15/1/179 Jones/Anderson no.2A 7/5/60. 
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shattered the myth of non-intervention, but left the position of the Bahraini 
Chief unchanged. The next ten years were characterised by sporadic conflict 
and instability originating in apparently irresponsible actions on the part of the 
Bahraini chieftain. It could not however have been otherwise as long as 
Muhammed bin Khalifah enjoyed any prerogatives as an independent sheikh. 
Having tolerated the idiosyncrasies of Sheikh Muhammed for over 
twenty years, the British reached the inevitable conclusion that a long-term 
settlement could only be effected by cutting the independent Chief down to 
size. Britain was therefore driven to depose Muhammed bin Khalifah and 
replace him with a more pliant relative whilst reserving some matters of state 
for British consideration only. In the process, the British established their right 
to veto and decide the succession of Bahrain and shattered the myth of 
independence for good. 
Conclusion. 
In 1820, the British had hoped that the system of independent Arab 
chieftains would promote responsible and 'civilised' government throughout 
the Gulf, but the net result of British intervention in the 'Utub quarrel was to 
re-establish Muhammed bin Khalifah as an oppressive and irresponsible, 
independent despot. Freed from the constraints of the Civil War Muhammed 
bin Khalifah grew increasingly despotic. Indeed, the Sheikh himself appeared 
to be the major obstacle preventing a return to regional peace and stability. 
Commodore Balfour, commander of the Persian Gulf Squadron in 1859, was 
moved to confess: 
'to being convinced that while a chief of so ill neglected a mind holds sway in 
Bahrein but little hope can be entertained of its affairs subsiding into a state of 
tranquility. 
Yet the Sheikh owed his position to Britain, since they alone had 
guaranteed his position against the refugees and the Wahhabis. As Jones 
noted: 
''Her Majesty's Government representatives in this quarter have ever been 
authorized to employ and have employed physical force to preserve existing relations and 
the integrity of Bahrain in particular. 
...To the British Government in short, the present Sheikh of Bahrein is indebted 
for the security of his possessions, and, in point of fact, for the Rulership as for the past 
sixteen years nothing but the uniform support we have given him has enabled him to keep 
his place against civil discord and repeated invasions. '2 
Muhammed bin Khalifah's actions thus reflected on the British 
themselves. Although Britain had by now abandoned the policy of non-
intervention, even direct involvement in the internal affairs of the Gulf was 
not enough to secure general tranquillity. As long as the British respected any 
aspect of Bahrain's independence however, Muhammed bin Khalifah could 
not be voluntarily induced to organise his affairs to Britain's satisfaction. 
Between 1859 and 1869 a near-continuous period of disagreements 
and conflict between Britain and Bahrain was occasionally punctuated by 
temporary periods of quiescence, but for the most part, the relationship 
lurched from one crisis to the next. With each successive crisis or flashpoint, 
Britain intervened more decisively, and incrementally withdrew the Sheikh's 
1 / BLOIORL R/15/1/179 Balfour/Jones 7/10/1859. 
21 BLOIORL R/15/1/179 Jones/Lytton, Constantinople 3/6/60. 
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sovereign prerogatives. The Sheikh on the other hand became a parody of 
himself, becoming proportionately more antagonistic as he was emasculated, 
giving the impression that he was committed to his own-self-destruction. The 
more Britain intervened, the more problematic Muhammed bin Khalifah 
became. By the mid-1860's, the relationship between Britain and Bahrain was 
self-defeating. The system of independent states prevented Britain from 
exercising a satisfactory level of imperial domination out of respect for a 
mythical independence and gave Muhammed bin Khalifah too much 
opportunity to undermine Britain's essential strategic interests. 
Muhammed bin Khalifah's nominal independence, which he owed to 
Britain, inhibited British involvement in the internal affairs of Bahrain, and 
lessened the impact of Britain's attempts to exercise its moral influence and 
persuasive abilities. Unless British counselling was supported by a display or 
threat of aggression, Muhammed bin Khalifah ignored it with machiavellian 
evasions. Captain Jones despaired that: 
'Advice however appears to be wholly lost on such a personage. '3 
The relationship fell into a predictable game of cat and mouse. When 
the British withheld Muhammed bin Khalifah the opportunity to exercise his 
sovereign rights in one quarter and placed him under duress, the Sheikh 
responded by asserting those rights that remained to him in the aftermath of 
any situation even more forcefully. All the time, Muhammed bin Khalifah 
refused point-blank to British interests, maintaining that he was independent 
and therefore sovereign over his own actions. This strictly accurate statement 
of the Sheikh's legal position was, however, lost on the British who 
interpreted it as contempt. Captain Jones offered an unflattering summary of 
his personal relationship with Muhammed bin Khalifah in the 1860's, noting 
that: 
'Throughout my intercourse with Sheikh Mahomed ben Khuleefa of Bahrein the 
same ungovernable fits of passion have possessed him, leading him to display at all times 
the most sovereign contempt for all and everything both in action and in speech. '4 
3 / BLOIORL R/15/1/166 Jones/Anderson 10/10/59 no.411. 
4 / BLOIORL R/15/1/166 Jones/Anderson 10/10/59 no.411. 
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Such was Muhammed bin Khalifah's pique that he even vented his 
spleen on the British, exploiting the hierarchical structure of the British 
administration to do so, and sought to actively encourage Persian and Turkish 
interest in Bahrain.5 
In September 1858, when Hajee Jasseem, Britain's Native Agent in 
Bahrain, commented on the Sheikh's unjust harassment of the banyans, 
Muhammed bin Khalifah threatened to expel the banyans outright and was 
quoted as saying that: 
'We do not want British subjects in our Territories. We are not afraid of them. We 
possess the Turkish flag. '6 
This deliberate offence only served to alienate Muhammed bin 
Khalifah even more, and encouraged the British to question their very 
commitment to him. It led Jones to conclude that: 
'however magnanimous the Gov. may be there are not wanting those who would 
annoy him until forebearance reaches a limit which is ruin to the actor. .. nothing in my 
opinion is more treacherous or more perilous to Bahrein and its ruler than the disposition 
and temperament of Sheikh Mahomed ben Khuleefa himself. 7 
Britain were thus led to withdraw their patronage of their own 
protege in an attempt to stabilise Bahraini affairs. The Government of 
Bombay authorised evacuation from Bahrain in May 1861. British evacuation 
from Bahrain constituted a renunciation of Britain's support for Muhammed 
bin Khalifah and destroyed the foundations on which the Sheikh derived his 
power. It was hoped that the Sheikh would prefer to reconcile himself with 
the British rather than face imminent dislocation and could thereafter be 
presented with a series of ultimata to which his agreement would be 
mandated. Jones accordingly informed Muhammed bin Khalifah that: 
'your having to the present moment met all advances towards a settlement with 
the same versatile spirit and indifference as last year now compels me to cease intercourse 
with Bahrein. '8 
However, the Sheikh reacted by showing complete disdain and 
disparaging Britain's ability to coerce a solution or impose its will on him. 
5 / See BLOIORL R/15/1/132 Kemball/Malet no.2 23/1/54 and no.7 2/7/53. 
6I BLOIORL R/15/1/166 Quoted in brief part of letter from Zitto bin Chuppurpooah and 
Fursoo ibn I. Rahmon, Natives of Sind dated 22nd Muharram 1275a.h. corresponding to 
2/9/1858 enclosed in Jones/Anderson no.319 Secret dated 21/9/1858. 
7 BLOIORL R/15/1/166 Jones/Muhammed bin Khalifah 10/10/59. 
8 / BLOIORL R/15/1/179 Jones/Muhammed bin Khalifah 20/5/61. 
119 
Britain had to impound two of the Sheikh's warships before a reconciliation 
could be effected. 
As an integral step to rapprochement with the British, Muhammed bin 
Khalifah was induced to sign a perpetual treaty of friendship- the terms of 
which specifically elucidated the rights of British Protected Subjects in 
Bahrain. This agreement known as the Friendly Convention -see appendix 
two- represented the first step towards Britain's assumption of formal 
protectorate over Bahrain. The Convention elicited a series of binding 
pledges from the Sheikh as to his future behaviour in return for Britain 
guaranteeing the Sheikh against maritime aggressions. It was agreed that the 
only hope for the future of the Gulf lay in formally reasserting Britain's 
authority. Jones noted that: 
'under no condition other than as a British colony or under a British Government 
can the internal repose of the Island and territory be secured or tranquility maintained in 
the Persian Gulf -If the latter is to be its future state- binding treaties if not stringent 
ones, can only be effective with dispositions so imputive and wayward as those of its 
present chief 
Muhammed bin Khalifah was therefore obliged to bind himself to 
renounce all maritime aggressions, to quickly report and redress all instances 
of piracy by those within his jurisdiction and to accept British arbitration in all 
future disputes. Thus Convention thus provided a recognisable and legal 
foundation for future British intervention and retribution in instances when 
the terms of this contract were breached. In addition the Friendly Convention 
appeared to have put a stop to the Sheikh's attempts at an independent 
foreign policy. Whilst this was not expressly mitigated by the Convention, the 
pledge to recognise British arbitration in cases of dispute could be used to 
inhibit any further attempts to make Bahrain a dependency of Persia or 
Turkey. 
Nonetheless, Muhammed bin Khalifah disregarded the Convention to 
pursue further oppressions. The sheikh encouraged both Persia and Turkey to 
'7 BLOIORL R/15/1/179 Jones/ Anderson no.348 10/11/60. 
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renew their claims over Bahrain in the hope that he could evade his 
responsibilities for punishing piracies and oppression. Perversely the Sheikh 
accepted the suzerainty of both Persia and Turkey simultaneously to protect 
himself from the British. Britain however disregarded the sheikh's sovereignty 
in order to secure its hegemony. Captain Jones informed Muhammed bin 
Khalifah that his initiatives were meaningless: 
7 told him that if he hoisted the colours of every nation under the sea, we should 
still consider him the independent chief of Bahrein and as such hold him responsible and 
punish him promptly for any act of aggression by sea or any act of himself or his Tribe that 
tended to disturb the peace of the Gulf. ' , 0 
This forthrightness however exposed the emptiness of Bahrain's 
independence. In reply, Muhammed bin Khalifah fulminated that: 
'You insist upon my being an independent Chief said the Sheikh, in reply (and I 
confess to my mind somewhat pertinantly) and you refuse to give me the slightest power to 
act for myself, or settle my own disputes 
Not only did Jones empathise with the Bahrain Chief, but the 
Secretary in Bombay, Rawlinson, was also led to doubt the legality of 
Britain's position. He communicated these uncertainties to Jones, indicating 
that: 
7 am not sure that we should be entitled to resent the voluntary surrender of the 
Sheikh's independence. ' n 
A two-fold change in British diplomacy thus occurred. The sheikh had 
pushed his relationship with the British to breaking point and Britain 
subsequently committed itself to removing him. Equally, the British 
determined to protect their power and hegemony in the Persian Gulf from the 
obduracy of the independent chiefs, by compacting formal agreements that 
retrospectively legitimised those rights that the British enjoyed. When the 
Bahraini Sheikh laid waste to Doha and Wakrah in 1867, the British resolved 
to inflict an exemplary punishment. A ship arrived in the Gulf in May 1868 to 
seek retribution, but since it had forgotten its ammunition, it was not until 
July 1868 that pressure could be bought to bear on the Sheikh. In the 
meantime however, Muhammed bin Khalifah had fled Bahrain to avoid 
'7 BLOIORL R/15/1/179 Cruttenden/Jones reply 21/7/60. 
"/ ibid. 
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responsibility. An agreement was therefore concluded with the brother of 
Muhammed bin Khalifah under the terms of which it was agreed that the 
incumbent Sheikh had forfeited the Chieftainship of Bahrain and Muhammed 
bin Khalifah was outlawed. Britain thus recognised Sheikh Ali bin Khalifah as 
the sole and legitimate ruler of Bahrain, and settled the question of Bahrain's 
independence. 
In thus deposing and outlawing the incumbent and formally sovereign 
chief of Bahrain, Britain shattered the myth of independence and heralded the 
beginning of a new phase of colonial domination. Privately the British had 
never accepted that the Al Khalifah or any other Arab chieftain were truly 
independent. Since they owed their independence to Britain, it was 
unthinkable that this independence would bestow upon the Al Khalifah the 
right to contradict British interests. Yet over the course of the nineteenth 
century, the independence of Bahrain had become an obstacle that prevented 
Britain from protecting its essential strategic interests. The British persevered 
with the system of independent states up to the point at which its own proxies 
turned around and attempted to use there independence to undermine British 
hegemony. When this happened, Britain withheld the contentious aspects of 
sovereignty from the Sheikhs and imposed its own interests by force. The 
sovereign rights of the independent chiefs to conduct their own foreign 
policy, generate their own income through oppression, and wage war on their 
enemies were thus incrementally ignored, until ultimately Britain disregard the 
sovereign right of the Al Khalifah to elect their own leader. 
This encroaching British activity in the Persian Gulf, and specifically in 
Bahrain affairs can be evidenced in Britain's variable attitude to the question 
of succession. In 1834 Bahraini tribal elders agreed to the replacement of the 
Amir, Khalifah bin Sulman, by his son, Muhammed bin Khalifah without 
interference or outside pressure. In 1842 Britain tacitly supported the 
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derobing of Abdullah bin Ahmed and having conveyed this information to 
interested parties, in practice guaranteeing the success of any coup de main, 
subsequently watched impassively as Muhammed bin Khalifah assumed 
individual control. In 1869 Isa bin Khalifah was appointed Sheikh by the 
British Resident, given Muhammed bin Khalifah's unsatisfactory behaviour, 
and the break down of local authority. The nineteenth century history of 
Bahrain was thus a history of an unworkable experiment in independence that 
was defined by the opposition of Britain's and Bahrain's strategic interests. 
Since the independence of the Al Khalifah did not safeguard British 
hegemony, the system of neutral benevolence was thus replaced by a tendency 
for Britain to exercise more direct control of Bahraini affairs. Once the myth 
of independence had been shattered and the British began to create the formal 
foundations for its exercise of power, the relationship was inevitably 
reconstructed as a protectorate under'the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts and an 
Order-in-Council. And thus, one of the more bizarre features of Bahraini 
history emerges. Although Britain spent the best part of the nineteenth 
century proclaiming Bahrain's mythical independence, Bahrain was granted its 
independence for a second time in 1971, although it had never formally been 
colonised. 
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A Brief Chronology of Bahrain/British Relations. 
1808 Exchange of letters Britain and Rahman bin Jabir. 
1810 Treaty of Friendship with Rahman bin Jabir. 
1814 Nepean considers offering Sultan of Musqat possession of Bahrain in 
return for assistance against Qawasim. 
1816 Sultan of Muscat attacks Bahrain, but intervention of the Resident 
reduces effect. Treaty of Friendship signed. 
1820 Bahrain made a party to the Treaty of Peace. 
1822 Treaty of Shiraz, [Bruce & Governor of Fars]. 
1826 Attempted British mediation between Abdullah bin Ahmed and Rahman 
bin Jabir. 
1828/9 Imam of Muscat threatens invasion. British mediate. 
1830 Bahrain submits to Wahhabis. 
1835 Al b in ' Ali & Al Bu 'Ainain migrate to Abu Dhabi. 
1839 Threatenened Egyptian invasion of Bahrain. Sheikh offers sovereignty 
to British Government and is refused. Bahrain subsequently submits to 
the Egyptians. 
1840 British consider occupation of Bahrain. 
1842/3 Civil War. Muhammed bin Khalifahh, Isa bin Tareef & Bashir bin 
Rahman defeat Abdullah bin Ahmed. Abdullah bin Ahmed expelled. 
Muhammed bin Khalifah becomes sole Sheikh. 
1853 Threatened invasion of Bahrain by Faysal. 
1855 British mediate between Al Khalifah & Al Abdullah leading to 
agreement in May. 
1856 Agreement of 1856 binds the Sheikh to hand over slaves to British 
vessels of war, and to seize and deliver boats which carry them, to the 
British Resident. 
1860 Muhammed bin Khalifah extends invitation for protection to both 
Persia and Turkey. 
1861 Friendly Convention with Independent Ruler of Bahrain. 
1867 Muhammed bin Khalifah and Zaid lay waste to Qatar. 
1868 Muhammed flees Bahrain. 'Al i becomes sole Sheikh. 
1869 Muhammed bin Khalifah attacks Bahrain, and is joined by Muhammed 
bin Abdullah and Nasir bin Mubarak. 'Al i killed. Muhammed bin 
Abdullah declares himself. Sheikh. Muhammed bin Khalifah denounced 
by British as a pirate and deported to India. Isa bin 'A l i appointed 
Amir. 
1880 Agreement of 22.11.1880. 
1892 Exclusive Agreement of 13.3.92. 
1898 Isa bin 'Al i binds himself to prohibit arms dealing through Bahrain 
territory. 
1900 First Appointment of British Political Assistant for Bahrain. 
1913 First Order in Council passed under Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, but not 
applied until 1925. 
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Translation of the General Treaty with the Arab Tribes of the 
Persian Gulf, 18201 
In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate! 
Praise be to God, who hath ordained peace to be a blessing to his creatures. 
There is established a lasting peace between the British Government and the 
Arab tribes, who are parties to this contract, on the following conditions:-
Article 1. 
There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy by land and by sea on the part 
of the Arabs, who are parties to this contract, for ever. 
Article 2. 
I f any individual of the people of the Arabs contracting shall attack any that 
pass by land or sea of any nation whatsoever, in the way of plunder and piracy 
and not of acknowledged war, he shall be accounted an enemy of all mankind 
and shall be held to have forfeited both life and goods. And acknowledged is 
that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by government against 
government; and the killing of men and taking of goods without proclamation, 
avowal, and the order of a government, is plunder and piracy. 
Article 3 
The friendly (literally pacificated) Arabs shall carry by 
land and sea a red flag, the breadth of the white in the 
border being equal to the breadth of the red, as 
represented in the margin, (the whole forming the flag 
known in the British Navy by the title of white pierced 
red), and this shall be the flag of the friendly Arabs, and 
they shall use it and no other. 
Article 4. 
The pacificated tribes shall all of them continue in their former relations, the 
exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall 
no fight with each other, and the flag shall be a symbol of this only and of 
nothing further. 
Article 5. 
The vessels of the friendly Arabs shall all of them have in their possession a 
paper ( Register) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the 
name of the vessel, its length, its breadth, and how many Karahs it holds. And 
they shall also have in their possession another writing (Port Clearance) 
signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the 
owner, the name of the Nacodah, the number of men, and the number of 
arms, from whence it sailed, at what time, and to what port bound. And i f a 
British or other vessel meets them, they shall produce the Register and the 
Clearance. 
1/ Aitchison (1932) p!92. 
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Article 6 
The friendly Arabs, i f they choose, shall send an envoy to the British 
Residency in the Persian Gulf with the necessary accompaniments, and he 
shall remain there for the transaction of their business with the Residency; and 
the British Government, i f it chooses, shall send an envoy also to them in the 
like manner; and the envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the Chief 
in the paper (Register) of their vessels, which contains the length of the 
vessel, its breadth, and tonnage; the signature of the envoy to be renewed 
every year. Also all such envoys shall be at the expense of their own party. 
Article 7. 
I f any tribe, or others, shall not desist from plunder and piracy, the friendly 
Arabs shall act against them according to their ability and circumstances, and 
an arrangement for this purpose shall take place between the friendly Arabs 
and the British at the time when such plunder andpiracy shall occur. 
Article 8. 
The putting men to death after they have given up their arms, is an act of 
piracy and not of acknowledged war; and i f any tribe shall put to death any 
persons, either mahomedans or others, after they have given up their arms, 
such tribe shall be held to have broken the peace; and the friendly Arabs shall 
act against them in conjunction with the British, and, God willing, the war 
against them shall not cease until the surrender of those who performed the 
act and of those who ordered it. 
Article 9. 
The carrying off of slaves, men, women, or children from the coasts of Africa 
or elsewhere, and transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the 
friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature. 
Article JO. 
The vessels of the friendly Arabs, bearing their flag above described, shall 
enter into all the British ports and into the ports of the allies of the british so 
far as they shall be able to effect it; and they shall buy and sell therein, and i f 
any shall attack them, the British Government shall take notice of it. 
Article 11. 
These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all tribes and persons, who 
shall hereafter adhere thereto in the same manner as to those who adhere to 
them at the time present. End of Articles. 
Issued at Ras-ool- khyma, in triplicate, at mid-day, on Saturday, the twenty-
second of the month of Rabe-ul-Awal, in the year of the Hegira one thousand 
two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the eighth of January one 
thousand eight hundred and twenty, and signed by the contracting parties at 
the places and times under written. 
Signed at Ras-ool-khyma at the time of issue by 
(Signed) W. Grant Keir 
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Major General. 
(Signed) Hassun bin Rahman, 
Sheikh of Hatt and Faleia, formerly of Ras-ool-khyma. 
(Signed) Razib bin Ahmed, Sheikh of Jourat al Kamra. 
(An exact Translation) (Signed) T.P. Thompson, Captain 17th Light 
Dragoons & Interpreter 
Later signed by Sheikhs Shakbout, Hassun bin AH, Saeed bin Syf, Sultan 
bin Suggur, Syud Abdool Jalel bin Syud Yas, Suleman bin Ahmed bin 
Khalifa, Abdoola bin Ahmed bin Khalifa, Rashid bin Hamad, Abdoolla 
bin Rashid. 
Ratified by the Governor General in Council on 2nd April 1820. 
Translation of Preliminary Treaty with the Shaikh of Bahrain 
1820.2 
In the name of God the merciful, the compassionate! 
Know all men there hath come into the presence of general William Grant 
Keir the Saeed Abdool Jalil, Vakil on the part of Shaikh Suleiman bin Ahmed 
and Abdulla bin Ahmed and there have passed between the General and the 
said Abdool Jalil, on the part of the above named the following stipulation. 
Article 1. 
That the Sheikhs shall not permit from henceforth, in Bahrein or its 
dependencies, the sale of any commodities which have been procured by 
means of plunder and piracy, nor allow their people to sell anything of any 
kind whatsoever to such persons as may be engaged in the practice of plunder 
and piracy; and i f any of their people shall act contrary hereto, it shall be 
equivalent to an act of piracy on the part of such individuals. 
Article 2. 
That they shall deliver up all the Indian prisoners who may be in their 
possession. 
Article 3. 
The Sheikhs Suleiman bin Ahmad and Abdulla bin Ahmad shall be admitted to 
the terms of the general Treaty with the friendly Arabs. End of Articles. 
2I Aitchison (1932) p233. 
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Issued at Sharjah in triplicate on Saturday, the twentieth of the month of 
Rabeool Thany, in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and 
thirty five, corresponding to the fifth of February one thousand eight hundred 
and twenty. 
W.G. Keir, Major General 
The above articles accepted by me in quality of Vakeel of the Shaikhs named 
above. 
Saeed Abdool Jalil bin Saeed Yasal Tabatabee. 
Translation of an agreement proposed by His Highness Housein 
Ali Mirza through his Minister Zekee Khan and discussed 
between him and William Bruce Esquire Resident of Bushire on 
the 8th August 1822.3 
Preamble. 
As the arrangement and settlement of the affairs of subjects are entrusted to 
Kings and their Governors and the prosperity of States depends upon the 
unanimity and friendship existing between Governors of adjoining Provinces 
for this purpose the States of Great Britain and Persia entered into terms of 
amity and good understanding that the subjects of each and their Forces might 
enjoy tranquillity and prosperity. The Governors of Provinces adjacent had 
maintained this appearance and had rested satisfied with and actually fulfilling 
them. Two years previous to this, it became necessary to suppress the 
piratical acts committed by the Joassmes for which purpose troops arrived 
from India in the Gulf of Persia and a few acts were committed by them 
aroneously which did not accord with the good understanding existing with 
this State, in consequence of which His Royal Highness Hoosein Ali Mirza, 
Kajar, deemed it advisable for the good of his Government, to make known 
these acts of misunderstanding to the Government appertaining nearest to his 
own that they might beware of what had occurred, that some explanations 
might be offered for His Royal Highness to act upon and for this reason 
deputed Mirza Baugher, Military Secretary, to proceed to Bombay at the time 
that the Honorable Mount Stuart Elphinstone was Governor of it and of its 
dependencies, and he came to an explanation with the Honorable the 
Governor who showed every wish and inclination to preserve the good 
understanding and for which purpose deputed Captain Bruce as the 
Honorable company's Resident to Bushire as the Government Agent after he 
arrived, his Royal Highness directed his attendance and on the 8th of August 
1822, or 20th Zilkad, 1237, Higree at Shiraz, came to an amiable discussion 
and understanding with Mohammed Zekee Khan, Serdar and Minister of Fars, 
the following engagements being agreed upon-
First- That the Vekeels 'of the two States, Mohammed Zekee 
Khan, and Captain Bruce, shall enter into friendly discussions and 
explanations tending to cement the ties of amity and good understanding 
between the Governors of the adjacent countries. 
3/BLOIOLRR/15/l/183 ppl36-140. 
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Second. The island of Bahrein which has always been 
subordinate to the province of Fars and its possessors, the Bein Attabee 
Arabs, who have of late been unruly and disobedient and had applied to the 
commanding Officer of the British Forces for a distinguishing Flag: this Flag i f 
it has been granted, to be withdrawn and no assistance to be rendered to the 
Bein Attabee Arabs hereafter. 
Third. That such losses as the inhabitants of and 
Charrack may have suffered by mistake in the destruction of their vessel to be 
restored in kind, i f forthcoming; i f not, made good in money by the 
Government Vekeel 
Fourth- With regard to Captain Bruce's residency at Bushire, 
as the Government of Persia had applied for his removal and another Officer 
to be appointed, supposing him to have committed acts contrary to the good 
understanding between the States, which he having cleared up to the 
satisfaction of his own Government while Mirza Baughir was present, and 
shown every inclination to forward the interests of the two Serkars, the 
Government deem it advisable to re-nominate him to his former duties and 
His Royal Highness, being equally convinced, has preferred his being re-
appointed to any other officer and requested it accordingly. 
Fifth- The British Forces who had taken a position in an Island 
on the Coast of Persia and who had been requested to withdraw- As the 
Honorable the Governor of Bombay has expressed a wish for their being 
allowed to remain for a time for the sake of appearances and benefit arrived 
thereby.- In consequence His Royal Highness deemed it advisable for the 
safety and tranquillity of the Gulf and to preserve the intercourse free for the 
term of five years and until a Naval Equipment sufficient for the purpose can 
be gradually collided on the following conditions-
First. That i f previous to the five years His Royal Highness 
should have a Naval Force sufficient to insure the tranquillity of the Gulf and 
will pledge himself to that effect, the British Forces to withdraw on the 
assurance and plague being given. 
Second. That i f the British Forces should be considered too 
great, with a view to economy they are to be reduced and an equivalent force 
to be furnished by his Royal Hinges under the orders of an Officer to encamp 
on the Island and to attend to their wishes and desires. 
Third. The British and Persian Forces to take possession on 
any Island on the coast of Persia, the climate of which may be found to be the 
best and which His Royal Highness may nominate and deem advisable. 
Fourth. Should His Royal Highness during the period the 
British Troops are stationed in the Gulf require the services of one or two 
Cruizers from the Station to proceed to any of the Islands or Ports of Persia, 
they are to be furnished, and particularly so on the present occasion when an 
expedition is in contemplation against Bahrein to reduce it to obedience, His 
Royal Highness promising after the service may be over to dismiss the vessels 
with proper honor and respect Should the vessels be required beyond the 
period of Forty days, provisions and necessaries to be supplied by His Royal 
Highness, in failure of which the vessels are at liberty to return. 
appendix two 
Fifth. Such vessels and stores as His Royal Highness may 
require, to be at liberty to purchase then on any of the Ports o India without 
molestation from the Government. 
The Vekeels of the two Governments who now exchange 
engagements agree to present them to their respective Governments for their 
consideration and approbation and for the guidance of each other in the case 
of change of Governors. 
30th August 1822 
/Signed/ Will Bruce, Resident with his seal in Persian 
The Persian Version having the seal of Mohammed Zekee with his 
autograph. 
/Signed/ William Bruce 
30th August (Ls/S.) 
Friendly Convention between Jones & Mohamed bin Khuleefa 
dated 31st May 1861.4 
Preliminary- Considering the tribe disorders which arise and are perpetrated 
from maritime aggression in the Persian Gulf, I , Sheikh Mohamed bin 
Khuleefa, independent ruler of Bahrein, on my part and on that of my heirs 
and successors, in the presence of the Chiefs and elders who are witnesses to 
this document, do subscribe and agree to a perpetual Treaty of peace anf 
friendship with the British Government, having for its object the advancement 
of trade and the security of all classes of people navigating or considering 
upon the coasts of this sea:-
Article 1. 
I recognise as valid and in force all former Treaties and Conventions agreed 
to between the Chiefs of Bahrein and the British Government, either direct or 
through the mediation of its representatives in this Gulf. 
Article 2. 
I agree to abstain from all maritime aggressions of every description, from the 
prosecution of war, piracy, and slavery by sea, so long as I receive the 
support of the British Government in the maintenance of the security of my 
own possessions against similar aggressions directed against them by the 
Chiefs and tribes of this Gulf. 
Article 3. 
In order that the above engagements may be fulfilled I agree to make known 
all aggressions and depredations which may be designed, or have taken place 
at sea, against myself, territories, or subjects, as early as possible, to the 
British Resident in the Persian Gulf as the arbitrator in such cases, promising 
Al Aitchison (1932) pp 234-236. 
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that no act of aggression or retaliation shall be committed at sea by Bahreinis 
or in the name of Bahrein, by myself or others under me, on other tribes, 
without his consent or that of the British Government, i f it should be 
necessary to procure it. And the British Resident engages that he will 
forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for every injury 
proved to have been inflicted, or in the course of infliction by sea upon 
Bahrein or upon its dependencies in this Gulf. In like manner, I , Shaikh 
Mahomed bin Khuleefa, will afford full redress for all maritime offences, 
which in justice can be charged against my subjects or myself, as the ruler of 
Bahrein. 
Article 4. 
British subjects of every denomination, it is understood, may reside in, and 
carry on their lawful trade in the territories of Bahrein, their goods being 
subject only to an ad valorem duty of 5%, in cash or in kind. This amount 
once paid shall not be demanded again on the same goods i f exported from 
Bahrein to other places: and in respect to the treatment of British subjects and 
dependants they shall receive the treatment and consideration of the subjects 
and dependants of the most favoured people. All offences which they may 
commit, or which may be committed against them, shall be reserved for the 
decision of the British Resident, provident the British Agent located at 
Bahrein shall fail to adjust them satisfactorily. In the like manner the British 
Resident will use his good offices for the welfare of the subjects of Bahrein in 
the ports of the maritime Arab tribes of this Gulf in alliance with the British 
Government. 
Article 5. 
These articles of alliance shall have effect from the date of ratification or 
approval by the British Government. 
Done at Bahrain, this twentieth day of Zilkad, in the year Hegira 1277, 
corresponding with the thirty- first day of May 1861. 
Felix Jones, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. 
Seal of Sheikh Mohamed, Ruler of Bahrein. 
Seal of Ali bin Khuleefa, Brother of the Amir. 
Elders of Bahrein and Witnesses to this Convention 
Hamad bin Muhamed, 
Khuleefa bin Muhamed, 
Ahmed bin Mubarak. 
Approved by the Governor General in Council 9th October 1861. 
Ratified by the Government of Bombay 25th February 1862. 
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Agreement comprising the terms of reconciliation between Sheikh 
Mahamed bin Khuleefah, the Chief of Bahrein and Sheikh 
Mahomed bin Abdullah, son of the late Abdullah bin Ahmed ex-
Chief of that island.1 
Translation-Praise be to him who has given Peace to be the means of 
adjusting the affairs of mankind and of promoting harmony among all classes of 
his creatures and peace and reverence be to our Lord Mahomed and to his 
honoured descendents. 
These words of sincerity and truth are inscribed in evidence of the 
reconciliation that has been affected between Sheikh Mahomed bin Khuleefah 
Cheif of Bahrein for himself and his adherents the Al Khuleefah on the one side 
and Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah for himself and his adherents the Al 
Abdullah on-the other on the following terms: 
that from this day hence forward Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah 
on the part of himself and his relatives does renounce all pretension to the 
Chiefship of Bahrein and does bind himself to abstain for the future from any 
designs upon that island and its dependencies and in consideration hereof 
Sheikh Mahomed bin Khuleefah on the part of himself and his relatives does 
engage to assign certain villages +(meaning the plantations belonging thereto) 
situated on the island as communicated below to be held by Sheikh Mahomed 
bin Abdullah and he Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah shall be at liberty to 
appoint an agent on the spot to receive the income derived from the said 
villages who shall be treated with all the consideration due toward him- This 
clearly understood by the present engagement that Sheikh Mahomed bin 
Abdullah shall break off his present connection with Ameer Fysul in all matters 
militating against the observance of his obligations above recorded and further 
that he shall not receive under his protection (collect around him) the enemies 
of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khuleefah or the subjects of that chief who may secede 
from Bahrein with hostile intentions against him as for example the A l Bin Ali 
the Jalahimah and others like them- The above agreement having been 
concluded through the mediation of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf 
with general interests of Peace and more especially with a view to the 
maintenence of good order and tranquility at sea it is further agreed between 
the contracting parties that i f any differences shall arise affecting its observance 
such difference shall be submitted to the arbitration of the same functionary and 
on no account shall recourse be had to violence or arbitrary procedure until his 
decision shall have been declared and i f his decision should not be satisfactory 
to both parties then must the question at issue be referred to the British 
Government in Bombay who will determine what course should be adopted for 
the vindication of this agreement and no more- The villages referred to in the 
body of this document are Sitrah and Sar, and Jezirah and Juddum and Houz 
ibn Buttye, the last including seven villages/plantations rzt Jidah, Zirkal, 
Jammud, Barboorah, Moeyderet, Ukkur, and Farsiyah- and of the above God is 
the best witness and agent. 
V BLOIOR R/15/1/132 Enclosure to Kemball to Anderson dated 26/5/1855, at sea. 
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-Executed and writted on the seventh day of the auspicious month 
Rumzan in the year 1271. 
[24 May 1855] 
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Record of British Personel with Responsibility for Bahrain 1815-1927. 
Resident- Bushire. 
Lt William Bruce 
James Dow i/c 
Asst Surgeon John Tod 
Capt John MacLeod 
Capt Henry Hardy 
Col Ephraim Gerrish 
Stannus 
Capt David Wilson 
i/c Lt Samuel Hennell 
David Anderson Blane 
Lt Samuel Hennell 
Surgeon Thomas MacKenzie 
Mjr James Morrison 
Lt Sameul Hennell 
Col Henry Dundas 
Robertson 
Lt Arnold Burrowes 
Kemball 
Capt Arnold Burrowes 
Kemball 
Capt James Felix Jones 
Capt Heibert Frederick 
Disbrowe 
Lt- Col Lewis Pelly 
Lt Col Edward Charles Ross 
Lt Col William Francis 
Prideaux 
Lt Col Samuel Barrett Miles 
Lt Col Adelbert Cecil Talbot 
Capt Stuart Hall Godfrey 
Mjr James Hayes Salder 
James Adair Crawford 
Mjr James Hayes Salder 
Col Frederick Alexander 
Watson 
1808- 7/1822 
11/19-1/20 
5/20- 1/22 
i/c 1/22- 3/22 
12/1822- 8/23 
[died] 
10/23-12/23 
12/23- 1/27 
1/27- 3/31 
3/31-1/32 
1/32- 6/34 
6/34- c 7/35 
acting 
c 7/35-10/35 
10/35- 10/37 
5/38-3/52 
officating 1/42-
4/43 
4/43-12/43 offg 
3/52- 7/55 
10/55-4/62 offg 7/56 
4/62-11/62 offg 
11/62-10/72 acting to 
3/63 offg to 4/64 
10/72-3/91 actgto77 
5/76-77 acting 
1885- 10/86 acting 
1891-5/93 offg to 
8/91 
5/93-6/93 ic 
6/93- 7/93 acting 
7/93-12/93 ic 
12/93- 1/94 acting 
1/94- 6/97 
Natve Agent- Bahrain. 
Assoo 
Rahman 
Chundoo 
Khoodel 
Merza Mahomed Ally 
5/27-4/29 
5-7/29 
7/29-4/33 atg 
to 6/31 
1/34 
5/37-11/38 
Hajee Jasseem 
Hajee Ibrahim 
Ahmed Abdoo Rasool 
K.W. 
2/49-60 
actg3/62 
10/74 
8/77 
Mohammed Rahim Saffir 1897-1900 
Political Agent- Bahrain. 
Lt Col Malcolm John Meade 
Lt Col Charles Arnold 
Kemball 
Mjr Percy Zachariah Cox 
6/97-4/1900 offg to 
3/98 
4/1900- 4/04 acting 
4/04-12/13 offg 
tol0/05 
Mjr Arthur Prescott Trevor m 9 ~ 5 / 1 0 i c 
John Francis Gaskin 
Capt Francis Belville 
Pirdeaux 
Capt Charles Fraser 
Mackenzie 
Mjr Stuart George Knox 
Capt David L R. Lorimer 
2/1900-10/04 
PAic 
10/04- 5/09 
5/09-11/10 
11/10-4/11 
4/11-11/12 
Records of the Native Agent in Bahrain are incomplete. Dates refer to verifible mention in records and not period of 
service.During the 1870, the First Political Assistant at Bushire, Charles Grant was want to spend a period of the year in 
residence at Bahrain. Information for table taken from Tuson(1978) & records of BLOIOR. 
